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Cambodia’s economy continues to experience extraordinary growth. This economic growth 
is significant for Cambodians, as eventually more and more people will benefit from its 
occurrence. However, with significant growth there is a need to ensure that Cambodian 
citizens of all classes, but especially the poor, enjoy an equitable share. This growth also 
comes with significant changes, thus the public sector, private sector and civil society must 
be prepared to navigate those changes. Cambodia’s move from a low-income economy to a 
lower-middle income economy represents a significant change in how the Royal Government 
of Cambodia will obtain revenue and puts increased emphasis on tax collection.
These changes are exciting for businesses; however, they can be daunting as well. Increased 
regulations signify more headaches for business, particularly small and medium enterprises. 
However, continuing to develop and enforce a strong legal framework will create a vibrant 
level playing field for all businesses.
It has come to the point where bureaucratic processes and informal payments are 
constraining Cambodia’s businesses. It is our hope that new initiatives such as increased 
online mechanisms for business registration, tax payment, and import and export 
procedures will make these inhibitors a thing of the past. This report strongly recommends 
that more mechanisms be available online wherever possible. The legal framework must 
also be strengthened to be in line with Cambodia’s World Trade Organization obligations and 
provide the necessary backbone for business to operate effectively. We have long advocated 
for the passage of a law to protect whistleblowers, and we continue to recommend that the 
draft law on the protection of reporting persons be promulgated. In addition, we recommend 
the passage of the draft law on competition to ensure a level playing field. Enforcement of 
the current legal framework supporting business integrity is difficult to measure because 
there is very little information that is publicly available.  We call for greater transparency 
on enforcement measures, as we believe that knowing about enforcement of the law deters 
others from violating the law. 
The private sector must also share in some of this burden to level the playing field and 
create fair competition for all businesses. Domestic companies are encouraged to develop 
strong internal mechanisms to increase their business integrity and compliance with the 
law. We recommend our Corporate Integrity Systems as a mechanism to equip companies 
with the policies and procedures they need to combat corruption. Larger companies should 
demonstrate greater transparency on their websites or in their annual reports about their 
organisational structure, tax payments, and revenue in Cambodia. Additionally, companies 
should make clear statements about their stance on corruption. Foreign companies must 
also be transparent about their activities in Cambodia in their annual reports and on 
their websites, and must remain compliant with Cambodia’s laws. Business associations 
and chambers of commerce have long provided meaningful and valuable services to 
their members and we hope they will lead the way in promoting business integrity. Lastly, 
businesses who have not registered should become legally compliant and register with the 
Ministry of Commerce. While this is daunting for many, many businesses, it is the first step 
in creating a cleaner and less vulnerable business.  
To our friends in civil society, we hope you will work with the public and private sectors to 
promote a level playing field for all businesses. Civil society can work with the private sector to 
promote responsible, sustainable businesses, as both sectors have important values and ideas 
that can be exchanged with one another. Additionally, civil society must maintain its watchdog 
role and bring to light abuses in the private sector that have had detrimental effects on society. 
This is and always will be a valuable role for both media and civil society organisations.
It is our hope that this report will provide valuable and meaningful information and actions 
for moving forward. The intention of the report was never to place blame on one sector or 
institution, but rather to provide a baseline for Cambodia’s progress and growth. By taking 
an honest look at where we are, we can clearly see how we can move forward together. We 
hope that by increasing accountability, transparency and integrity in all sectors, Cambodia 
can level the playing field and experience growth that creates equal opportunities for all 
members of its society.
Foreword
Kol Preap
Executive Director
Transparency International Cambodia
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The Role of Business Integrity  
in Fighting Corruption
Cambodia’s private sector is rapidly changing as the country continues to experience 
steady economic growth and development. Not all changes are positive, however, as 
companies continue to be incentivized to engage in corruption. The private sector is 
frequently viewed as the supply side of corruption, making informal payments to facilitate 
permits, licenses, and tax declarations. Private sector actors who refuse to engage in 
corruption may face an uneven playing field in terms of establishing their business and 
claiming a share of the market.
Improving business integrity counters both the supply and demand side of corruption. 
This report seeks to further understand the factors and actions that can increase business 
integrity. In order to address both sides of the corruption equation, this report analyzes:
1) The overall business environment created by the public sector;
2) The private sector’s interaction with the public sector;
3) The private sector’s behavior;
4) Civil society’s role in checking both sides.
This report first examines the legal framework within which the private sector operates 
and how the relevant laws are enforced. That only tells part of the story, however. The 
report also examines the private sector’s behavior in terms of the policies and procedures 
they implement and the standards they choose to uphold.
Figure 1: BICA Assessment Tool
Prohibiting commercial bribery
Prohibiting laundering of 
proceeds of crime
Private
Sector
Efforts
Public 
Sector
Efforts
Civil
Society
Efforts
Broader checks and balances
Integrity Management Auditing & assurance
Transparency & disclosure Stakeholder engagement
Prohibiting collusion
Whistleblowing
Accounting, auditin & disclosure
Prohibiting undue influence
Public procurement
Prohibiting bribery 
of public officials
Tax & customs
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Transparency International defines business integrity as, “adherence to globally-
recognized ethical standards, compliance with both the spirit and letter of the law 
and regulations, and promotion of responsible core values (i.e. honesty, fairness, and 
trustworthiness)”.1 This puts business integrity in line with corporate social responsibility 
in that private companies must go beyond the law to promote healthier employees and a 
stronger community. It is not sufficient simply to stay just within the bounds of the law; 
companies must pursue the values the law was created to protect and promote. Thus, the 
analysis looks beyond what is required by the law to further understand the commitment 
of companies to business integrity.
Why BICA?
Transparency International’s Business Integrity Country Agenda (“BICA”) assessment is 
the first of its kind in Cambodia. BICA is the first report to analyse the overall business 
integrity environment in a given country by looking at the efforts of all stakeholders and 
it is the first comprehensive assessment aimed at reducing private sector corruption. The 
report creates a body of evidence and a benchmark to assess future progress in private 
sector anti-corruption movements. Additionally, BICA informs a collective action agenda 
that will be adopted based on the findings of the report. Other studies in Cambodia have 
analysed the business environment from an investment or development perspective and 
may be informative. These include:
• Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
• Transparency International Cambodia’s NISA Study
• World Bank Enterprise Survey
• World Bank Ease of Doing Business
The BICA Assessment is designed to encourage all stakeholders to use the findings and 
collaborate to improve business integrity and level the playing field. 
Methodology
Transparency International’s Business Integrity Country Agenda (BICA) Assessment of 
Cambodia seeks to explore in detail the level of business integrity within the country 
by analyzing three thematic areas: public sector, business sector, and civil society. Each 
of these three areas is broken down to a set of indicators and each indicator is further 
broken down to a number of sub-indicators (Figure 1). 
Scores are generated for each indicator and sub-indicator. There are a total of 15 indicators 
and 51 sub- indicators (Figure 2). Nine indicators and 31 sub-indicators relate to the public 
sector. Five indicators and 17 sub-indicators relate to the private sector, while 1 indicator 
and 3 sub-indicators relate to civil society.
BICA Assessment 2017
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17
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3
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Figure 2: Evaluation Framework
BICA Researchers used a combination of desktop research and expert interviews to 
assess all indicators and sub-indicators. The aim of BICA is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis framework that assesses efforts by all stakeholders to improve business integrity, 
therefore the legislative framework, law enforcement capacity, and strategies and policies 
undertaken by public, private and non-governmental organisations were evaluated. 
“Qualitative research examines events or experiences in context from the perspective 
of the individuals experiencing the phenomena. This approach allows the researcher to 
explore the depth and complexity of a phenomenon, identify and describe its components 
and their relationships, and develop a picture of the whole that can enhance and guide 
practice and future research…qualitative research is appropriate to address such questions 
as, “What is going on here? How can I explain it?” or to describe how people live or cope 
with particular experiences”3.
A key feature of BICA is that the researchers’ assessments and observations must be 
discussed and validated by multiple stakeholders. A National Advisory Group (NAG) 
was created for this purpose that includes 9 organisations involved in the banking, 
agriculture, tourism, legal, non-governmental and public sectors. As stated in TI’s 
“Conceptual Framework for BICA Assessment, Supplement #1: Assessment Process”4, 
the role of NAG is to: 
• advise on research, for the selection or addition of thematic areas, and outreach;
• identify expert interviewees and workshop attendees;
• offer feedback on BICA findings (possible causes and solutions options);
• identify strategic recommendations;
• discuss ways to transform strategic recommendations into an operational 
reform agenda;
• strengthen the legitimacy and buy-in of key stakeholders into the BICA process and 
the final report;
• promote BICA findings and recommendations; and
• build up the project partner’s network and contacts.
The inaugural NAG meeting was held early in the BICA assessment process to gather 
feedback on the research methodology.
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Scores of BICA Indicators
As mentioned, each indicator and sub-indicator is scored. The scoring system is based 
on internationally-accepted standards set forth in international conventions, such as 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”) of 2004,5 the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“UNCATOC”) of 2003, and 
others. To facilitate the research, TI prepared a set of questions for each sub-indicator. 
Each indicator and sub-indicator6 is evaluated on a scale of 5 (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100). 
There are only 5 possible scores. In order to facilitate communication, the scores were 
visualized through common and easily understood “traffic light” symbols (Table 1) 
Table 1: Framework of BICA Indicator Scores
Scale of 
colors
Colors Comment
0
25
50
75
100
The corresponding answer to the scoring question is “Not at all”. The evidence collected for the assessment 
criteria indicates that requirements are not met at all.
The corresponding answer to the scoring question is “To a limited extent”. The evidence collected for the 
assessment criteria indicates that few requirements are met or that many requirements are met to a 
limited extent.
The corresponding answer to the scoring question is “To some extent”. The evidence collected for the 
assessment criteria indicates that roughly half of the requirements are met or that most requirements are met to 
some extent.
The corresponding answer to the scoring question is “Largely”. The evidence collected for the assessment 
criteria indicates that many of the requirements are met or most requirements are met to a large extent.
The corresponding answer to the scoring questions is “Fully”. The evidence collected for the assessment criteria 
indicates that all, or almost all, of the requirements are met.
Scores were given and validated through a comprehensive process that included: 
• Desktop Research: TI researchers conducted secondary research in response to
each of the questions listed for every sub-indicator. They gathered information from 
Cambodian laws, Cambodian newspapers, reports from international institutions, 
local NGOs, private companies, and local media publications, such as the Cambodia 
Daily and the Phnom Penh Post. They also collected numeric data from the World 
Bank Development Indicators, World Bank Enterprise Survey, Statistics Bureau 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan)Transparency International, 
and other sources. A summary of the findings is provided in the comments section 
below each indicator.
• Expert Interviews: Where there was insufficient secondary data available to
attribute a score, researchers conducted expert interviews. The experts were 
asked precise questions and in some cases were asked to evaluate some of the 
sub-indicators on the scale of 5. 
• Draft of the scores: Following the desktop research, expert interviews, and the
references for each sub-indicator7, TI Cambodia generated the first draft of scores 
along with the comments related to each indicator and sub-indicator. TI Cambodia 
researchers based the proposed scores on their holistic analysis of the aggregated 
data. Given the necessarily qualitative nature of the assessment, a certain degree of 
subjectivity is inevitable but TI Cambodia took steps to control for bias and to ensure 
that scores were well-informed. 
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• Feedback from NAG: TI Cambodia shared the indicator scores and comments with
NAG members to increase the credibility of the BICA report and to ensure the 
objectivity of  the results. Two workshops were held to discuss each indicator 
and validate each score. Some of the scores were modified based on the 
recommendations and feedback of NAG members.
• Final scores attribution: TI researchers revised the scores and comments based on
NAG input and finalized the report. An independent expert reviewer edited and 
provided additional comments on the report. 
It should be emphasized that some indicators have scores of 0 (red color) because there 
is no applicable law, (i.e. law on lobbying). While provisions in other laws or regulations 
may be relevant, the BICA researchers only scored indicators were specific laws to the 
indicator were promulgated. The 0 score simply means there is no clear legislative 
framework related to the indicator, not that the private or public sectors are completely 
inactive in that area. 
The idea of the scoring is not to cast a negative light on stakeholders or suggest that 
they lack willingness to improve the business integrity in Cambodia. On the contrary, 
the purpose of scoring is to launch continued discussion and engagement with 
relevant stakeholders and to highlight where more efforts are needed in terms of law 
enforcement and legislative initiatives. A scoring metric creates benchmarks to assess 
continued progress, and TI Cambodia will conduct a follow-up BICA assessment in the 
future. 
“BICA National Advisory 
Group Meeting” was 
hosted on 12 September 
2017 to revise BICA 
indicators results and 
receive comments from 
NAG members.
Timeline
The BICA Assessment began with the BICA Workshop at the Transparency International 
Secretariat in early February 2017. The first NAG meeting was held on 1 March 2017, and 
research commenced shortly after that. The second NAG meeting was held in September 
to discuss the initial scores, and a follow-up NAG meeting was held in early October. The 
report was sent to the Expert Reviewer, Megan Karsh, from 18-20 October 2017. 
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The Role of Business Integrity  
in Fighting Corruption
The Business Integrity Country Agenda (BICA) Initiative
The Business Integrity Country Agenda (BICA) Initiative is a new initiative designed by 
Transparency International (TI) aimed at reducing corruption and improving the overall 
business environment. The Initiative consists of two parts: 1) a research assessment of 
the business integrity environment in Cambodia resulting in the BICA report; and 2) 
the application of the report’s key findings to inform an operational agenda aimed at 
improving the business integrity environment through collective action. BICA is based on 
the idea that all sectors, including government and civil society, working collaboratively is 
the most effective method for reducing corruption in the business environment.
The BICA assessment forms the basis for the report. The assessment examines the three 
main stakeholders of the business integrity environment: public, private, and civil society. 
The stakeholders are divided and analysed using 15 thematic areas and 51 indicators. 
The assessment scores and applies a colour code to each indicator and thematic area 
according to stakeholders’ compliance with the scoring question. The score range is as 
follows: red (0) for an answer that corresponds to “not at all,” orange (25) for an answer 
that corresponds to “to a limited extent,” yellow (50) for an answer that corresponds 
to “to some extent,” yellow-green (75) for an answer that corresponds to “largely,” and 
green (100) for an answer that corresponds to “fully.”
The BICA assessment report is the first of its kind to be conducted in Cambodia and 
will serve as a benchmark for further progress in the overall business environment. The 
assessment was carried out by Transparency International Cambodia. The assessment is 
based on evidence gathered from multiple sources: legislation, relevant reports, primary 
data, stakeholders, and interviews with experts. The process included the selection of a 
National Advisory Group (NAG) representing a cross-section of the private sector, public 
sector, and civil society. The NAG was responsible for validating the research scores and 
informing the recommendations that will be utilised to initiate collective action activities. 
Results of the BICA Assessment for Cambodia
Public Sector
The public sector portion of the BICA analysis addresses the role and capacity of national 
and local governance institutions to promote a transparent and fair business environment 
and identifies specific areas for reform and reference. The public sector analysis 
includes the thematic areas of anti-corruption, bribery of public officials and commercial 
bribery, money laundering, economic competition, undue influence on political parties, 
protection for whistleblowers, accounting and auditing standards, public tendering and 
tax administration. 
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Public Sector Assessment
1.1 Prohibiting Bribery of Public Officials
1.1.1 Laws prohibiting bribery of public officials
1.1.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting bribery of public officials
1.1.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting bribery of public officials   
1.2 Prohibiting Commercial Bribery
1.2.1 Laws prohibiting commercial bribery 
1.2.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting commercial bribery
1.2.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting commercial bribery
1.3 Prohibiting Laundering Proceeds of Crime
1.3.1 Laws prohibiting laundering proceeds of a crime
1.3.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting laundering proceeds of a crime
1.3.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting laundering proceeds of a crime
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1.4 Prohibiting Collusion
1.4.1 Laws prohibiting collusion 
1.4.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting collusion 
1.4.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting collusion 
1.5 Whistleblowing
1.5.1 Whistleblower laws
1.5.2 Enforcement of whistleblower laws
1.6 Accounting, Auditing, and Disclosure
1.6.1 Accounting and auditing standards
1.6.2 Enforcement of accounting and auditing standards
1.6.3 Professional service providers
1.7 Prohibiting Undue Influence
1.7.1 Laws on political contribution
1.7.2 Enforcement of public disclosure of political contribution
1.7.3 Laws on lobbying
1.8 Public Procurement
1.8.1 Operating environment
1.8.2 Integrity of contracting authorities
1.8.3 External safeguards
1.9 Taxes and Customs
1.9.1 Operating environment
1.9.2 Integrity of tax administration authorities
1.9.3 External safeguards
1.6.4 Beneficial ownership
1.7.4 Enforcement and public disclosure on lobbying
1.7.5 Laws on other conflicts of interest
1.7.6 Enforcement and public disclosure of other conflicts of interest
1.8.4 Regulations for the private sector
0 - Not at all            25 - To a Limited Extent            50 -  To Some Extent            75 - Largely           100 - Fully
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Public Sector Assessment Summary
Business integrity in the public sector is analyzed along three fronts, i) the legislative and 
policy framework within which the public and private sector operate; ii) the enforcement 
of this framework by the public sector; and iii) the capacity for enforcement in the public 
sector and compliance in the private sector. 
The first step in assessing the degree to which the public sector is contributing to business 
integrity in Cambodia is identifying the relevant legal frameworks. Cambodia acceded to 
the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) in 2004 and the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (“UNCAC”) in 2007.8 The domestic legislative framework regulating business 
generally aligns with international standards, and includes the 2010 Anti-Corruption Law 
(“ACL”). Cambodia has also promulgated laws relating to the bribery of public officials, 
commercial bribery, money laundering, accounting and auditing, undue influence, public 
procurement and tax administration. The legal framework is not comprehensive, however. 
Several laws are either in draft stage or have yet to be drafted. Additionally, enforcement 
of existing laws has been problematic and there have been very few convictions or 
sanctions. Below is an overview of the public sector assessment based on the current legal 
framework, as well as the institutions responsible for implementation and enforcement. 
Bribery of both national and foreign public officials is prohibited by the ACL, which 
incorporates by reference the Cambodian Criminal Code. Commercial bribery is also 
prohibited, although more explicitly by the Criminal Code than the ACL. The Anti-
Corruption Unit (“ACU”) is the leading organisation with the mandate to investigate 
corruption complaints. The ACU is intended to interact with the Cambodian courts, which 
have jurisdiction to try cases9.  Research indicates that the ACU actively promotes internal 
solutions to corruption issues with the private sector rather than publicly pursuing public 
prosecution. There have been very few prosecutions for bribery in Cambodia. However, 
since the formation of the ACU, only one high level official has been convicted of bribery.10 
The number of corruption claims made to the ACU have decreased since the unit’s 
formation, which some attribute to the public’s decreasing faith in its independence.11 As 
for the courts, there is little information available about judicial capacity, and the judiciary 
is frequently criticized for corruption.12
Cambodia has adopted strong legislation, prakas (proclamations), and declarations 
concerning anti-money laundering  and financing of terrorism, and a multi-stakeholder 
group coordinates the Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) Strategy for Cambodia. While the 
legal framework is relatively strong, Cambodia suffers from a weak judicial system and 
“endemic corruption” that constrain effective enforcement.13 The Cambodian Financial 
Intelligence Unit (“CAFIU”) has publicly stated that it lacks capacity to investigate money 
laundering and reporting institutions.14 Only one AML case has been publicly prosecuted 
to date.15 
A very limited legal framework exists regarding collusion, despite many highly publicized 
cases of collusion in natural resource industries. There is a draft Law on Competition, 
which will address establishing output restriction quotas and sharing or dividing markets, 
but the law is not in force as of this report’s publication. Despite minimal legislation 
and enforcement against collusion at the national level, there has been progress at the 
commune level. Local law enforcement has enforced blacklists against colluding bidders.16
Despite minimal legislation and enforcement against 
collusion at the national level, there has been progress 
at the commune level. Local law enforcement has 
enforced blacklists against colluding bidders.
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Currently, Cambodia lacks a whistleblower law, although there is a draft law on the 
protection of reporting persons.17 Additionally, the Cambodian Criminal Code and the 
ACL criminalize malicious or false denunciations, which arguably deters whistleblowing18. 
The ACL has a confidentiality clause for individuals who report corruption, however, it 
is unclear whether that provision would protect whistleblowers whose information is 
deemed malicious. 
Cambodia’s accounting and auditing standards are inline with international IFRS 
standards.19 Domestic accountants, tax consultants and auditors receive a fairly high 
level of training and are considered professional competent and largely independent. By 
law, companies must document financial transactions, although some small to medium 
sized enterprises (“SMEs”) are exempted. All companies must register with the General 
Department of Tax (“GDT”) and the Ministry of Commerce (“MoC”), who aid in enforcing 
auditing and assurance standards. TI Researchers were unable to obtain information 
about sanctions applied by the National Accounting Council (“NAC”) or the Kampuchea 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Auditors (“KICPAA”) and ACU investigations 
into accounting and auditing standards are not publicly available. Obtaining beneficial 
ownership information is problematic under the current auditing and assurance 
framework as company registration is sporadic and information company’s do disclose 
upon registration with the MoC is not publicly available as of 2015. 
Cambodia has a very limited framework for laws on undue political influence, including 
conflicts of interest, and the concept of “lobbying” is still very new.  The 2013 Amendments 
to the Law on the Elections of Members of the National Assembly (“LEMNA”) does contain 
provisions on  reporting requirements for political parties, including submitting a bank 
statement prior to the election20.  This statement is not made publicly available.  While 
anonymous contributions are not banned outright, all parties must report their source 
of income and expenses during the campaign21.  There is very little information available 
about the NEC’s enforcement of this new requirements and the NEC is the only entity with 
oversight. 
Currently, there is no legislation on lobbying and none being drafted. 
Conflicts of interest are currently only addressed in the Procurement Law, however 
further provisions are forthcoming in the Draft Competition Law. Under the prakas related 
to the Law on Procurement, there is a section on conflicts of interest22 in the procurement 
process that defines the term and mandates that any bidder or staff of the procurement 
process must disclose a potential conflict of interest.  Sanctions, including criminal 
penalties, are available under the law. There is no oversight body to monitor conflicts of 
interest at this stage. 
There is a substantial legal framework to regulate public procurement processes in both 
domestic and international contexts. Two operational manuals (prakas) contain bidding 
forms and sample contracts, while the Law has several anti-corruption clauses. The public 
procurement process limits the opportunity of decision-makers to use their discretion 
during the tender process.23 All contracting authorities and their employees must submit 
to the ACL, and corruption in public procurement is monitored by the ACU24.  Internal 
monitoring and auditing bodies operate independently under the law, but they do not 
function consistently across all levels of government. Companies are permitted to tender 
only if they have sign a statement prohibiting fraud, corruption and collusion25.  While 
the law provides incentives for companies who implement anti-corruption policies, these 
incentives are not applied in practice.26 Sanctions include monetary penalties, being 
blacklisted and criminal penalties. 
The General Department of Taxation (“GDT”) and the General Department of Customs and 
Excise (“GDCE”), have made strong efforts in recent years to improve their transparency 
and service delivery27.  Despite this, requests for informal payments continue to 
contravene tariff regulations and a high level of bureaucracy can impede private sector 
productivity and business integrity.28 The most recent version of the Automated System 
for Customs Data (“ASYCUDA”) has been implemented in 54 major customs branches29 
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and offices, which covers approximately 87% of trade activities, and helps to limit in-
person interactions, thereby limiting opportunities for informal payments. Additionally, 
there is no formal mechanism for monitoring and evaluating GDT and GDCE staff. Tax 
incentives are available under Qualified Investment Projects (“QIPs”) projects and as 
incentives to companies who register with the  Cambodian Stock Exchange (“CSX”). 
However, multinational enterprises and QIPs do not disclose their tax deals publicly. 
While the MoC and the GDT are working to encourage companies to register and be tax 
compliant, many companies are reluctant to do so, which causes compliant companies to 
be unfairly disadvantaged compared with unregistered businesses.   
Recommendations for the Public Sector:
Short-Term Recommendations:
• Increase online and one-window public services to reduce bureaucratic burdens and
costs associated with doing business in Cambodia, particularly for SMEs, and 
coordination, responsiveness and accountability from relevant Ministries.
• Make business registration with the MoC and GDT publicly available, including access
to information on beneficial ownership.
• Expedite the promulgation of key pieces of legislation to increase transparency and
accountability such as the draft law on competition; the draft law on the protection of 
reporting persons; the draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses 
and provide operational benchmarks for both public and private sectors that are in 
line with international standards. 
• Engage with business associations and civil society to draft laws regulating
e-commerce, consumer protection and commercial contracts as well as laws on 
environmental impacts assessments and building codes.
• The Cambodian Stock Exchange should provide training and encourage companies,
particularly SME’s, in corporate governance systems and business integrity. 
• Strengthen monitoring and oversight of national and sub-national public procurement
to assure public notification of contracts and transparency in the outcomes of 
awarding contracts on national level bids.
• Disclose all Qualified Investment Projects (QIPs) publicly and provide a list of
beneficiaries and aggregated data regarding tax incentives and other benefits 
under the QIP program.
• Disclose all official tariffs levied by the GDCE, the GDT, and other officials publicly,
and sanction any officers who request informal tariff payments. Disallow changes to 
tariff schemes without timely notification to the public.
On 11 August, TI 
co-organized a 
training with FASMEC 
on “Transparency in 
Accounting Standard for 
SMEs” to its members. 
Around 80 participants 
attended the event, all of 
who are business owners 
and members of FASMEC.
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• Introduce mechanisms to submit complaints directly to the GDT and GDCE
and provide a mechanism for anonymous reporting by companies of any issues or 
wrongdoing involving customs and tax officers.
• Consistently and transparently enforce new amendments to the Cambodian tax
code, under the 2017 Financial Management Law, across sectors to avoid creating 
a non-competitive business environment. Provide more training, incentives and 
support for businesses to become tax compliant.
• Increase the consistency of enforcement of the GDT of penalties provided under the
Tax Code and ensure due process and appeal mechanisms for each application of a 
penalty by the GDT.
• Clearly define Micro, Small and Medium businesses according to the number of
employees and revenues across relevant Ministries in order to have clearer 
expectations for compliance with taxation and business registration requirements. 
• Increase  the independence of the NCAC and the ACU by amending the legislation
regarding the appointment of NCAC members and the ACU leadership as clearly 
stated in the TI-NISA Cambodia report. 
• Continue to create an environment of integrity within the ACU and a better
relationship between the ACU and the public by i) providing an anonymous 
mechanism for complaints against ACU investigators (i.e. through the online 
complaint mechanism administered by the Ministry of Civil Service) ii) making public 
the general process by which ACU investigations result in charges of corruption iii) 
providing mechanisms of due process and appeal for public allegations of corruption.
• Publish the terms and conditions of the MoUs that the ACU has signed with
Cambodian and international companies and other ministries.
• Strengthen the effectiveness of CAFIU in investigating and sanctioning instances of
suspected money-laundering and in coordinating and consistently reviewing 
financial institutions.
Long-Term Recommendations:
• Improve transparency from the MEF and National Assembly regarding the annual
budget and fiscal deficit by the public and timely release of an annual independent 
audit of the national budget by the national audit authority.
• Increase the independent functioning of the ACU and the Office of the Inspector
General from the Executive and Government Ministries.
• The GDT should include more positive reinforcement for tax compliant companies,
particularly SMEs, while continuing to work with the business associations and 
organise workshops and training on business registration and on tax compliance.
• The MoJ and RGC should amend legislation in order to require Judges at all levels of
court to publish their decisions and reasoning and ensure that standards are 
established for open court proceedings.
• Publish and implement a clear and transparent mechanism for the recruitment and
appointment of judicial officials and judges, including clear and well-publicised 
recruitment and appointment criteria.
• Innovate and implement a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating staff
performance at GDT and GDCE for consistency and transparency in order improve 
good and fair working practices of taxes and customs’ officers.
• Strengthen anti-corruption legislation within the Law on Taxation and the Law on
Customs and link the Anti-Corruption Law with tax and customs regulations through 
a sub-decree.
• Create an online legal database of all laws in Cambodia, with translation of all new
laws into English, in order to increase awareness of the legal framework in Cambodia 
and the ability of civil society organisations to monitor legal developments and their 
implementation.
• The RGC should update existing laws that are outdated, or run counter to anti
corruption objectives in consultation with the private sector and civil society (Anti-
Corruption Law, Law on Commercial Rules and Commercial Register, Investment 
Law, Law on Corporate Enterprises, Law on Customs, Law on Taxation).
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• The RGC should amend the Law on Commercial Enterprises to include legal
obligations for companies to establish a code of conduct and anonymous 
whistleblowing channels. 
“Compliance Best
Practice Training”, 
organised by TI Cambodia 
to approximately 130 
companies interested in 
corporate compliance 
systems.  
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Private Sector Assessment Summary
Most multinational and joint ventures establish clear strategies against corruption but 
very few domestic companies have integrity management policies in place. The legal 
framework in Cambodia does not require companies to adopt a code of conduct or to 
publicly disclose their anti-corruption policies. The domestic financial sector, including 
microfinance institutions, tends to have the most established and publicly available 
policies and procedures, including ethic codes. The ACU has offered substantial support 
to the private sector, by publishing a guide for companies to avoid corruption and signing 
MoUs with over 80 private sector entities30.  
Companies’ internal auditing and assurance structures depend on their size. A survey 
of members of the Federation of the Association of Small and Medium Enterprises in 
Cambodia (“FASMEC”) found that 38% of SMEs had some internal control system.31 All 
legally registered domestic companies are required by law to document every financial 
transaction. Most domestic companies, however, are not large enough to finance an 
internal audit structure and over 50% of SMEs do not have an official audit committee. 
External auditors are licensed, but the quality of firms can vary greatly. For larger 
companies, financial statements are typically externally audited every year, but there is 
no law requiring an independent assessment of internal audit structures.32 Companies 
that are large enough to submit to external auditing often do disclose their audit 
reports. Very little information is available about whether companies undergo voluntary 
Business Sector Assessment
2.1 Integrity Management
2.1.1 Provision of policies
2.1.2 Implementation of practices
2.1.3 Whistleblowing 
2.2 Auditing and Assurance
2.2.1 Internal control and monitoring structures 
2.2.2 External audit
2.2.3 Independent assurance
2.3 Transparency and Disclosure
2.3.1 Disclosure of anti-corruption programs
2.3.2 Disclosure of organisational structures 
2.3.3 Disclosure of country-by-country operations
2.4 Stakeholder Engagement
2.4.1 Stakeholder relations 
2.4.2 Business-driven anti-corruption onitiatives 
2.4.3 Collaboration 
2.5 Board of Directors
2.5.1 Oversight 
2.5.2 Executive remuneration 
2.1.4 Business partner management
2.3.4 Additional disclosures 
2.5.3 Conflicts of interest 
0 - Not at all            25 - To a Limited Extent            50 -  To Some Extent            75 - Largely           100 - Fully
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independent assurance on the design and implementation of their anti-corruption 
programs. Cambodian companies are largely not in the habit of disclosing their anti-
corruption programs, operations, or organisational layouts, in large part because this 
information is not legally required. 
TI researchers conducted a survey of 47 companies (31 domestic and 16 international), 
based on the information available on their websites (following TRAC Methodology, see 
Appendix A). The purpose of the survey was to understand typical practice in terms 
of disclosing assurance information. Of the 31 domestic companies, only 4 shared 
any information about their anti-corruption programme or compliance with domestic 
laws, compared to 12 out of 16 foreign companies. This implies that either domestic 
companies do not have these policies or that they largely prefer to keep policies an 
internal matter rather than to publicly disclose them. By contrast, foreign companies 
and multinationals operating in Cambodia usually have more advanced and publicly 
available anti-corruption policies and procedures. 
The main avenue for private sector companies to engage in multi-stakeholder initiatives 
on anti-corruption is through the business associations for domestic companies and 
Chambers of Commerce for foreign companies. The European Chamber of Commerce 
(“EUROCHAM”) has a tax committee and works with authorities to provide free 
information to its members.33 The Government-Private Sector Forum (“GPSF”) is an 
initiative between the Prime Minister and his Cabinet and the business community that 
facilitate a series of working group committees that coordinate between the business 
associations, the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce and the Cabinet. Despite these 
initiatives and the improvement of several ministries, there is a need to establish better 
mechanisms for communication between businesses and the ministries, including 
allowing for more public services online.
The Law on the General Statute of Public Enterprises (“LPE”) and the Law on Commercial 
Enterprises (“LCE”) outline the roles and responsibility of the Board of Directors in 
Cambodian companies, requiring that directors and officers act honestly and make 
decisions in good faith.34 Additional regulations outline the corporate governance 
requirements and the establishment of mechanisms to protect shareholder rights.35 
According to the research, while regulations are in place to govern the conduct of the 
Board of Directors, very little information is publicly available regarding implementation 
of these regulations. However, based on expert interviews, these regulations are largely 
followed where applicable. 
Recommendations for the Private Sector:
Short-Term Recommendations:
• The chambers of commerce and business associations should disclose information
about the benefits of engaging closely with the ACU to their members, particularly, 
the importance of protection for potential whistleblowers who report to the ACU. 
• Business associations and chambers of commerce should continue to organise
training in business integrity and corporate practices (i.e. codes of conduct, codes 
of ethics, anti-corruption reporting channels, anti-corruption policies), including 
working closely with the ACU to establish and train in best practices.
Cambodian companies are largely not in the habit of 
disclosing their anti-corruption programs, operations, 
or organisational layouts, in large part because this 
information is not legally required. 
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• Business associations should identify benchmarks for business integrity in each
industry and acknowledge and reward companies who achieve them.
• Domestic and international companies should establish anonymous, and protected
lines for whistleblowing to encourage employees at all levels to report cases of 
corruption or other wrongdoing. 
• Companies should ensure compliance by registering with the MoC and the GDT.
Business associations should encourage the process and assist whenever possible. 
• Domestic companies, particularly SME’s, should increase business integrity by
adopting internal policies and procedures, including codes of conduct, whistleblowing 
channels and other anti-corruption measures.
• Companies who are required to conduct annual independent audits should conduct
audits and publicly release their audited annual reports.
• Companies should disclose anti-corruption policies and activities in their annual
reports and on their websites.
Long-term Recommendations:• Business associations should encourage companies to understand the value of clean
accounting practices and the value added by professional accounting services.
• Companies should require anti-corruption due diligence of their partners and
suppliers and create a database of clean companies. 
• Private companies should offer more channels to report cases of corruption. Reporting
exclusively to ACU is insufficient.
• Chambers of commerce should promote and advise ministries on drafting and
promulgating relevant legislation, including the draft law on the protection of 
reporting persons, the draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses 
and the draft law on competition and update existing laws which are outdated or run 
counter to anti-corruption objectives. This should be in consultation with the private 
sector and civil society.
• Business associations should promote a dialogue on challenges incurred in doing
business in Cambodia to remove the shame associated with reporting and talking 
about problems in doing business.
“Business Integrity and
Introduction to Tax 
Compliance”, organised 
by TI Cambodia with the 
Association of Cambodian 
Recruitment Agencies 
(ACRA) to around 
37 participants in 
Phnom Penh. 
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Civil Society Assessment Summary
Civil society organisations (“CSOs”) have a strong presence in Cambodia, yet very few 
CSOs have historically emphasised business integrity. Recently, there have been some 
initiatives focused on business integrity and responsible business conduct. In 2008, 40 
domestic and foreign companies supported PACT Cambodia’s Clean Business Initiative, 
which called for a commitment by companies to avoid bribery and the sale of fake and 
unsafe products, and to operate with fairness and integrity and to promote reforms to 
the business environment.  In 2014, Transparency International Cambodia launched its 
Business Integrity Program (“BIP”), which focuses on creating greater transparency, 
accountability, and integrity in the business environment.36 Specifically, the BIP works 
closely with companies to improve their internal structures to combat corruption. 
Finally, the Cooperation Council for Cambodia (“CCC”) launched their Responsible 
Business Conduct Program in 2017, which seeks to promote civil society and private 
sector interaction.37  
CSOs have not historically served as watchdogs for the private sector around business 
integrity issues, but they have the capacity to do so. CSOs operating in Cambodia are 
well placed to serve as watchdogs, as many have done so for the public sector. The 
watchdog role is extremely important since Cambodia’s media is largely unable to play 
an accountability role as many media outlets are aligned with the ruling party. As of 
2017, 7 of 10 TV channels are owned by individuals associated with the ruling party 
who are either government employees or are advisors to the government.38 Other 
media outlets are disinclined to cover corruption issues because they are supported 
by advertisements from private companies. Independent journalists do exist and many 
maintain high standards of journalistic integrity, but they face significant challenges. 
In late 2017 all radio stations broadcasting Radio Free Asia and Voice of America were 
prohibited from broadcasting these programmes, coinciding with the closure one of the 
largest English-language newspapers for unpaid taxes without due process.39 Some CSOs 
previously involved in human rights reporting and advocacy may be able to hold private 
companies accountable for business integrity. They have previously taken companies to 
task for human rights violations, specifically concerning land rights. 
Recommendations for Civil Society:
Short-Term Recommendations:• Civil society organisations should engage with independent media outlets to provide
training in investigating and documenting private sector corruption and business 
integrity issues.
• Civil society organisation should continue to work closely with the private sector on
initiatives that promote business integrity.
• Civil society should acknowledge and reward businesses who actively promote anti
corruption and business integrity.
0 25 50 75 100
Civil Society Sector Assessment
3.1 Broader Checks and Balances
3.1.1 Independent media
3.1.2 Civil society engagement in business integrity
3.1.3 Civil society monitoring of business integrity 
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• Civil society organisations should actively monitor and report on the private sector
with an eye towards anti-corruption and business integrity.
Long-Term Recommendations:
• Civil society and the private sector should coordinate to promote initiatives that
increase business integrity, including legislation and policy changes that increase 
integrity, transparency and accountability.
• Civil society should consult and engage the private sector and public sector on the
passage of key pieces of legislation to increase transparency and accountability, such 
as the draft law on competition; the draft law on the protection of reporting persons 
and the draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses. 
• The media should continue to identify independent sources of income for their outlets,
in order to maintain and promote independence.
• The media should increase investigation and reporting on business integrity.
What YOU Can Do?
• Encourage your favourite companies to publish their Codes of Conduct and Anti
Corruption Policies on their websites.
• Support companies who publicly state that they are against corruption and are
known to uphold their commitment to business integrity.
• Report acts of corruption to the ACU.
Anti-corruption Glossary
Thompson & Walker, 1998
TI-BICA Supplement 1: Assessment, 2016, p.12 
UNCAC, Articles 14, 23.
TI-BICA Supplement 2: Indicators, 2016
TI-BICA Supplement 2: Indicators, 2016
WTO Cambodia; UNODC, UNCAC Ratification
ACL, 2010. Chap. 6. 
The Phnom Penh Post, 6 January 2012, 
The Phnom Penh Post. 5 January 2017.
TI-NISA Cambodia 2014, p. 6.
US State Department, 2017 
The Phnom Penh Post, 5 October 2015
The Cambodia Daily, 11 January 2017.
Expert Interview 13.
The Phnom Penh Post, 30 June 2016
ACL, 2010. Art. 17. 
KPMG, 2016
LEMNA 2013, Article 37 
LEMNA 2013, Article 37
Procurement Manual 1, Reg. 4.7. 
Procurement Manual 1, Reg. 6.2.1
Procurement Manual 1, Reg. 4.3.5. 
Procurement Manual 1, Reg. 14.2.2.  
Procurement Manual 1, Reg. 17.1
EUROCHAM, 2017
WBG Enterprise Survey, 2016
ASYCUDA Project 
US State Department Investment Climate, 2017
FASMEC Survey, 2017 
FASMEC Survey, 2017
EUROCHAM,Tax Committee, 2017
LCE, 2005, Article 127
Prakas No. 013, Article 3
The Cambodia Daily, 24 September 2008.
CCC Strategy 2016-2021
Reporters Without Borders, 2016
HRW, 2017
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
BICA Assessment 2017
30
Country Context
Population & Geographic Context
Cambodia is geographically situated in the southwest of the Indochinese peninsula, 
bordering Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. It has a total land mass of 181,035 square 
kilometres and a 443km coastline along the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodia has twenty-five 
provinces including the capital city of Phnom Penh, which is a special administrative area 
that is administered at the same level as the other provinces. The UN Statistics Division 
reported that the population of Cambodia is over 15.8 million as of 2016.40 Cambodian 
youth under 30 represent 65.3% of the population41 and 21.4% of the Cambodians live 
in an urban environment.  
Political Context
In the last century, Cambodia experienced dramatic changes in its social, economic 
and political systems. After decades as a French Protectorate, Cambodia emerged 
as an independent state in 1953 with a market oriented economy and a democratic 
government led by the former King, Norodom Sihanouk. Samdech Sihanouk retained 
power until a military coup overthrew the government in 1970. The following years were 
defined by both civil war between the US backed Khmer Republic government and the 
Khmer Rouge militia, and the US led bombing campaigns along the border with Vietnam. 
The Khmer Rouge gained control of Cambodia from 1975 and 1979 and forcibly imposed 
a communist programme of nationalisation and agricultural self-reliance based on the 
Maoist economic and social model of the Great Leap Forward. This policy resulted in an 
estimated 1.5 to 2 million deaths from starvation, overwork, lack of medical treatment 
and harsh punishments imposed by the regime including extra-judicial executions of 
suspected traitors.43 Vietnam took control of Cambodia in January of 1979 to stabilise 
the situation, but the fighting continued between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese 
backed government until 1998, although in the 1990s it was mostly isolated along the 
Thai border.
The actions of the Khmer Rouge decimated the social and economic structures of 
Cambodia. Many families were relocated from their original homes and land during the 
regime and were separated from each other as a result. Internally displaced people 
lacked the means to produce their own food or make a livelihood, and their traditional 
familial support systems had disappeared. All enterprises were abolished, and any use 
of currency was banned under the regime; therefore, the market economy had to be 
rebuilt from scratch. The Vietnamese and Soviet backed government, the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989) rebuilt the Cambodian economy based on a policy 
of centralisation, relying on state-owned enterprises, communes, and family owned 
businesses but continued conflict and high levels of poverty continued.44  
Due largely to international pressure following the end of the Cold War, the single-party 
system established in 1979 was phased out by the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 
1991. This lead to the creation of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (“UNTAC”)45 
who sponsored democratic elections in 1993 and facilitated the adoption of a national 
constitution guaranteeing a liberal multi-party democratic system.46 Currently, Cambodia 
functions as a constitutional monarchy. The historical importance of the monarchy was 
retained in the Constitution and guarantees national independence, territorial integrity 
and respect for citizens’ rights and freedom.47 
There have been five national elections since the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, 
which ended over two decades of civil war and foreign occupation. An election is held 
after the end of the legislative term of the National Assembly and the Senate, every five 
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or six years,48 respectively.  There have been four general elections in Cambodia, for the 
National Assembly, since the UNTAC mandated elections in 1993 (1998, 2003, 2008, 
2013) and two for the Senate after the opening of the first Senate session in 1999 (2006, 
2012). The upcoming elections in 2018 will be the first time that the National Assembly 
and the Senate are elected within the same year. Administrative elections at the district, 
commune and municipal level are held with regular terms of five years.49 
Currently, the Cambodian People’s Party (“CPP”) holds the majority in the National 
Assembly and the Cambodian National Rescue Party (“CNRP”) was the largest 
opposition party prior to the dissolution of the party on 16 November 2017.50 The current 
Prime Minister, has served in this role since 1985, as the sole Prime Minister since 1998, 
and as Member of Parliament for Kandal province.51 The CPP has maintained control 
of the National Assembly since 1993 through a majority or coalition, but not without 
controversy. Cambodia’s most recent National Assembly election in 2013 was widely 
seen as procedurally sound but marred by a pre-election environment of intimidation 
and threats against the opposition party and voters alike, and marked by irregularities.52
Since the 2013 national elections, there have been significant restrictions placed on 
the former leading opposition party and its leadership. The former leader of the CNRP 
has been living in self-imposed exile in France since November 2015 after a warrant for 
his arrest was issued over charges of defamation levied seven years prior.53 A directive 
banning his entry into Cambodia was issued in October 2016,54 but was rescinded in June 
2017.55 In February and July 2017 the National Assembly passed new amendments to 
the Law on Political Parties that ban party leadership from having criminal convictions, 
resulting in the resignation of the former leader of the CNRP56 and restricting his future 
participation in the political arena.57 A new president of the CNRP was elected on 2 
March 2017,58 but was subsequently arrested and detained on 3 September 2017 on 
charges of treason.59 As of October 2017, several lawsuits have been filed demanding the 
dissolution of the CNRP and the redistribution of its seats among other parties in the 
National Assembly.60 On 16 October 2017 the National Assembly approved amendments 
to Cambodia’s election laws to allow for the majority of CNRP seats to go to a royalist-
aligned party.61 The continued detention of the leader of the CNRP has inspired an 
exodus of party members. Currently, twenty-six opposition MPs are out of the country 
and seven MPs have charges against them.62 As of 16 November 2017 the Supreme 
Court of Cambodia ruled to dissolve the CNRP and ban 118 of the CNRP’s senior officials 
from participating in politics for five years.63 The National Assembly seats formerly 
held by the CNRP are being redistributed among the other parties using provisions 
provided under LANGO,64 with FUNIPEC standing to gain the most seats.65 The situation 
is developing as of the writing of this report.
The actions of the Khmer Rouge decimated the social 
and economic structures of Cambodia. 
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Economic Situation
The Cambodian economy has sustained robust average economic growth, at a rate 
of 7.6% between 1994 – 201566 with a Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) of 20 billion 
USD in 2016.67 The main driver of economic growth was the adoption of a liberal 
market economy in 199368 and the implementation of an economic policy of market 
liberalization in the form of increased foreign investment, economic integration into 
ASEAN, and accession to the WTO (2004).69 Cambodia’s accession to the WTO has led to 
an overhaul of the country’s legal framework, as the RGC works to make Cambodia’s laws 
align with international standards. New laws such as the draft Law on competition and 
recommended laws on commercial arbitration, e-commerce, and consumer protection 
are largely driven by Cambodia’s membership in the WTO and other international trade 
associations such as EUROCHAM.70 Cambodia’s growing role on the world stage is clear 
as the country was selected to be the chair of the Global Coordination Bureau of the 
Least Developed Countries (“LDCs”) at the WTO in 2017.71
Cambodia’s sustained economic grown can be attributed to two industries: garment 
manufacturing and tourism. More recently, growth in agriculture, construction, and 
real estate, as well as the diversification of garment exports to Europe and Japan have 
boosted the GDP.73 The diversification of the Cambodian economy is expected to sustain 
the current growth rate into 2018.74 This macroeconomic growth in Cambodia has 
translated into greater per capita wealth. Within the last ten years, the per capita Gross 
National Income (GNI) has more than tripled although distribution of this wealth remains 
an issue. In 2016, due to the rapid growth and the GNI reaching 1,140 USD,75 the World 
Bank changed the status of Cambodia from low income to lower-middle income country. 
This new status is expected to reduce the country’s eligibility for foreign assistance and 
will put pressure on the government to seek new sources of financing.76 Additionally, 
Cambodia’s transition will result in fewer preferential trade measures and less donor 
financing. At the same time, the increasing cost of living and low salaries are making it 
more difficult for many Cambodians to rely on simple commodity markets for economic 
stability. 
Figure 3: GDP Growth in Constant (1999 – 2016), Current and PPP Prices
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Figure 4: GNI Growth in Constant (1999 – 2016), Current and PPP Prices
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Source Data: World Bank, International Comparison Program database77 
The Cambodian economy is highly dollarised and has remained so since the re-
establishment of the first private bank after Cambodia’s civil war.78 A country transitioning 
from a political or economic crisis typically reverts to using local currency once the 
economy stabilises, yet the USD is still used in most domestic transactions. This is 
especially true in urban areas and industries that deal with high-cost transactions, such 
as foreign investment, donor aid, remittances, export industries, and tourism.79 Since 
1998, the National Bank of Cambodia (“NBC”) has kept the exchange rate between the 
US dollar and Riel, the domestic currency, stable at approximately 4,000 Riel to 1 USD.80 
The Riel is more prevalent in rural areas, low-cost transactions, and agricultural-based 
transactions.81
Foreign Direct Investment
The net inflow of foreign direct investment (“FDI”) represented 9.4% of the Cambodian 
GDP in 2015 and 10.7% in 2016, a substantial increase from 2.1% in 1993.82 The 
Cambodian foreign economic policy seeks to increase foreign investment by offering 
investment guarantees under the Law on Investment (“LoI”), which has been in force 
since 1994. The Law’s most important provisions restrict the RGC from discriminating 
against foreign investors with the exception of land title ownership.83 Special Economic 
Zones (“SEZ”) and Qualified Investment Projects (“QIP”) provide additional incentives, 
allowing for tax incentives and relief of import duties.84 The majority of FDI inflows are 
from neighbouring Asian countries, most importantly China.85 Net FDI increased by 
30.5% to an estimated 2.2 billion in 2016 from the previous year, after declining by 
8.1% in 2014 and 1.4% in 2015.86 Construction and telecommunications had the highest 
growth in FDI for 2016, while inflows to manufacturing declined slightly.87 
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Exports & Imports
Export of goods and services represent 11.2 billion USD of the 16.8 billion USD economy, 
of which 7.45 billion USD were goods, as of 2014.88 In 2016 the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (“MEF”) reported the value of exports to be 10.07 billion USD.89 The garment 
industry has the longest export history in Cambodia and accounts for approximately 
70% of Cambodian exports.90 The main export market for garments and footwear 
are the United States and the European Union, which account for 65% of Cambodia’s 
exports. However, a couple of trends in the industry suggest that the country should 
prepare to diversify its export income and begin transitioning to a knowledge based 
economy. Exports posted 9.2% growth in 2016, down from 14.1% in 2015, due to slower 
growth in the garment industry.91 The MoC reported 12.37 billion USD in imports in 2016, 
up by almost 16% from 2015.92 The MEF projects that imports are expected to decline 
from representing about 66% of the GDP in 2016 to 63% by 2017, while exports are 
likely to stabilise at 46.2%.93
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Human Development
Cambodia ranks 143rd on the 2016 UNDP Human Development Index, placing it at 
the bottom end of Medium Human Development countries, just above Myanmar and 
Nepal.95 Over two-thirds of the population live on less than 5.50 USD per day Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), which constitutes moderately poor or vulnerable to poverty.96 Yet 
Cambodia’s sustained economic growth has resulted in significant poverty reduction in 
recent years. The percentage of Cambodians living under the national poverty line fell 
from 47.8% in 2007 to 13.5% in 2014, according to estimates by the World Bank Group 
and UNDP.97 The number of people living in extreme poverty is down yet people remain 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks and natural disasters.98 The risk factors that Cambodia 
continues to face are the growing income disparity, particularly between urban and 
rural populations, and continued gender disparity in education and income equity.99 
Since 2009 inequality has improved significantly, marked by a 22% decline in the Gini 
coefficient, which measures the distribution of wealth in a country.100
Although more and more households are out of poverty, a large proportion are vulnerable 
to falling back into poverty from relatively small economic shocks.101 Major development 
institutions recommend that Cambodia can mitigate the risks associated with income 
disparity and a large agriculturally-sustained rural population by increasing investment 
in human capital.102 Sustaining Cambodia’s high growth will require developments 
in agricultural productivity, diversification of the economy, and higher value-added 
production. This will necessitate increased spending on logistics and training to improve 
a wide range of skills.103 This is especially important as Cambodian youth between 
the ages of 15-30 and children under 15 make up 33% and 32.3% of the population 
respectively but often do not have the skills to meet the requirements of the labour 
market.104 The RGC developed the Social Protection Policy Framework (SPPF) to build a 
foundation for a social protection system but social protection remains limited, especially 
for vulnerable groups.105 This is largely due to proportionally low public spending for the 
region and government spending not being targeted at poverty reduction,106 such as in 
areas of sanitation, basic health care and education.
Training to “Promote Small 
Medium Enterprises and 
Export Development” was 
conducted by TI Cambodia 
in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Commerce’s 
Trade Training and 
Research Institute (TTRI), 
with approximately 60 
participants, most of them 
were MoC public servants 
from Phnom Penh and 
other provinces, a few of 
whom were from private 
sector.
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Employment
With its new World Bank Atlas status, Cambodia is expected to see a progressive decline 
in preferential trade treatment and an increase in labour costs.107 The recent increase 
in the value of the US dollar makes Cambodian goods relatively more expensive 
in European markets.108 This will result in more intense competition with garment 
industries in neighbouring countries like Vietnam and Myanmar.109 A previous lack of 
investment in equipment and training as compared to Thailand and Vietnam will further 
hamper the transition into higher-value manufacturing. Between 1993-2014 Cambodia 
only grew 3.5% in labour productivity as compared to Vietnam and Thailand, who grew 
4.7% and 7.1% respectively during their boom years.110 Most production in Cambodia 
remains labour intensive, with little to no production of pieces and parts, restricting 
labour force mobility going forward. Although Cambodia enjoys a relatively low rate of 
unemployment, most of the jobs available are for labour intensive activities. Minimum 
wage is only available in the garment industry and is relatively low at 153 USD per month,111 
recently increased from 100 USD in 2014. This gives Cambodia a competitive advantage 
in foreign manufacturing but nearly a third of Cambodians continue to supplement their 
income with agriculture and fisheries due to income and food insecurities. 
Public Sector Expenditure
Cambodia’s public-sector spending was 20.8% of the GDP in 2015 or 3.75 billion USD.112 
The 2016 budget gives future direction for increased expenditure in education and the 
health sector.113 Total public expenditure increased by 5% in 2015 but the registered 
increase in public spending was partially due to a mandated increase in public servant 
wages.114 In 2017, total public expenditure is projected to reach around 23.1% of GDP, 
with wage spending at around 7.7% of GDP.115 Public expenditure on social assistance 
is not concurrent with the increased revenues generated by the government through 
broadening the sectors of the population subject to tax collection. As development 
assistance will decline in the future, it is imperative that targeted public spending on 
vulnerable groups offsets the tax burden on poor households.116 
Fiscal Deficit
The MEF reports that the current fiscal deficit remains modest with continued strong 
economic growth and minimal increase in public expenditure.118 In 2015, Government 
revenues and public expenditures constituted approximately 18.0% and 20.9% of the 
GDP respectively, resulting in a deficit of nearly 3%.119 Currently, the fiscal deficit is 
almost entirely financed externally, which is not sustainable in the long-term as the 
Cambodian economy continues to grow.120 Going forward the Ministry projects that 
continued growth in revenues and modest increases in public expenditures should 
contain the fiscal deficit to below the RGC’s targeted threshold of 5% of the GDP.121  The 
adoption of a new tax system by the GDT to expand the tax collection base is projected 
to significantly increase national revenues, mitigating the risk of increasing the deficit.122 
Sectors 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015e 2016BL
Education 7.9 8.0 8.6 9.5 10.8 12.0
Health 6.1 6.3 6.3 5.7 6.5 6.1
Defense 7.5 7.4 7.5 8.0 8.5 8.5
Transport 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.9 2.8
Table 5: Current Expenditure by Sector (Share of Total Current Expenditure in %)
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance117
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Natural Resources
Unsustainable and often illicit economic activities have significantly degraded 
Cambodia’s natural resources, which include timber, fisheries, and fresh water.123 The 
protection of Cambodia’s natural capital is particularly important to the most vulnerable 
citizens, who rely on subsistence agriculture for survival. Deforestation increased by 
over 10% between 2006 and 2014 with the result that 50% of Cambodia’s forests and 
almost 45% of Cambodia’s wetlands are gone.124 Hydropower developments along the 
Mekong River and increased use of irrigation technology are also expected to impact 
vulnerable populations living along the Mekong. The World Bank Group recommended 
in its 2017 Outlook report that Cambodia expand sustainable tourism, improve fisheries 
and hydroelectric power and being restoring deforested areas.125
Unsustainable and often illicit economic activities have 
significantly degraded Cambodia’s natural resources, 
which include timber, fisheries, and fresh water.  
Current Economic Reforms
Cambodia economic reforms are focused on increasing the tax base and increasing 
foreign investment in line with the country’s new economic status. The GDT is committed 
to raising taxpayer awareness and providing incentives to tax collection officials and 
businesses to increase tax compliance.126 The implementation of the RGC’s “Revenue 
Mobilization Strategy 2014-2018” increased Government revenues from 15.2% of GDP 
in 2013 to 17.6% in 2016.127 Revenue collections by the GDT increased by 22% in the last 
year as these measures were implemented.128 The GDT is seeking to implement more 
efficient tax collection measures through computerisation of tax payments and better 
coordination with financial institutions and customs authorities.129 
The microfinance sector is increasing quickly in Cambodia as many family businesses are 
borrowing from microfinance institutions (“MFI”) who have set up shop in rural areas. 
MFIs are typically funded by foreign borrowing.130 They are growing more interconnected 
with the Cambodian financial services sector but lack regulations akin to the banking 
sector to curb risks. Credit from microfinance is growing at an unsustainable pace of 
nearly 50% per annum since 2013.131 Average loans increased from 200 USD to 1,000 
USD in a decade.132 From March 2018, MFIs will have to comply with a much stricter set 
of capital requirements which may curb domestic borrowing.133 Furthermore, due to the 
ascension to the WTO, Cambodia’s legal framework continues to undergo significant 
reform to comply with WTO requirements. 
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Business Sector Composition 
Dominant Industries
The main industries are garment manufacturing, tourism, construction, and agriculture. 
The economy is dominated by small and micro Cambodian businesses. According to the 
Cambodian 2014 Inter-Censal Economic Survey, foreign enterprises represent only 1% 
of the total number of companies operating in Cambodia and 94.3% of companies have 
an individual proprietor.134 59.5% of the businesses are in wholesale and retail trade, 
14% are in manufacturing, and 10.9% operate in accommodation and food services 
sectors.135 These three industries represent 39.4%, 37.1% and 4.8% of the total annual 
sales, respectively. A huge part of the economic activity is concentrated in Phnom Penh; 
18.9% of the businesses are situated in the capital and they generate 51.3% of the total 
revenues and account for 29.5% of the total labour force. Two additional industrial 
centres are Siem Reap and Kampong Cham, representing 10.9% and 7.8% of the annual 
sales in 2014, respectively.136 International firms are mostly operated by Chinese, South 
Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese citizens carrying out business in the garment, 
footwear, agriculture, agro-industry, tourism, construction and real estate sectors.137
With its export growth of 7.2% in 2016, the garment sector is the backbone of the 
Cambodian economy, accounting for 78% of the country’s total merchandise exports.138 In 
the same year, it provided employment for 605,129 people in 626 garment and footwear 
factories.139 The employment and investment in the garment sector has decreased by 
2.9% and 17%, respectively.140 As a former Least Developed Country, Cambodia has 
benefited from the duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets under the “Everything 
but Arms” program.141 This might change due to the revision of its status by the World 
Bank to a Lower-Middle Income Country. The country’s competitive advantage of cheap 
labour could be negatively impacted due to the gradual increase of the minimum wage 
(from 80 USD in 2013 to 153 USD in 2017) and the potential trade agreement between 
EU and Vietnam, eliminating nearly 99% of tariffs.142
Despite its steady growth, Cambodia remains a rural country but in recent years, the 
value added by the agricultural sector has decreased. In 2011, agriculture products 
accounted for 37.1% of GDP, while in 2016 it was only 26.7%.143 Despite a high annual GDP 
growth of 6.9% in 2016, the agricultural sector grew by only 1.2%.144 The main agricultural 
commodity produced in Cambodia is rice. Since 2012, the average growth of rice exports 
has been 31.5%.145 The main export markets are China, France and Poland which account 
for 23.6%, 14.7% and 11.4% of the total rice exports in 2016, respectively.146 Growth can 
be explained by the improvement of irrigation systems and farmers’ productivity. 
Another important sector contributing to the steady economic growth of Cambodia 
is tourism. Since 2006, the average annual growth rate of international arrivals was 
12% with over 5 million international tourists arriving in 2016.147 According to the World 
Travel and Tourism Council, the tourist industry has a direct contribution148 of 12.2% 
and total (direct plus indirect149 spending) contribution of 28.3% of the total GDP.150 
The sector generates 988,000 direct jobs and 1.2 million indirect jobs, which is around 
25.9% of total employment.151 In 2016, travel and tourism investments accounted for 
600 million USD, 15.5% of the total investments.152 
The construction and real estate markets in Cambodia are booming. In 2016, 2636 
projects covering more than 14,620 km2 were approved. Their estimated cost is 8.5 
billion USD, which is an increase of around 155% compared to the year prior.153 The 
main foreign investors registered at Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning 
and Construction (“MLMUPC”) are from Korea, China, Japan and Thailand. Most of the 
construction projects are in Phnom Penh. In 2017, concerns of oversupply in the capital 
were raised.154
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Relationship between multinational and national 
enterprises and the role of state-owned enterprises
In 1968 there were 57 state-owned, and private and public joint venture companies.155 
From 1979-1989 a centralised state-owned economic model was implemented, after 
1991 Cambobodia transitioned to a liberal market free trade economic model.156 The 
Government has been gradually improving the performance of state-owned enterprises 
through corporatisation and privatisation, however, efforts to establish separation 
between ownership and regulation have been limited. Many activities within the 
Government are performed by private companies which are not state-owned but closely 
related to members of the Government.157  
In 2014, state owned organisations158 accounted for only 2.3% of the total number 
of enterprises and  9.3% of the employment.159 However, big companies (more than 
100 employees), who are state-owned establishments, represent 15.4% of the total 
and provide employment for 7% of the entire workforce.160 State-owned companies 
operate in key industries of the Cambodian economy. Electricté du Cambodge, the 
main electrical supplier, had revenues of over 900 million USD in 2015, with an annual 
increase of around 27%.161 The Phnom Penh Water Supply is a “Public Establishment 
having Economic Vocation”, listed on CSX. Its revenues in 2016 were around 48 million 
USD. The two major international ports, Sihanoukville Autonomous Port and Phnom 
Penh Autonomous Port, are also state owned and both are listed on the Cambodia 
Securities Exchange (CSX). In 2016, the two ports had revenues of around 51 million USD 
and 13 million USD, respectively.162 Other major state-owned companies are Telecom 
Cambodia (telecommunication), Green Trade Company (logistics), Rural Development 
Bank and Cambodia Post. It should be highlighted that there are two types of state 
owned enterprises. The first includes companies whose capital is owned by the state 
such as Electricité du Cambodge, while the second are joint-ventures where the majority 
of the capital is owned by the state and a minor part by private investor, i.e. Phnom Penh 
Water Supply Authority.163
“Reduce Corruption
in Export Procedures 
for SMEs” was jointly 
organized by TI Cambodia 
and FASMEC.
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Share of small and medium-sized enterprises
Defining SMEs
Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”) represent the majority of businesses in Cambodia 
and form the backbone of the domestic economy. The definition of SMEs in Cambodia is 
not without controversy as there are different classifications of SMEs between the UN, 
World Bank, ASEAN, TI and the Royal Government of Cambodia. The definition adopted 
in this report is displayed in the Table below (Table 6) and is consistent with the most 
recent economic census data released by the Ministry of Planning on 25 February 2015164 
and previous publications from Transparency International Cambodia.165
SMEs and the Informal Economy
The Cambodian economy is predominantly composed of SMEs, most of which are not 
registered with the Ministry of Commerce (“MoC”) nor the General Department of 
Tax (“GDT”). According to the Cambodian 2014 Inter-Censal Economic Survey, 33% of 
businesses are run by a single person. Even though microenterprises (employing less 
than 10 people) account for 97.2% of all Cambodian enterprises, their share of total 
annual sales in 2014 was only 35.4%. Small companies (employing between 10 and 49 
people) account for 2.5% of the total number of enterprises and 12.3% of the total 
annual revenues. Medium companies have a share of 0.1% of all enterprises and 2.1% of 
the annual sales. Finally, big companies account for 0.2% of all businesses in Cambodia 
but generate more than 50% of sales. 
Type of 
Enterprise
Statistical Definition Based on 
the Number of Employees
Financial Definition for Assets 
(in USD) Excluding Land
Micro Less than 10 Less than 50,000 USD
Small Between 10 – 49 50,000 – 250,000 USD
Medium Between 50 – 99 250,000 – 500,000 USD
Large 100 and Over Over 500,000 USD
Table 6: Number of Small and Medium Enterprises in Cambodia
Type of enterprise 
according to the 
number of persons 
engaged
Number of 
enterprises
Share of the 
number of 
enterprises 
of the total
Annual sales 
except street 
businesses 
(thousand 
USD)
Share of 
annual sales 
of the total
Annual sales 
except street 
businesses per 
enterprise
(thousand 
USD)
Micro (less than 10) 499,248 97.2% 8,005,980 35.4% 16.0
Small (10-49) 13,001 2.5% 2,781,672 12.3% 214.0
Medium (50-99) 615 0.1% 462,898 2.1% 752.1
Big (100 and more ) 895 0.2% 11,361,084 50.2% 12,692.4
Table 7: Types of Cambodian Enterprises According to the Number of Enterprises, 
Annual Sales and Annual Sales per Enterprise in 2014
Source: Computed from the data on Cambodian 2014 Inter-Censal Economic Survey167
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Table 8: Types of Cambodian Enterprises According to the Number of Persons Engaged, 
Annual Sales and their Efficiency (Annual Sales per Person Engaged) in 2014
Type of enterprise 
according to the number 
of persons engaged
Number 
of persons 
engaged
Share of 
persons 
engaged 
of total
Annual sales 
except street 
businesses 
(thousand USD)
Annual sales 
in thousand 
USD per 
person 
engaged168 
Micro (less than 10) 1,069,856 57.1% 8,005,980 7.5
Small (10-49) 230,833 12.3% 2,781,672 12.1
Medium (50-99) 43,772 2.3% 462,898 10.6
Big (100 and more ) 530,209 28.3% 11,361,084 21.4
Source: Computed from the data on Cambodian 2014 Inter-Censal Economic Survey169 
The majority of the workforce in Cambodia is engaged in micro businesses, 57.1%, 
followed by big companies at 28.2% of the total. Small and medium enterprises account 
for 12.3% and 2.3% of the labour force, respectively. In order to understand the efficiency 
of different types of companies based on the annual sales generated by worker, divide 
the Annual Sales by the Number of Persons Engaged. These results suggest that there 
is a disparity between different types of businesses, which is normal. The big companies 
are able to realize economies of scale and maximize their profits.
Type of establishments according 
to the persons engaged
Registered Not registered
Micro (less than 10) 1.2% 98.8%
Small (10-49) 28.6% 71.4%
Medium (50-99) 50.5% 49.5%
Big (100 and more ) 80.9% 19.2%
Table 9: Number of Cambodian Enterprises Except Street Businesses by Size of Persons 
Engaged and Whether Registered at the Ministry of Commerce or Not in 2014
Source: Computed from the data on Cambodian 2014 Inter-Censal Economic Survey170 
As of 2011, nearly 100% of all enterprises in Cambodia are classified as SMEs and they 
employ or engage almost 75% of the workforce.  According to Cambodian 2014 Inter-
Censal Economic Survey, the majority of SMEs and microenterprises are not registered 
with the Ministry of Commerce (Table 9). In comparison, the majority of big companies 
are registered with the MoC. This reveals that while the economy in Cambodia is highly 
liberalised, the reality on the ground is that enterprises remain largely informal. Official 
infrastructure and logistics services are lagging,171 and a vast majority of SMEs and single 
or small business operators in the service industries operate outside of legal or official 
channels. The most recent data published by the International Labour Organisation 
(“ILO”) in 2003 indicates that the informal economy accounted for 62% of GDP and 85% 
of the total labour force.172 This figure is largely inaccurate for 2017, but no current data is 
available. 
Industries such as tourism, construction, natural resource and small-scale goods and 
services allow for a wide entry-point into the informal economy. This is particularly 
the case for the large proportion of Cambodians connected to village life or who 
supplementing their income with subsistence agriculture. Workers in the informal 
economy are typically self-employed or working without a contract, and work from their 
homes, small shops, or on the street.173 It is clear that there remains a substantial gap 
between the stated market objectives in Cambodia and the realities of doing business. 
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The incorporation of a business as a legal entity is governed by multiple laws in 
Cambodia: the Law on Commercial Rules and Commercial Register (“LCRCR”),174 the 
Law on Amendments to the Law on Commercial Rules and Commercial Register, the 
Law on Commercial Enterprises (“LCE”)175 and the Law on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating Financing of Terrorism (“LAMCTF”).176 Enforcement of the provisions in 
the legal framework governing businesses in Cambodia will remain a significant issue 
moving forward, but one the government is moving to address.
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
B2B Cambodia Business Startup
ILO 2017
ILO 2017
ILO 2017
European Commission
ILO 2017
WB Data 
WB Data
COMTRADE Statistics, 2017
COMTRADE Statistics, 2017
WB Data
Direct contribution refers to the total spending and generated employment within a particular country on travel and tourism 
by residents and non-residents for business purposes, as well as government ‘individual’ spending”.
Indirect contribution to GDP and jobs include capital investment spending by all industries directly involved in travel and 
tourism, Government spending in support of general tourism activity, and purchases of domestic goods and services directly 
by different industries within travel and tourism as inputs to the final tourism output.
World Travel and Tourism Council, 2017
World Travel and Tourism Council, 2017
CCA website
The Cambodia Daily, 1 March 2017
The Cambodia Daily, 1 March 2017
Chhair and Ung, 2013
Chhair and Ung, 2013
OECD 4th Meeting, 2017
State-owned Organisations include (1) Public corporation owned and operated by the central government and all other State-
controlled institutions (2) Autonomy-owned organisations or local government-owned organisations whose fund is shared by 
the state (3) Public corporations such as provincial hospitals, district schools and so on which are owned and operated by local 
governments.
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
EAC, 2016
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
OECD 4th Meeting, 2017
OECD 4th Meeting, 2017
NOTE: the data sited in the Transparency International Cambodia report on Corruption Perceptions in Cambodian SMEs relies 
on 2005 data from the Sub-committee on Small and Medium Enterprises SME Secretariat (TI Cambodia  SMEs, 2015, p. 12). The 
classification of micro enterprises in the TI-C report is 10 employees or less while the most recent survey data from Statistical 
Bureau of Japan (SBJ) measure a standard of less than 10 employees. Similarly the number of employees defining a small 
business in Cambodia is 11-50 in the TI-C report and 10-49 in the SBJ analysis. The slight variations in the classifications of 
SMEs reflects the 2015 standards reported by the Ministry of Planning with the assistance of the SBJ.
Annual Sales per establishment = Annual Sales except Street Businesses/Number of establishments
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
Annual Sales per person engaged = Annual Sales except Street Businesses /Number of persons engaged
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
MoP 2014 Economic Survey, 2015
Hill et al., 2014
ILO Handbook, 2006
ILO Handbook, 2006
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Corruption Profile
While there is no concise definition of corruption in Cambodia’s current legal framework, 
Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. The definition of corruption contains several classifications, including 
grand, petty, and political depending on the amount of money lost and the sector 
involved in the corrupt act. Grand corruption is defined as the abuse of power by the 
few at the expense of many, while petty corruption is defined as the everyday abuse of 
power by trusted public officials in their interactions with citizens attempting to access 
daily and basic services, such as education or schools. Political corruption is defined as 
manipulation of policies, institutions, and procedures in the allocation of resources and 
financing by decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status, 
and wealth.177 
In Cambodia, corruption is viewed by experts to be entrenched economically, politically, 
and culturally.178 In a 2015 survey of 100 Cambodian business owners, 47% stated there 
was a culture of corruption in Cambodia that required them to pay unofficial fees.179 
In 2016, only 35% of Cambodians perceived corruption as increasing, which suggests 
that petty corruption could be decreasing since that is the form of corruption most 
Cambodians face; however, 40% of Cambodians reported paying a bribe for basic public 
services.180 Grand corruption is still perceived to be a problem since 56% of Cambodians 
believe the government is doing “badly” with combating corruption.181
Contextually, it is important to understand that gift giving is institutionalised in 
Cambodian culture, especially to monks and the poor.182 Giving a gift without sincerity 
is the vocabulary used to describe corrupt practices. In some situations, a gift can be 
perceived as corruption particularly when the giver and the receiver know each other 
and when there is an expectation of something to be given in return. Gifts that lack 
sincerity can often blur the line between gift-giving and corruption.183 Gifts without 
sincerity are widely given throughout Cambodia, which may indicate that Cambodians 
understand the implications of these transactions, but prefer to call them gifts.184 For 
example, Cambodians frequently give small gifts to inspectors to thank them, these are 
viewed as normal.185
Corruption level
Reports and data demonstrate consistently high levels of corruption in Cambodia. 
In 2016, Cambodia was ranked 156 out 176 countries on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index. For the second year in a row, Cambodia received a score 
of 21, making it the most corrupt country in Southeast Asia.186 This score puts Cambodia 
on par with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uzbekistan according to the report. 
In terms of corruption in public institutions, 59% of Cambodians believed most or all 
judges and magistrates are corrupt, 52% perceived the police to be corrupt and 44% 
believed government officials are corrupt.187 On the TRACE International Matrix section 
on Anti-Bribery Laws and enforcement, Cambodia scored a 60 out of 100 or (high), 
based on a moderate level of laws, and a low quality of enforcement on the TRACE 
International Matrix. Cambodia scored a 92, or very high, in the category of business 
interaction with government based on a moderate degree of government interaction, 
very high expectation of bribes, and high regulatory burdens. Cambodia’s overall score 
is a 92,188 making it a high-risk country for instances of bribery in business.189 In 2010, a 
survey conducted by an international NGO, PACT, found that urban people were exposed 
to corruption more than individuals living in rural areas, due to increased interactions 
with government officials.190 
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Corruption in the Private Sector
In 2017, Cambodia was ranked 131 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business survey. This represents a loss of three spots from 2016, where it sat at 
128.191 The Ease of Doing Business ranking considers a variety of factors, including how 
long it takes to legally start a business, whether there is a comprehensive and clear 
regulatory framework, and the ability to enforce contracts. On average, it takes 99 days 
to start a business legally in Cambodia versus 23.9 days in the region.192 In 2016, 25% of 
Cambodians viewed most or all business executives working in Cambodia as corrupt.193
The TI Cambodia Advocacy and Legal Advice Center (“ALAC”) has been contacted by 
770 clients between July 2013 and August 2017. Of these, 9 complaints involved the 
private sector, which is roughly 5% of all complaints for comparison. ALAC received 
31 complaints (16%) involving the public sector, 31 (16%) complaints involving public 
service fees, and 27 complaints (14%) involving the judiciary. ALAC referred 10 total 
complaints to the ACU.194 ALAC has also referred 11 complaints, that are not related to 
corruption, to other law enforcement agencies.  
The link between business and corruption could originate in the concept that gift-
giving is cultural appropriate in Cambodia. Many businesses often feel an obligation to 
offer gifts during the Khmer or Chinese New Year holidays; however, gift giving for the 
purposes of obtaining influence is illegal under the Criminal Code.195 In the 2016 World 
Bank Enterprise survey of 363 firms, 64.7% of private enterprises reported receiving 
at least one bribe payment request. Additionally, in 59.4% of public transactions, a gift 
or informal payment was requested and 50.3% of businesses had to pay a bribe to 
receive an operating license, 63.4% to receive an import license and 86.8% to receive a 
construction permit. Finally, 66.3% of surveyed businesses were required to pay a bribe 
in order to “get things done.”196 Annually, these percentages translate into approximately 
19,028 USD for large companies, 1,028 USD for medium companies and 623 USD for 
small companies.197 
Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”) are a large and important segment of the 
Cambodian economy. SMEs encounter corruption at all stages of their business, from 
registration to day-to-day operations. 57% of 100 SMEs surveyed by Transparency 
International Cambodia reported that corruption was an external factor impeding their 
business.198 In addition to potential requests for extra payments or gifts, businesses also 
face problems dealing with the bureaucracy within certain institutions. According to the 
Enterprise Survey, 48% of medium companies spent 48% of their time on dealing with 
requirements imposed by government regulations, while small companies spent 54% of 
their time dealing such requirements.199 Therefore, small and medium companies spend 
a significant amount of time annually dealing with “red tape”. 
Legal Framework
Cambodia is a party to United Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”), which 
it acceded to in 2007. Cambodia passed the Anti-Corruption Law (“ACL”) in 2010, which 
was viewed as a positive step in eliminating corruption. The ACL was amended once in 
2011 to provide more independence of its budget under the Council of Ministers. The 
ACL does contain some loopholes that undermine its effectiveness in identifying and 
preventing corruption.200 These loopholes include no requirements for family members 
of public officials to conduct asset declarations, and that the asset declarations of 
public officials themselves are kept highly confidential.201 Additionally, under Article 41 
The link between business and corruption could 
originate in the concept that gift-giving is cultural 
appropriate in Cambodia. 
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the law punishes complainants whose complaints are deemed to be defamatory, which 
is viewed by rights groups as a mechanism to silence complaints.202 The ACL created 
the Anti-Corruption Institution, which consisted of the Anti-Corruption Unit (“ACU”) 
and the National Council Against Corruption (“NCAC”).203 The Cambodian Criminal 
Code contains multiple provisions prohibiting bribery of various officials or individuals, 
including judges, experts, and high-level individuals in business.204 The Criminal Code 
criminalises both the offering and accepting of bribes. The Law on Public Procurement 
also prohibits corruption from public officials, bidders, contractors or suppliers involved 
in the bidding process or in public procurement contracts.205 Cambodia is in the process 
of drafting the law on the protection of reporting persons; the law on the protection 
of experts, victims and witnesses, which would help to encourage individuals to report 
instances of corruption. 
Anti-Corruption Efforts
In 2013 the RGC underwent its first UNCAC Implementation Review, where it organised an 
inclusive approach for its review process. The RGC organised a Steering Committee of 16 
members representing different sectors, to provide oversight of the implementation of 
the articles under the Review. 206 The UNODC Implementation Review Group highlighted 
the RGC’s inclusive process as well as the ACUs memoranda of understanding with 
various private entities.207 In addition to recommendations on mutual legal assistance 
and extradition, the Review Group recommended the RGC build a mechanism to share 
and analyse data and strengthen cooperation between regional and local authorities.208 
The RGC  prioritises the fight against corruption in its Rectangular Strategy for Growth 
III, where the strategic objective is to implement a set of interlocking and cross-cutting 
measures through education, prevention, strengthened accountability, and institutional 
capacity, public support and involvement, private sector participation and strengthened 
law enforcement.209 Additional efforts by the RGC include: 1) broadly disseminating 
the ACL throughout the country, particularly to line ministries and state institutions; 
2) establishing focal points in government agencies to coordinate with the ACU; 3) 
requiring civil servants to declare assets at regular intervals; 4) establishing public lists 
of public service fees and time limits for services; and 5) arresting and prosecuting 
those who commit corrupt practices.210
Another initiative of particular note, undertaken by the Public Sector, is the One 
Window Service Office Project, which demonstrates transparent practice in the delivery 
of services at the sub-national level.211 The Ministry of Mines and Energy (“MME”) has 
committed to effect positive changes in the mining sector following criticisms by civil 
society regarding illegal mining, bribery, and corruption. The MME initiated a multi-
stakeholder initiative, the Extractive Industry Governance Form (“EIGF”), to promote a 
multi-stakeholder approach in the governance of the extractive industry. This approach 
builds on partnerships with industry, government, the public, and civil society and is 
modelled after the widely used EITI governance model. While this is a relatively new 
initiative, the first stakeholders’ meeting was held in January 2017, followed by a 
workshop to validate the group’s findings. In June 2017, the Governance Risk Assessment 
report was publicly released by TI Cambodia in a joint effort with the MME and EIGF. The 
report identified and analysed governance risk associated with the process for granting 
mineral exploration licenses.212
Publicly, the ACU has investigated and charged only a handful of cases involving bribery 
or misappropriation of public funds. In 2013, the ACU arrested two employees of a UK 
biofuel firm who were accused of forging documents.213 They were later sentenced to 
seven and eight years in prison.214 In March 2017, a government official in the intellectual 
property office of the Ministry of Interior was charged with misappropriation of public 
funds for illicitly taking money from 100 businesses in Phnom Penh. This case is still 
ongoing.215 In 2016, a government official was accused of soliciting bribes from a foreign 
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clothing company, convicted of misappropriation of public funds, and given a suspended 
one year sentence and fined approximately 1,500 USD.216
Business Integrity Activities
Cambodia’s membership into the World Trade Organisation in 2004 had a significant 
impact on all sectors and businesses in Cambodia. The most significant effects of WTO 
membership were the adoption of a broader legal framework, as well as improvements 
in judicial and quasi-judicial processes.217 In terms of the legal framework, with ascension 
to the WTO, the RGC committed to the passage of 50 new laws in order to comply with 
WTO standards.218 The Law on Commercial Enterprises, the Commercial Arbitration Law, 
the Anti-Corruption Law, and the Securities Law are examples of the expansion of the 
legal framework following WTO ascension.219 Laws currently being drafted include the 
Consumer Protection Law, the Competition Law, and the Commercial Contract Law.220 
The WTO agreements obligate Cambodia to establish a dispute resolution system 
consisting of: 1) judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals or procedures for prompt 
review and correction of administrative action relating to customs maters, and 2) laws, 
regulations, decisions, and rulings should be administered in a uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner.221
In an effort to reduce bureaucracy and corruption in service provision, the RGC rolled 
out the One Window Service Office project to increase transparency in service delivery 
at the sub-national level.222 In 2016, the Ministry of Commerce introduced an online 
platform for business registration, that has been viewed by businesses as an effective 
mechanism for reducing corruption in the registration process. The introduction of online 
platforms to assist in service provision, is a trend that both the Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Economy and Finance plan to utilise in order to limit bureaucracy in 
registration and licensing processes.223 The General Department of Customs and Excise 
(GDCE) plans to rollout a National Single Window to create a single, standardised entry 
point for all import export, and transit related regulatory requirements in 2017-2018.224 
Additionally, GDCE plans to expand the use of electronic transactions by implementing 
e-payment of duties and taxes and accepting electronic copies of attached documents, 
such as invoice and transportation documentation.225 These plans are in line with GDCE’s 
strategy to strengthen its legal framework, promote good governance, and reduce 
corruption.226
Sharing session on 
“Business Integrity & CSR 
in ASEAN” on 28 April 
to Impact Hub’s young 
entrepreneurs. They are 
from the LEAD Program 
which is designed for 
mature start-ups looking 
to scale up their activities 
through both peer learning 
and one-to-one coaching. 
All of them already owned 
a business; some of them 
faced one mutual problem 
which is business and 
tax registration. They 
said it takes time and is a 
complicated process.  
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Business associations, such as the Federation of Association of Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Cambodia (“FASMEC”), the Cambodian Women’s Entrepreneurs 
Association (“CWEA”), the Cambodian Federation of Employers (“CAMFEBA”), the 
Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia (“GMAC”), and the Cambodian Freight 
Forwarders Association are powerful entities in providing trainings and support to their 
private sector members. In an interview we conducted with the director of a leading 
business association, we learned that the businesses within the association were able 
to reduce the cost of informal payments from 700 USD to 300 USD by joining together 
and refusing to pay the informal fees.227 In addition to the business associations, the 
chambers of commerce, including the American Chamber of Commerce (“AMCHAM”), 
the European Chamber of Commerce (“EUROCHAM”), and the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce (“AUSCHAM”), are effective support organisations for their private sector 
members and are active in improving business integrity. EUROCHAM signed an MoU 
with the Anti-Corruption Unit, which strengthened the link between EUROCHAM, its 
members, and the ACU. The ACU has organised an event with EUROCHAM to encourage 
the Chamber’s members to work with the ACU and to contact the ACU with questions 
or complaints.228
The MoUs between private sector companies and the Anti-Corruption Unit, though 
confidential, seem to be an effective mechanism for promoting business integrity, 
according to companies with whom we spoke. Thus far, the ACU has signed MoUs 
with approximately 80 companies, with a couple hundred more planned. According 
to EUROCHAM, the MoUs create a mechanism for companies to access the ACU and 
informally resolve complaints with the ACU’s assistance.229
In terms of foreign aid, the largest donors in 2008 were Japan, China, and the 
European Union, with pledges of 113 million USD, 257 million USD, and 214 million USD 
respectively.230 Other donors and multilateral institutions operating in Cambodia are the 
UN Office of Drugs and Crime, who oversees the formal review process for UNCAC,231 
the Asian Development Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development who are both committed to anti-corruption in the region232. The World Bank 
has supported anti-corruptions in terms or the formation of the Arbitration Councils 
and the One Window Service Initiative.233 USAID has been active in promoting anti-
corruption activities since its 2004 report on corruption in Cambodia. USAID supported 
PACT Cambodia in many of its anti-corruption projects, including its corruption in 
business campaign.234 The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(2015) supports the current TI Cambodia strategic plan from 2015-2019, while the Swiss 
Development Cooperation Agency supported TI Cambodia’s Business Integrity activities 
in 2017.235 GIZ has funded several programmes to promote good governance, including 
the National Audit Authority (2006-2014), and Japanese development projects support 
Cambodia’s legal and judicial reform.236 While donors have supported anti-corruption 
efforts in Cambodia for quite some time, there has been less of a focus on promoting 
anti-corruption efforts in the private sector, with the bulk of funding seeming to go to 
strengthening public institutions’ anti-corruption efforts. 
In addition to heavily relying on donor aid, Cambodia also houses 607 NGOs as of 2003, 
407 of which were local. The NGO Forum of Cambodia (“NGO Forum”) and the Cooperation 
Council for Cambodia, both NGO umbrella organisations, each have approximately 100 
NGO members.237 NGO activities are diverse, according to NGO Form 22% of NGO activities 
are focused on rural development, followed by activities in education and training, health 
and social development, capacity building and institutional development, sectoral analysis, 
policy, advocacy, and monitoring of large scale development projects.238 While civil society 
organisations have been active in Cambodia since the late 1990’s focusing on a variety 
of initiatives, CSOs have largely focused on business and human rights, with very  few 
initiatives targeting business integrity issues directly. The United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights actively trains private sector and CSOs on the UN 
Guiding Principles for Human Rights. The Cambodian Center for Human Rights (“CCHR”)’s 
Business and Human Rights programme seeks to increase respect for human rights of 
corporate actors working in the land sector.  
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In 2008, forty domestic and foreign companies supported PACT Cambodia’s Clean 
Business Initiative, which called for companies to commit to avoid bribery or selling 
fake and unsafe products, to operate with fairness and integrity and to promote reforms 
to the business environment.239 The initiative closed in 2010.240 In 2012, Transparency 
International Cambodia launched their three-year strategic plan, which included a 
focus on private sector anti-corruption measures. The Business Integrity Programme 
was officially established in 2014 and began offering compliance and business integrity 
training, as well as one on one consultative services to companies interested in establishing 
Corporate Integrity Systems, to better equip their staff with policies and procedures 
to ward off corruption. However, prior to the establishment of the Business Integrity 
Programme, most anti-corruption efforts in Cambodia were focused on improving anti-
corruption in the public sector, such as the passage of the Anti-Corruption Law and the 
establishment of the ACU. 
There is also a focus amongst civil society on promoting responsible business conduct. 
The Oxfam led Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) Platform consists of private 
companies and NGOs with the objective of coordinating the government, the private 
sector, and civil society to promote corporate social responsibility principles in business 
practices.241 While the Platform focuses on a broad range of CSR issues, anti-corruption 
and business integrity are included in the Platform’s focus. Impact Hub Phnom Penh 
seeks to promote entrepreneurs who have business ideas that seek to make a positive 
social impact. Finally, the Cooperation Council for Cambodia (“CCC”) launched its 
Responsible Business Conduct Program in 2017, which seeks to prepare CSO’s for 
increasing engagement with the private sector. Their aim is to enable sustainable 
inclusive development and to strengthen CCC and its CSO members’ capacity to engage 
with the private sector and understand and promote responsible business conduct.242 
In 2017, USAID and Development Innovations supported SHE Investments to produce 
an online platform for business owners aimed at explaining some of the logistical 
issues of registering a business and maintain tax compliance. The platform also shares 
information with companies about how to avoid corruption in their business practices.243
While donors have supported anti-corruption efforts 
in Cambodia for quite some time, there has been less 
of a focus on promoting anti-corruption efforts in the 
private sector, with the bulk of funding seeming to go to 
strengthening public institutions’ anti-corruption efforts. 
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Summary of Public Sector Indicators 
Public Sector Overview 
In most thematic areas under the public sector BICA analysis, Cambodia has a sound legal 
and policy framework that is in line with international standards. This was the result of 
Cambodia’s legal frameworks initially being structured under the guidance of international 
organisations when Cambodia made the transition to a liberal democratic market economy 
in the 1990s. The RCG’s continued willingness to receive and implement guidance from 
donors and international organisations, such as the WTO and ASEAN, resulted in further 
progress. Benchmarks include significant improvements in human development indicators, 
GDP growth, and substantial foreign investment. Cambodia has also signed and ratified 
international and regional anti-corruption agreements, and administrative protocols in 
areas such as tax and accounting to meet its international and regional obligations. Areas 
where improvement in legislation are required are in the protection of whistleblowers and 
legislation controlling undue influences on political parties.
Despite robust legal standards, the implementation of these frameworks is an ongoing 
challenge in Cambodia. There are many reasons for these challenges. Worth mentioning 
are the differing capacities between urban and rural populations to transition to a 
more regulated operational framework in doing business, coupled with the entrenched 
reliance on informal networks and economic systems. Additionally, the post-conflict 
context of Cambodia remains relevant as governance institutions must transition 
from functioning through patronage networks meant to exclude large portions of the 
population to implementing transparent bureaucratic measures to govern the state 
as a whole. As Cambodia transitions from an aid reliant low-income economy to a 
lower middle-income economy, the state must transition its governance measures to 
reduce reliance on informal systems. It can do so by ensuring compliance with revenue-
generating activities such as taxation and accurate accounting and by providing a base 
of social services such as healthcare, education and water and sanitation. Furthermore, 
agencies entrusted with implementing the new laws are not uniformly effective. Some 
Ministries and provincial level governance bodies are making great strides in areas such 
as taxation and procurement, but others lack oversight and training and have lower 
operational capacities that interfere with their ability to enforce the adopted standards. 
As detailed below in the in-depth analysis of the indicators, the effectiveness and 
ineffectiveness of existing legal frameworks stem from several factors, including:
• Capacity of enforcement agencies to implement the laws;
• Capacities among domestic firms to develop their business in compliance with the law;
• Inadequate coordination between nationally directed projects and provincial
management;
• The challenge of competing for foreign investment while shifting the business
environment;
• Lack of political will to call out lagging institutions on sensitive issues in combatting
corruption.
The public and private sectors have historically been very interwoven in Cambodia, 
making the creation of an open, fair, and transparent business environment all the 
more challenging. Destabilizing systems of patronage requires a delicate balance 
of increasing the capacity of actors who were formerly excluded from the table and 
limiting behaviours that result in opacity and lack of due process from actors who enjoy 
the majority of the table. In an economy reliant on imports and exports, Cambodia 
must also increase its competitiveness between two much larger economies (Thailand 
and Vietnam) in an environment where transparency and public accountability are not 
universally prioritized.
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Summary of Public Sector Indicators
The business environment in Cambodia is known for being facilitated by gifts and 
unofficial fees. Although this is seen as culturally appropriate in Cambodia, it is not 
conducive for fostering a culture of transparency and business integrity. Most commonly, 
anti-bribery practices in Cambodia are based on the anti-corruption policies of foreign 
enterprises operating within the country rather than internal structures mandated under 
the law by the Cambodian Government. Cambodia’s legal framework on anti-corruption 
is sound with the adoption of the Law on Anti-Corruption in 2010 that prohibits the 
bribery of public officials and commercial bribery. While the law sets out effective 
definitions and sanctions for both direct and indirect forms of bribery, enforcement of 
the law is still sporadic with only a handful of investigations resulting in convictions.244 A 
lack of transparency in the investigative process prevents external actors from knowing 
whether the investigations meet standards of due diligence. 
The capacity of investigations to be fully independent may be hampered because the 
Chairman and Vice-chairman of the ACU are appointed by the related Ministries and the 
Prime Minister. Information of where investigations are stalled once the ACU receives a 
complaint is not clear, whether that is within the ACU itself, the police investigation, or 
the judiciary. The ACU is well integrated into the public sector, with representatives in 
most Ministries, and has opened five provincial offices as of early 2017.245 200 additional 
judicial police officers will increase the capacity of the ACU to carry out thorough 
investigations and monitor key sectors. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) would also benefit 
from greater transparency and oversight as very few charges of bribery are prosecuted.
Cambodia is considered the most at-risk country for money laundering in Southeast 
Asia but recent changes to the laws promise improvement. Cambodia passed its first law 
on the proceeds of crimes in 2007246 and later mandated the creation of the Cambodian 
Financial Intelligence Unit (“CAFIU”) to investigate reports of money laundering.247 In 
2008, the National Bank of Cambodia (“NBC”)  issued Prakas requiring banks to conduct 
due diligence to confirm the identification of customers opening an account or for 
one-off transactions more than 10,000 USD.248 Additional Prakas were issued covering 
insurance firms, investment and pension funds, real estate agents, lawyers, casinos, 
trusts, and NGOs. A National Coordination Committee on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism was created in 2012 to coordinate efforts. The 
existing regulations are generally in line with international standards, particularly those 
of the NBC, but enforcement is problematic. Instances of suspected money laundering 
are not being investigated by the CAFIU, border control is problematic, a standardised 
reporting mechanism and beneficial ownership registration are lacking, and there is no 
coordination with other nations or international organisations on investigations or such 
measures as asset seizure.   
Under Cambodian Law collusion is prohibited solely under the Law on Public 
Procurement. Acts constituting collusion according to the definition provided by 
Transparency International249 include the formation of cartels, fraud and price fixing 
are addressed in multiple laws, including the Cambodian Criminal Code and the Anti-
Corruption Law. In addition to stronger legislation, fighting collusion within a business 
environment requires strong whistleblower protection. Unfortunately, there is not yet 
a Cambodian law to protect whistleblowers, though there is a draft of such a law. There 
are protections for those reporting suspicious behaviour in the Anti-Corruption Law 
and the Law on Public Procurement, yet there are equal measures to punish perceived 
defamation for false reporting, which may have a silencing effect.250    
Cambodia’s scattered legislation prohibiting collusion will soon be bolstered by several 
draft laws on competition, contracts, e-commerce and the protection of reporting 
persons, but it is doubtful that tangible improvement will be realised in the near future. 
Enforcement against collusion practices is an ongoing problem. On the one hand, 
Cambodia’s economic context includes capitalising on cheap labour and producing low 
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value-added items, which makes cartels and price fixing unlikely. On the other hand, 
collusion facilitates illicit financial flows and trade mis-invoicing, which have increased 
in Cambodia to over 4 billion USD, or 20% of the GDP in 2014. Moreover, the political 
context exacerbates enforcement as public allegations of collusion are often used as 
a tool to deter and subvert political opposition and civil society rather than promote 
business integrity.
The National Assembly adopted a comprehensive procurement law and two operational 
manuals in 2012. Public procurement is an area of high risk for collusion and corruption 
because it involves the spending of public resources. The Ministry of Economy and 
Finance implemented new procurement processes but enforcement of this framework 
and transparency in the bidding process are inconsistent251. Building capacity among local 
actors at the national, provincial, district and Commune/Sangkat level to implement the 
technical aspects of the regulation will be a key component of identifying irregularities 
and stamping out old systems of doing business. 
There is currently a very weak legal framework that sets limits on campaign financing, 
political contributions, or political lobbying from the private sector, political parties, or 
civil society. This lack of structure gives the ruling party an advantage during election 
cycles, with greater capacity to raise funds from the public and private sector. The 
2013 Election Law adds marginal regulations on campaign finance contributions.252 
The parties are generally inexperienced with political lobbying and have a limited 
understanding of how it can affect party platforms and decisions in both the election 
campaign and the administrative term. The lack of provisions on political lobbying in 
any law in Cambodia, leave a large area of political influence that is unmonitored and 
unregulated. The legal framework on conflicts of interest between the public and private 
sector deserves mention here. Similar to collusion, a definition of conflict of interest 
is found only in the Law on Public Procurement. A definition is also pending in the 
draft competition law, which has remained in draft form since 2006. The Manual on 
Public Procurement recognises the role of civil society in promoting transparency and 
accountability in financial interactions between the public and private sector, thereby 
creating some space for external monitoring of political lobbying and fundraising.
Cambodia’s auditing and accounting standards are the most well-developed area 
of the law related to business integrity in the public sector and the most rigorously 
implemented. Both auditors and accountants are licensed under a national regulatory 
body, the National Accounting Council of Cambodia, which operates with a high 
degree of independence from the Government. The International Financial Reporting 
Standards (“IFRS”) have been adopted for both larger businesses and SMEs, and are 
TI Cambodia and CWEA 
conducted a workshop on 
“Financial Management 
for SMEs” to 40 female 
participants attended the 
event on 22 November 
with a guest speaker from 
a local accounting firm. 
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being increasingly implemented among domestic businesses. The Ministry of Economy 
and Finance recently extended a deadline to implement IFRS standards in banking and 
insurance institutions to 2019. This is expected to increase the reporting of beneficial 
ownership information, which is currently underreported due to a previously low level 
of business registration with the MoC and the GDT. The major constraint to broader 
implementation of accounting standards is cost and education. Many SMEs and family 
owned businesses perceive the transition to tax compliance as onerous, uneven or 
express concern at paying back-taxes. Most NGOs implementing internationally funded 
projects and larger globally or regionally connected businesses have their accounts 
audited by one of the major internationally affiliated accounting firms operating in 
Cambodia (PWC, KPMG, E&Y, Deloitte).
Cambodia’s economic reclassification in 2015 from low-income economy to lower-
middle income economy by the World Bank has incentivised the RGC to generate more 
revenue by increasing the tax base and enforcing tax compliance. The adherence to 
auditing and accounting standards is largely due to the role of the GDT who have 
implemented new laws and sub-decrees designed to increase awareness and fulfilment 
of tax obligations for a larger portion of Cambodian businesses.  Measures taken by the 
GDT to increase engagement have been to simplify accounting for small businesses, 
place more services online and carry out more training for both tax audit officers and 
domestic businesses. Furthermore, the GDT is using business supply chains to increase 
tax compliance by disallowing deductions for services unless the service provider is 
tax compliant. Incentives to attract foreign investment with tax exemptions, such as 
Qualified Investment Projects (“QIPs”), require audited financial statements with their 
registration and annual reports to the Council for Development of Cambodia (“CDC”). 
Several Ministries are cooperating on assuring that auditing and accounting standards 
are implemented and upheld, thereby reinforcing a culture of compliance and increasing 
capacity among local businesses. 
Known challenges to private sector importers and exporters doing business in Cambodia 
are excessive bureaucracy and a high likelihood of unforeseen informal payments and 
facilitations fees. Companies doing business in Cambodia reported that in some cases 
tariffs for services (administration fees, facilitation fees, and other charges) are not 
announced in advance and are requested by customs at the time of service.253 The 
inconsistent business environment for imports and exports reduces efficiency and 
productivity and is challenging, particularly for international businesses who have 
detailed budgets for the fiscal year and must comply with accounting and transparency 
standards within their home jurisdiction. Since 2014, the average growth of exports and 
imports is 12.3%254. The GDCE has become 155th member of World Customs Organisation 
(WCO) in June 2011 and is implementing several projects which contributed to the trade 
facilitation and reduction of bureaucracy.255
Known challenges to private sector importers and 
exporters doing business in Cambodia are excessive 
bureaucracy and a high likelihood of unforeseen informal 
payments and facilitations fees.
BICA Assessment 2017
58
Cambodia’s Law on Anti-Corruption is largely viewed as a strong step towards limiting 
corruption, however, some provisions are considered problematic and the effectiveness of 
its main institutions has been questioned. The law posits effective definitions of bribery and 
punishes direct and indirect bribery of public officials, but enforcement of the law is viewed 
as sporadic and potentially ineffective. 
The Anti-Corruption Unit (“ACU”) is responsible for enforcement of the Law, yet in the 7 
years since its establishment, only a handful of complaints have led to convictions. While 
the ACU claims to investigate hundreds of cases,  it does not make public whether or why it 
does or does not pursue a particular case. Because of this lack of transparency, it is difficult 
to identify whether the complaint is dropped with the ACU or with the judiciary. Recently 
the overall number of complaints to the ACU have dropped. Some hypothesise that the 
public has lost confidence in the ACU’s independence and efficacy, however, the decrease in 
complaints could be due to the public now knowing where to make certain complaints.
According to an ACU official, the ACU has adequate resources and coordinates well with 
other Ministries. Ministry of Commerce (“MoC’) officials also acknowledged that the ACU has 
officials in most Ministries and Departments of the RGC, including the General Department of 
Taxation (“GDT’) and the General Department of Customs and Excise (“GDCE’), to coordinate 
on preventing and detecting corruption. There is little available information about the 
coordination between the ACU and foreign law enforcement agencies. This doesn’t mean that 
coordination does not exist, but the scope is unclear if it does.  
The independence of the ACU is difficult to ascertain since the Chair and Vice Chair are 
chosen by the Prime Minister and the remaining officials are appointed by various government 
entities. This coupled with the lack of transparency about decisions lead to questions about 
the independence of the ACU. The Royal Government of Cambodia, however, recognizes the 
problems associated with corruption and does seem to be taking steps to combat it, with Law 
on Anti-Corruption a strong step in that direction. 
1.1.1 Laws prohibiting bribery of public officials
Do the country’s laws prohibit bribery of national and foreign 
public officials?
The Anti-Corruption Law (“ACL”) was passed in 2010, after a lengthy legislative journey 
that began in 1994. The ACL addresses bribery of national public officials, foreign public 
officials and officials of public international organisations, including receiving and offering, 
“...directly or indirectly, a donation, promise or any benefit,” in order to perform or refrain 
from carrying out their duty.256 Therefore, passive and active forms of bribery, as well 
as direct and indirect bribery, are banned under the law.257 Payments made to “facilitate 
any process during the exercise of an official’s function,” are also a violation of the anti-
corruption law. The law also includes a broad definition of bribery, including benefits 
or promises that are not explicitly of financial value; therefore there can be a range of 
benefits incurred by the public official. The ACL links to the Cambodian Criminal Code, 
covering bribe-taking by employees, and bribe-offering and taking.258 Article 606 of the 
Criminal Code prohibits the proffer directly or indirectly of a gift, promise or interest in 
order to induce a public official or holder of public office, to use their influence to obtain 
public tenders or any other favourable State decision.259 While the ACL links extensively 
to the Cambodian Criminal Code, the Law does not link to the Law on Taxation. In fact, 
bribery or any proceeds of any illegal activities are not mentioned in the unallowable 
deductibles section. 
1.1 Prohibiting Bribery of Public Officials
50
75
BICA Assessment 2017
59
While the ACL provides a good initial framework for combatting corruption, there are 
some aspects of the law that are not consistent with international standards. International 
standards require the creation of independent body to investigate corruption complaints. 
The ACL created the National Council Against Corruption (“NCAC’) and the ACU but 
allows for members of both of these bodies to be appointed by the Prime Minister or other 
government entities.260 The ACU is also not required to disclose information relating to 
their investigations.261  
1.1.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting bribery of  
public officials
Are sanctions and incentives applied in practice to deter bribery of 
public officials?
Under the ACL and the Cambodian Criminal Code, national and foreign public officials 
can receive a jail sentence from 7 years to 15 years for unrightfully asking for, demanding, 
or accepting any benefits.262 Meanwhile, a person who directly or indirectly offers a 
donation, promise or a benefit to a foreign public official can be sentenced to jail for 
between 5 and 10 years.263 The ACL does not include a statute of limitations provision, 
however, the Criminal Code sets the statute of limitations at 15 years for felonies and 
5 years for misdemeanours.264 Any crime that incurs a prison sentence of more than 
five years is considered a felony.265 Therefore, although in the ACL bribery of a public 
official is not explicitly deemed a felony, given that the prison sentence is typically over 
five years, it can be assumed bribery of a public official is a felony and carries a statute 
of limitation of 20 years. This should be clearer under the ACL.266 Under the ACL, legal 
entities that commit corruption are required to pay a fine between 10,000,000 and 
100,000,000 riel (between 2,368 and 23,686 USD).267 In addition to fines, legal entities 
are subject to dissolution, expulsion from public procurement, or barring of operation 
from activities.268 There are no penalties under the Anti-Corruption Law for insufficient 
oversight or supervision. 
In terms of active enforcement, very few cases are passed to the Municipal Court for 
prosecution. In 2012, the ACU Chairman reported that the institution received 800 
complaints in the first 8 months of 2012, of which it investigated 30%.269 At least 240 
cases, should have been investigated in 2012 but were not.270 It is very difficult to gauge 
whether the cases are not investigated further at the ACU level or with the Municipal 
Court. 
As of January 2014, only 11 corruption investigation cases have been documented on the 
ACU website since 2010.271 In 2017, the ACU announced that the number of complaints 
had halved between 2014 and 2016, with the Unit receiving only 597 complaints in 
2016.272 While the ACU attributed this drop in complaints to the public directing their 
complaints to the proper entities, the ACU pattern of receiving a complaint, questioning 
the public official, publishing the official’s response on their website, and closing the 
complaint, is not viewed by the public as an effective mechanism for investigating 
corruption complaints.  Additionally, the ACU does not publish justifications about why 
a particular case has been chosen for investigation over another. Only a limited number 
of corruption cases appear to have been prosecuted in the courts.  
However, according to one ACU official, since there is a culture of corruption in 
Cambodia, it would be hard for the ACU to investigate and punish everyone.273 In 2013, 
the ACU arrested three employees of a UK biofuel firm who were accused of forging land 
documents and fraud. The three were ultimately convicted and sentenced to several 
years in prison each.274 In 2016, a high ranking official with the Council of Development 
of Cambodia was arrested for demanding bribes from foreign and domestic investors to 
process paperwork. He was ultimately convicted of “misappropriation of public funds,” 
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fined 4 million riel (1,000 USD), and received a suspended 2 year prison sentence.275 
This followed a recent trend of offering public officials accused of bribery suspended 
sentences once convicted.276 Therefore, while suspended sentences are offered to public 
officials, they are often offered in a way that undermines the strength of the law. In 
the six years since the ACU was established only one high-ranking official has been 
prosecuted and sentenced to life in prison for taking bribes and syphoning drugs from 
confiscation piles.277 
1.1.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting bribery of 
public officials
Do relevant public authorities possess adequate capacities for enforcing 
laws prohibiting bribery of public officials?
The ACL established the ACU in 2010 with the aim to implement laws, orders, and 
regulations related to corruption.278 The ACU is charged with receiving, reviewing and 
taking appropriate action for all corruption complaints.279 Members of the ACU who are 
appointed as judicial police have the power to take charge in investigating corruption 
allegations.280 The ACU receives its budget from the RGC, but also accepts donations 
from domestic and international sources.281 In terms of inter-Ministry cooperation, a 
member of the ACU is appointed to liaise and sit with various Ministry officials, including 
the General Department of Taxation (“GDT”) and the General Department of Customs 
and Excise (“GDCE”). According to an ACU official, the ACU is independent but is able 
to work closely with GDT, the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (“MPWT”), and 
other Ministries. Also, according to an ACU official, the Unit engages and cooperates 
with foreign authorities, funding and staff are sufficient and the ACU is independent.282 
However, the independence of the ACU has been called into question, particularly 
since under the ACL the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the ACU are appointed by the 
Prime Minister. In 2016, the independence of the ACU was called into question following 
corruption allegations against the Cambodian National Rescue Party (“CNRP”)’s Deputy 
Minister and the related investigation and arrest of one former National Election 
Commission employee and four other civil society members. These investigations and 
arrests were characterised by civil society as politically motivated and cast scrutiny on 
the ACU’s operational independence.283 
The ACU works with foreign institutions to receive training and participate in exchange 
programs, however very little information is available about the ACU’s collaboration on 
investigations with foreign institutions to date. In an effort to reduce corruption faced 
by private sector entities, the ACU has signed memorandums of understanding (“MoU”) 
with dozens of companies, that affirm the company’s commitment to anti-corruption 
and are meant to prevent illicit payments to government officials. However, information 
relating to the content of the MoU are kept confidential, so it is difficult to gauge how 
they help to combat corruption. 
In addition to the ACU, the NCAC was created to provide guidance and recommendations 
on anti-corruption work. The Council is comprised of a variety of individuals representing 
Cambodian institutions, including the King, the Senate and National Assembly, the 
National Audit Authority, the Council for Legal and Judicial Reform, and the Human 
Rights Committee.284 
It is unclear whether the judiciary and the police have the proper resources to investigate 
and prosecute the number of cases they receive. There is very little information available 
about whether cases are dropped by the ACU or the judiciary.
75
BICA Assessment 2017
61
Cambodia was given a score of 60 on the TRACE Matrix for its Anti-Bribery Laws and 
enforcement, based on its moderate quality of anti-bribery laws but low quality of anti-
bribery enforcement.285 Many aspects pertaining to commercial bribery are covered in 
the current legal framework, namely the Criminal Code and the Law on Anti-Corruption, 
including active and passive bribery. However, enforcement seems to be lacking, which 
is troubling in terms of effectively improving the integrity of the business environment. 
Very few cases of commercial bribery have been publicly prosecuted following an 
investigation by the ACU. The ACU is responsible for investigating cases and then 
referring to the judiciary, which is supposed to bring forward cases. It is unclear where 
complaints are stopping in the system. In the cases that have been brought forward, the 
charges ultimately filed or convictions handed down were lessened if compared to the 
initial allegations.
In terms of capacity, the number of MoUs signed between the ACU and many companies 
is promising, as well as ministerial coordination with the ACU. Finally, the announcement 
earlier this year that the ACU would open offices in 5 provinces, coupled with the training 
of 200 judicial police, mark promising progress in building the ACU’s capacity. 
However, concerns remain about the transparency of the ACU’s budget and independence, 
as well as how the ACU solves complaints outside of the courts. 
1.2.1 Law prohibiting commercial bribery
Do the country’s laws prohibit commercial bribery?
The legislation against commercial bribery is largely found in the Criminal Code 
of Cambodia, with a reference in the ACL. The ACL prohibits bribery offering and 
taking by employees.286 The Criminal Code prohibits an employee from “requesting or 
accepting unbeknownst to his employer and without their authorisation, any donation 
gift, promise or reward for performing or refraining from their duties.”287 Additionally, 
offering a donation, gift, promise, or reward to an employee so they perform or refrain 
from performing is illegal.288 The undue advantage is not limited to material goods and 
can include a promise or reward. Despite this, the law encompasses broad incentives for 
bribery. 
Again, there is a gap between the ACL, the Criminal Code, and the Law on Taxation, 
because neither bribes nor other illicit materials are mentioned to be non-tax 
deductible. Article 278 of the Criminal Code, which requires the request for a bribe 
be unbeknownst to the employer, is a broad section of the provision that could lead 
to a lack of enforcement of the law. In addition to bribery of employees, Article 280 
criminalizes bribes committed by individuals who serve as Governors or supervisors 
of a legal entity. The penalty for demanding or receiving such bribes is 5 to 10 years in 
prison. The goods are also to be confiscated or a monetary payment should be made to 
recover any remainder.289 As previously mentioned, legal entities can also be held liable 
for bribery and required to pay a fee of between 10,000,000 and 100,000,000 riel.290 By 
applying the bribery laws to both staff and supervisors, the law covers most individuals 
in a company or business as well as the legal entity itself.
Overall, the Criminal Code has reasonably strong provisions in place to prohibit 
commercial bribery, which is also covered by the ACL although a few gaps still remain 
in the law as discussed above. 
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1.2.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting commercial bribery
Are sanctions and incentives applied in practice to deter commercial 
bribery?
There are very few cases of individuals who have been prosecuted and convicted 
for commercial bribery offences. Instead, many individuals are charged with crimes 
other than bribery. In 2016, a Council for the Development of Cambodia official was 
convicted of misappropriation of public funds and sentenced to two years in prison 
after he was accused of soliciting bribes from a Dutch sportswear company.291 Charges 
were not brought against the company.292 In early 2017, a Ministry of Interior Official 
was arrested and charged with misappropriation of public funds following allegations 
that he demanded bribes from more than 100 business owners in Phnom Penh. That 
case remains pending.293 In 2014, two former Canadia bank employees were arrested 
and tried for forgery and fraud; one bank manager was sentenced to time served for 
embezzlement and required to pay a fine, while another employee was sentenced to two 
years in prison and a 1,000 USD fine.294 
The lack of enforcement of the law leads many businesses to continue paying informal 
fees or to participate in gift-giving. According to one financial institution, gift-giving 
is a common practice therefore, it is difficult for them to refuse gifts or not give gifts 
to clients.295 A business association that works closely with the customs department 
estimated that companies pay approximately 350 USD per shipment coming or leaving 
the port in unofficial fees.296  
While the punishment for bribery is moderately severe, cases or charges are frequently 
lessened to misappropriation of public funds or, more often than not, are not prosecuted 
at all. The statute of limitations for bribery of an employee or a supervisor is a 
misdemeanour and therefore five years, which seems adequate given the lack of current 
cases that are prosecuted. A source who works closely with the ACU explained that often 
the ACU will solve disputes informally, rather than prosecuting cases, particularly in the 
case of companies who have signed MoUs with the ACU. Thus far, over 80 companies 
have signed MoUs with the ACU and in 2017 the ACU chairman announced his intention 
to sign MoUs with 200 Chinese companies in order to eliminate corruption.297 While this 
may be an effective mechanism for solving complaints, it lacks transparency regarding 
the terms of the MoUs, how complaints are solved and potential punishments allocated. 
1.2.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting 
commercial bribery
Do relevant public authorities possess adequate capacities for enforcing 
laws prohibiting commercial bribery?
The ACU is the only agency in Cambodia charged with investigating complaints of 
corruption in Cambodia. The ACU is funded through its own budget decided by the Council 
of Ministers. Information about that budget is not publicly available. As mentioned, the 
independence of the ACU has been questioned because the Chairman and Vice Chairman 
are appointed by the Government. In 2016, the ACU was involved in the investigation of 
a highly political case with no finding of corruption. There are suspicions that the ACU 
chose not to pursue the complaint since there are many complaints that never reach 
judicial prosecution.298 This is difficult to prove, however, since information about when 
complaints get dropped or resolved is not publicly available.
One of the biggest indicators of the capacity of the ACU in working with the private 
sector has been through the MOUs that the ACU has signed with companies operating 
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in Cambodia.299 The ACU has also  published a manual for businesses on combatting 
corruption. Ministry and ACU sources with whom we spoke mentioned that the ACU 
enjoys a good level of coordination between Ministries, including the MoC and the MEF, 
with a member of the ACU sitting in every Ministry office. 
In early 2017, the ACU announced that it would open five provincial offices throughout 
Cambodia, in Preah Sihanouk, Kampong Speu, Siem Reap, Svay Rieng and Kampong 
Cham in order to effectively combat corruption. In addition to the offices, the ACU 
announced they would hire and train 200 new judicial police officers to add to their 
existing 500 officers, which would help to increase investigations into corruption related 
crimes in Cambodia’s provinces.300 There is no information available regarding the ACUs 
cooperating with foreign law enforcement. 
Thus, while the capacity of the ACU seems to be increasing, information about the 
ACU’s budget and mechanisms for solving complaints with companies remains largely 
unknown to the public. Additionally, very little information is available regarding the 
police investigations or judiciary decisions.
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Cambodia has shown some signs of improvement in effectively prohibiting laundering of 
the proceeds of crime, moving from 3rd on the Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index in 2014 
to 9th in 2017.301 Cambodia has been in the Index’s top ten list of most at-risk countries 
since the Index started in 2012. In 2016, Cambodia was listed as a country of primary 
concern by the US State Department.302 Recent improvements are largely based on 
changes to the regulatory framework, while conviction rates for money laundering remain 
low.303
Cambodia has made significant strides in improving its legal framework for prohibiting 
the laundering of the proceeds of a crime since the first law was passed in 2007. 
In 2015, the Financial Action Task Force  (“FATF”) removed Cambodia from its list 
of countries that were, “Subject to FATF’s ongoing AMT/CFT Compliance Process.” 
The FATF praised Cambodia for its significant process in improving the legal and 
regulatory framework.304 However, despite these efforts, issues still remain in 
terms of coordination between relevant Ministries and entities, and the Cambodian 
Financial Intelligence Unit (‘CAFIU”) seems to lack serious capacity to investigate 
reporting mechanisms for money laundering. Therefore, despite the legislative efforts, 
Cambodia still remains a potential hotbed for money laundering. 
1.3.1 Laws prohibiting laundering of proceeds of crime
Do the country’s laws prohibit laundering of proceeds of crime?
Cambodia’s laws prohibiting money laundering are found in the Criminal Code and the 
Law on Money Laundering and Combatting Funds from Terrorism (“LAMCFT”). Under 
the Criminal Code, money laundering is “the act of facilitating by any means the false 
justification of the origin of the direct or indirect proceeds of a felony or misdemeanour.”305 
The Law also includes assisting in the concealing of funds. The act of money laundering is 
punishable by imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine of 5 million riels, and is therefore 
a felony under Cambodian law. In addition to individuals, legal entities can be punished 
under the law by a fine from 100 million to 500 million riels.306  
Article 3 of the LAMCFT has a more detailed definition of the acts that constitute 
money laundering, including 1) the conversion or transfer of property known to be 
the proceeds of a crime, with the purpose of intentionally concealing or disguising its 
origin and helping those involved in the original offense to evade legal consequences; 2) 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, or disposition of property, 
knowing the property is the proceeds of an offense; 3) the acquisition or possession or 
use of the property with knowledge of its origin; and 4) participation in and attempts to 
commit or force to commit any of the above acts.307 
In addition to the legislation, in 2008 the National Bank of Cambodia (“NBC”) issued Prakas 
to provide further regulations on anti-money laundering activities. Specifically, the prakas 
outline the necessary customer due diligence that banks and financial institutions should 
conduct to obtain satisfactory evidence and properly establish the identity of individuals 
with whom they are doing business. Banks and financial institutions should conduct due 
diligence when establishing a business relationship with a customer who is opening an 
account or requesting  safety deposit facilities, or “individuals carrying out an occasional 
or one off transaction that involves more than 10,000 USD”.308  Customer due diligence 
should comprise of: 1) identifying the customer and verifying their identity using reliable 
independent source documents or data; 2) determine if the customer conducting business 
is acting on behalf of himself or a beneficial owner; 3) understand the beneficial ownership 
and control structure; 4) obtain information on the purpose and the nature of the business 
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relationship; and 5) conduct ongoing due diligence and scrutiny to ensure the information 
is updated and relevant.309 Additionally, a second set of Prakas, regulates reporting entities 
who are not under the purview of the National Bank of Cambodia. These entities include 
insurance firms, investment and pension funds, real estate agents, lawyers, casinos, trusts, 
and NGOs charged with fundraising, as well as any institution or profession that falls under 
the LAMCFT.310
The Law and the Prakas issued by the National Bank of Cambodia provide substantial 
regulations for preventing money laundering.  While the LAMCFT and associated Prakas 
are largely in line with international standards, the National Strategies 2013-2017 on Anti-
Money Laundering and Countering Funding Terrorism identified gaps in the regulatory 
framework. These gaps included a lack of standard reporting format for banks, and other 
reporting entities, a need for enhanced measures for high risk customers and transactions, 
a clear process for identifying beneficial owners and regulations to mitigate the risk of 
transactions flowing into the informal sector.311 
1.3.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting laundering of proceeds 
of crime
Are sanctions and incentives applied in practice to deter the laundering of 
proceeds of a crime?
In 2008, a Sub-decree established the Cambodia Financial Intelligence Unit (“CAFIU”). 
Additional Prakas in 2009 outlined the functions of the CAFIU, which include receiving 
suspicious and cash transaction reports and information regarding suspected money 
laundering, to collect information considered relevant to money laundering, to have timely 
access to information and materials, and to analyse and assess all suspicious transaction 
reports.312 Additionally, a National Coordination Committee on Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism as a permanent and senior level coordination 
mechanism for preventing and controlling money laundering was created in 2012.313  
Despite the laws and regulations on anti-money laundering, Cambodia’s money laundering 
susceptibility is characterised by “a weak and ineffective AML regime, a cash-based 
dollarized economy, porous borders and the National Bank of Cambodia’s limited capacity 
to oversee the fast-growing financial and banking industries. A weak judicial system and 
endemic corruption also constrain effective enforcement.”314  
Under the law, money laundering or any of the acts defined in Article 3 of the LAMCTF 
carry a prison sentence of from 2 to 5 years and a fine of between 100 and 500 million 
riels. Since a conviction for money laundering is considered a misdemeanour, the statute 
of limitations is only 5 years. The Criminal Code also provides penalties for legal entities 
that include of fines of 100,000,000 to 500,000,000 riels and additional penalty options, 
including 1) dissolution; 2) placement under court surveillance; 3) prohibition against 
operating activities 4) expulsion from the public marketplace; 5) prohibition against 
conducting public campaigns; 6) confiscation of modalities for which the offences 
occurred; 7) confiscation of incomes and properties; 8) posting decision on punishment; 
and 9) publication of decision in newspaper or broadcasting.315 None of these penalties are 
mentioned in the LAMCTF. 
In one case a domestic financial institution recognised criminal activity and called the police 
who immediately apprehended the suspect at the airport.316 This arrest was not widely 
reported. A foreign financial institution did state that there were clear criteria that separated 
suspicious activity from criminal activity and that the authorities were quick to respond 
when suspicious activity rose to the level of criminal.317 In 2017, two Congolese men were 
sentenced to eight years in prison after being convicted of forging public documents and 
using public documents to open multiple bank accounts in a money laundering scheme.318 
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While mitigation incentives are technically available depending on the seriousness of the 
crime, due to the limited information currently available on AML prosecutions, it is difficult 
to analyse whether and how these incentives are actually applied. 
1.3.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting the laundering of 
the proceeds of crime 
Are adequate enforcement capacities available for enforcing laws 
prohibiting laundering of the proceeds of a crime?
In 2007, CAFIU was established as the central body responsible for receiving, analysing, 
and disseminating reports on suspicious transactions and other information regarding 
money laundering or financing of terrorism within the National Bank of Cambodia 
(“NBC”).316 CAFIU initially lacked mechanisms to freeze assets, however, in 2014, a Sub-
decree created a mechanism for freezing assets of designated terrorists or money 
launderers and organisations. However, a weakness of the mechanism is that it cannot 
share assets with foreign governments. 
The National Coordination Committee on Anti-Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism was created comprising of the 1) The Governor of the National Bank of 
Cambodia; 2) Representative of the Ministry of Economy and Finance; 3) Representative 
of the National Counter Terrorism Committee; 4) CAFIU BOD from the Ministry of Interior; 
5) CAFIU BOD from the Ministry of Economy and Finance; 6) CAFIU BOD from the Ministry 
of Justice; 7) CAFIU BOD from the Council of Ministers; 8) Representative of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; and 8) Secretary General of the Cambodia 
Financial Intelligence Unit.320 The Committee was created to prevent and control money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism; therefore, the inclusion of a several different 
ministries, including Finance, Justice, and Interior seems to suggest coordination amongst 
different agencies. Because the National Council Against Corruption (“NCAC”) contains 
members from different organisations, it appears to maintain operational independence, 
along with CAFIU which is overseen by the NBC. 
In December 2014, the RGC revised Strategy 5 in the National Strategies on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 2013-2017 by adding seven more actions to build 
capacity of the CAFIU and law enforcement officials and to strengthen cooperation among 
relevant domestic agencies in AML activities.321 Primary concerns regarding enforcement 
and implementation of the Law involve the willingness of domestic authorities to share 
information amongst themselves and to investigate and prosecute cases. For that reason 
under the National Strategies, the RGC established a Review Panel managed by the 
Counter Terrorism Department of the General Commissariat of National Police. The Panel is 
comprised of CAFIU and law enforcement agencies and serves to strengthen cooperation and 
share information amongst relevant entities.322 The National Strategies also recommended 
increased coordination with international law enforcement through mutual legal assistance, 
request for freezing, seizing and confiscation of assets or proceeds of crime and extradition, 
by potentially ratifying any remaining UN Conventions, entering into memoranda of 
understanding with other nations, enhancing and strengthening international coordination 
by information sharing and working with neighbouring countries.323  
Some trainings for officials have been organised. In 2017, 30 ACU officials participated 
in a training on investigating and preventing money laundering crimes.324 In terms of 
coordination with financial institutions, a foreign financial institution noted reporting 
requirements are inconsistently applied and one institution may be more compliant than 
another with little to no enforcement from the NBC. The financial institution has sent 
numerous reports identifying suspicious activity; however, reports are usually not followed 
up on.235 In the January 2017 conviction of two Congolese men for forgery related to 
a money laundering scheme, the Ministry of Interior stated they would coordinate with 
Interpol to pursue additional suspects in Thailand.  
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Transparency International’s plain language definition of collusion is “a secret agreement 
between parties, in the public and/or private sector, to conspire to commit actions aimed 
to deceive or commit fraud with the objective of illicit financial gain. The parties involved 
often are referred to as ‘cartels”.327 Collusion is an assortment of acts that pave the way 
for a corporate and/or government culture to support corrupt acts such as bribery, price 
fixing, transfer pricing or the creation of slush funds. The only operational definition of 
collusion under Cambodian law is in the 2012 Law on Public Procurement. Collusion is 
defined as “a plot or an arrangement organised by two or more bidders to create an 
artificial price that has no real competitive nature, or to influence the activity of any 
party in the public procurement process, or the implementation of the contract”.328  
In the 2012 Law on Public Procurement, a bidder, contractor, or supplier who is found 
to be involved in corruption or collusion will be immediately terminated and blacklisted 
from current and future bidding processes.329 Although acts under the broader definition 
of collusion are included under the Cambodian Criminal Code (i.e. Fraud)330 and the Anti-
Corruption Law331 they are not specific or comprehensive enough to satisfy the standard 
of prohibiting collusion. Further, although prohibitions of corrupt practices under the 
Cambodian Criminal Code and Civil Code - such as fraud, bribery, extortion and cheating 
- exist they are rarely enforced. A more comprehensive treatment of collusion exists 
under the draft law on competition, but it remains in draft form and thus is not yet 
applicable to this analysis. Although the draft was expected to be put before the Council 
of Ministers at the end of 2016, it has yet to reach this stage of the legislative process.332 
Passing and implementing the draft law on competition will be vital to combatting 
collusion since protecting open market competition is one of the key mechanisms which 
weakens a culture of opportunism and poor business ethics. 
Legal frameworks prohibiting collusion and protecting whistleblowers who report acts 
of corruption, increasing communication between business associations, consumer 
groups and anti-corruption organisations and building adequate capacity in the business 
sectors to report cartels and price fixing are only starting to take root in Cambodia. It 
will take many years, with a significant level of capacity building and training, before a 
culture of self-reporting, civil society monitoring, and a strong legal framework are in 
place. Enforcing the minimal prohibition on collusion in public procurement is a starting 
point until the legal framework is further developed to be sufficiently robust. 
1.4.1 Laws prohibiting collusion
Do the country’s laws prohibit collusion?
The Law on Public Procurement provides the only definition of collusion under Cambodia 
law. Collusion is defined as “a plot or an arrangement organized by two or more bidders 
to create an artificial price that has no real competitive nature, or to influence the activity 
of any party in the public procurement process, or the implementation of the contract”.333 
The definition infers a prohibition on price-fixing in the bidding process.334 The Cambodian 
Law on Investment has a provision on price fixing that prohibits the Government from 
imposing price controls on products or services of investors who have received prior 
approval from the RGC.335 It also provides guarantees that the RGC will not undertake 
nationalisation policies that will adversely affect the private properties of investors.336  
The draft law on competition offers broader regulations on the Cambodian market, such 
as general prohibitions on price fixing, artificially dividing markets and restrictive quotas, 
when it is promulgated. The draft law on competition includes three articles prohibiting 
the sharing or dividing of markets on both horizontal and vertical agreements337 and 
two articles prohibiting the restriction of the quantity of goods on both horizontal and 
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vertical agreements.338 The draft law also includes two articles prohibiting price fixing in 
both horizontal and vertical agreements, which will reinforce the existing prohibition in 
the Law on Public Procurement.339 It will also prohibit the manipulation of bidding in the 
private sector on vertical and horizontal agreements when it is enacted. The purpose of 
the draft law is to establish provisions and procedures to promote a freely competitive 
market economy in Cambodia.340 Even when it becomes law, it will be some time before 
the Cambodian market develops sufficiently for the law to be widely applied.
Currently, market regulation operates through officially sanctioned and supported local 
trade associations who set prices/tariffs for local goods and services to mitigate the 
bottoming effect of a completely unregulated market. These trade associations typically 
operate on a municipal level, such as an organisation that regulates Tuk-Tuk prices in 
Sihanoukville.341 Larger trade associations such as Cambodian Federation of Employers 
and Business Associations (“CAMFEBA”) and the Federation of Association for Small & 
Medium Enterprises in Cambodia (“FASMEC”) exist to give a voice to the small and medium 
size businesses that make up the majority of the Cambodian economy. At its current stage 
of development, the connections and negotiating powers of the trade associations have a 
greater effect on market prices than would competition legislation.342 
1.4.2 Enforcement of laws prohibiting collusion
Are sanctions and incentives applied in practice to deter collusive 
practices?
Law enforcement agencies demonstrate weak enforcement of cases of collusion at the 
national level. Furthermore, any enforcement activity is limited by the narrow scope of 
collusion under the Law on Public Procurement, as discussed above. Under the Law, a 
bidder, contractor, or supplier who is found to be involved in corruption or collusion will 
be immediately terminated and blacklisted from current and future bidding processes.343 
Public procurement officials involved in collusion or corruption receive administrative 
sanctions and the possibility of criminal prosecution.344 There is no public record of 
complaints or accusations of collusion in public procurement at the national level. 
Under the Law there are no statute of limitation periods listed nor are there incentive 
programs or protections to reduce or suspend sanctions for whistleblowers who report 
acts of collusion in the bidding process.
The only active enforcement of regulations regarding collusion under the Law on Public 
Procurement was reported by civil society organisation SILAKA.345 SILAKA piloted the 
Joint Procurement Monitoring Committee at the Sub-National Level (JPMC) which 
creates procurement monitoring committees at the Commune/Sangkat level.346 For 
example, the JPMC group in Kampong Thom province reported bidders colluding together 
to the provincial authority, the Provincial Planning and Investment Division (PID).347 
The colluding bidders were blacklisted from the bidding process and the PID brought 
the concerns to the National Committee for Sub-National Democratic Development 
(“NDCC”). The NDCC initiated a change to the Procurement Implementation Manual 
which now requires bidders to place a 2% deposit to enter the bidding process at the 
Commune/Sangkat level.348
Despite the narrow definition of collusion under Cambodian law it is clear that instances 
of collusion occur in Cambodia by the reported large amounts of illicit financial flows 
(IFFs). It is estimated that Cambodia lost 1.5 billion USD to illicit financial flows between 
2004-2013, which necessarily depends on acts of collusion.349 Sources of IFFs in Cambodia 
are typically, but not limited to, illicit natural resource extraction such as the timber 
industry350, sand dredging exports351 and unregulated fishing. Within the time frame where 
IFF losses were reported there has been a sharp increase in the monetary amount of IFFs 
between 2011 to 2014, increasing from 1.7 billion USD to 4 billion USD.352  One lawmaker 
pointed out that the money lost to IFFs in 2013 was more than the national budget of that 
year353 profoundly impacting everything from public expenditures to taxation.
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For example, illicit logging has been an issue along Cambodia’s borders since the 1970s 
and there have long been accusations of collusion between local enforcement agencies 
and illicit loggers. In 2017 the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries registered 
a significant drop in the amount of illegal timber seized, compared to a much smaller 
decline in the number of logging cases, in the same period last year.354 The ministry 
attributes this drop to an anti-logging task force formed in 2016, specifically targeting 
North eastern provinces in Cambodia.355 Civil society organisations alternatively 
reported that forestry crimes have not dropped and that law enforcement remained lax 
because of collusion between timber traders and local officials.356 
Most of the IFFs leaving Cambodia are through trade mis-invoicing,357 where exporters or 
importers incorrectly report the value or volume of their imported or exported product 
on their shipping manifest.358 This process allows large sums of money to flow through 
international borders undetected. From 2005-2014 as much as 3.6 billion USD were not 
represented on exports and imports of goods passing through Cambodian ports because 
of mis-invoicing, but the amount is likely much greater.359 This figure also does not 
include services and other intangibles. This indicates that regulation of export markets 
through enforcement of corruption standards is not effective under the current legal 
framework. The challenge of stopping IFFs in Cambodia also suggests a poor connection 
between Government Ministries and local administrators at the provincial or district 
levels. That being said, trade mis-invoicing is a global problem which accounts for 83% 
of the 1 trillion USD leaving developing countries annually.360 Thus, Cambodia will need 
to participate in global efforts to curb IFFs and trade mis-invoicing in the future.
1.4.3 Capacities to enforce laws prohibiting collusion
Are adequate enforcement capacities available for enforcing laws 
prohibiting collusion?
The draft law on competition has not been enacted thus there is no enforcement. 
There is limited information and enforcement of the prohibition on collusion in public 
procurement, particularly at the national and provincial levels. The greatest success 
being at the Commune/Sangkat level in the provinces who are implementing the 
programme managed by SILAKA. There is no general information on whether funding 
is adequate for staff of enforcement authorities. Given that enforcement is both 
limited and weak, funding is unlikely to be adequate. The PIDs enforcing Commune/
Sangkat level procurement processes in Kampong Thom function effectively and have 
operational independence.361 Enforcement of the limited prohibitions on collusion in 
sectors vulnerable to IFFs remains a challenge. Cooperation with other anti-corruption 
agencies is limited to the increased activity reported by the General Department on Tax, 
who are increasing the pressure for SMEs to register their business activities. There is 
limited information on cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities.
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1.5 Whistleblowing
There is currently no whistleblower protection law in Cambodia. In 2016, a draft law 
was introduced that, if passed, could provide a good legal framework for protecting 
whistleblowers.362 As a signatory to UNCAC, a whistleblower law would be in accordance 
with Article 33 on the protection of reporting persons. Additionally, a whistleblower law 
would encourage individuals to come forward and report corruption. For example, after 
passing a whistleblowing law, the Republic of Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
commission recovered 50,000,000 USD in 183 cases.363 In November 2014, the ACU and 
the National Assembly’s Commission on anti-corruption, Commission X, expressed a joint 
commitment to drafting a whistleblower protection law.364 Currently the drafting process 
has progressed into two laws, the draft law on the protection of reporting persons and the 
draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses.
Of note are two provisions in the Criminal Code and the Anti-Corruption Law that 
penalise individuals who maliciously report or report false or defamatory information. 
These two provisions could arguably deter potential whistleblowers from reporting. 
1.5.1 Whistleblower laws
Do the country’s laws provide for protection to public and private sector 
whistleblowers regarding corruption?
Cambodia does not have a comprehensive law to protect whistleblowers. A draft 
whistleblower law has been developed by the ACU to encourage people to report 
wrongdoings, related to corruption, to the ACU. The draft creates a potentially sound 
legal framework for protecting whistleblowers and handling complaints.365 However, 
there are some problematic areas, particularly Article 12, which states that an individual 
who reports, “…shall be excused from administrative, civil, and criminal responsibility 
of acts relating to his or her reporting”.366 This provision limits liability only to acts 
related to reporting, therefore the whistleblower may be liable for other acts, which can 
be used to deter whistleblowing. Additionally, Article 10 states that the protection will 
not be granted if the whistleblower or a person close to them leaks the information.367 
This provision again creates an exclusion to the law that can be used against the 
whistleblower. 
In the Anti-Corruption Law, the Anti-Corruption Unit is charged with “keeping absolute 
confidentiality of corruption-related sources”.368 However, there are also legal provisions 
in the ACL and the Criminal Code that discourage individuals from serving as witnesses 
or reporting wrongdoing to a competent authority.  In the Criminal Code, the provision 
on malicious denunciation can criminalise a person who reports any crimes or who 
files a complaint to a competent authority.369 This provision only criminalises people 
who file reports maliciously or a fake report, however, due to the lack of trust in the 
judiciary and the lack of presence of a whistleblower law, individuals do not report at 
all.370 Despite statements by the Chairman of the ACU, who has repeatedly and publicly 
stated that he would not prosecute anyone under this provision who reported to the 
ACU, few whistleblowers have come forward.371 Additionally, in the Anti-Corruption Law, 
defamation or disinformation complaints on corruption lodged with either the ACU or 
the Court can be punished from 1 month to 6 months in prison and a fine from 1,000,000 
to 10,000,000 riels.372 
Whistleblowing protections are also provided under the Manual on Procurement in both 
the sections on the Complaint Handling Mechanism and the section referring to the 
Anti-Corruption Law. The Law shields the identity of a person reporting a complaint or 
corruption during the procurement process.373  
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The current draft law does not strongly outline comprehensive and accessible civil and/or 
employment remedies and should be clarified. The law also does not state what criminal 
or disciplinary sanctions are available against those responsible for retaliation.374 
Finally, while the law intends to create a reporting mechanism for whistleblowers, it 
does not include specifics about what those mechanisms are and how much authority 
they will enjoy.375 While the draft law is lacking in certain areas, there is undoubtedly a 
need for a comprehensive law, covering all sectors, which protects whistleblowers who 
report corruption.
1.5.2 Enforcement of whistleblower Laws
To what extent does the public sector enforce the laws protecting 
whistleblowers in the public and private sector?
Since there is not currently a whistleblower law, enforcement is currently impossible. 
There is also no information available on the protection of those reporting corruption 
during the procurement process.
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Cambodia has a robust legal framework of accounting and auditing laws and regulations 
and an independent professional monitoring body that governs the implementation 
of accounting regulations and accounting and auditing professionals. Under the Law, 
most enterprises and organisations are required to prepared financial statements 
within three months of the fiscal year-end. The 2017 Law on Financial Management 
significantly restructured the tax regime into small taxpayers, medium taxpayers and 
large taxpayers to require more businesses to file financial statements with their tax 
returns.376 Enterprises whose yearly revenues are less than 62,500 USD do not need to 
report their revenues in compliance with accounting standards. In the past two years, 
the General Department of Taxation (GDT) has substantially increased its activities in 
promoting tax compliance. This is the main driver of enforcing accounting and auditing 
standards in Cambodia. 
The low level of registration among SMEs and micro businesses means that tax compliance, 
and therefore compliance with auditing and accounting legislation, remains a challenge. 
Business associations representing SMEs report challenges and frustration among their 
membership regarding the changes to the Real Regime Tax System (“RRTS”) in 2016. 
The inconsistent implementation of tax reporting standards by the GDT exacerbates 
this problem as many SME business owners see the regulations as restricting their 
competitiveness in non-tax-compliant sectors.377 Multinational companies, on the other 
hand, are required to comply with international auditing and accounting standards from 
their home jurisdictions; therefore, the changes to the law were not overly burdensome. 
1.6.1 Accounting and auditing standards
Does the country’s accounting and auditing regulatory framework 
adhere to international recognized standards?
The regulatory environment of accounting and auditing standards in Cambodia is 
independent and technically skilled for both international and national level accountants 
and auditors. The National Accounting Council (“NAC”) of Cambodia implemented 
International Financial Reporting Standards (“CIFRS”) for both regular companies and 
Small and Medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) beginning on or after 1 January 2010 and 
1 January 2012, respectively. The MEF adopted IFRS standards as the national standard 
in Cambodia in 2009 without modification.378 CIFRS for SMEs have simplifications 
that reflect the needs of SMEs and also take account of cost-benefit considerations.379 
Mandatory implementation of CIFRS Standards for commercial banks and microfinance 
institutions is delayed to 2019 for all banking and financial institution and general 
insurance companies.380 A senior accounting consultant with a major firm confirmed 
that Cambodia has implemented IFRS standards and when assisting clients, their 
audited financial statements are IFRS compliant.381 
Companies are required to prepare regular financial statements following 
the accounting standards set by the Kampuchea Institute Certified Public 
Accountants and Auditors (“KICPAA”) and the National Accounting Council 
(“NAC”).382 Financial statements “shall include the balance sheet, the 
income statement, the cash flow statement and explanatory notes”.383 
Companies are also required under the Law on Corporate Accounts to maintain 
accurate books and records available for inspection that properly and fairly document 
all financial transactions.384 The Prakas set by the MEF in 2009 require all enterprises to 
submit their accounts to an independent auditor if they meet the following criteria: i) an 
annual turnover of 750,000 USD ii) Assets totalling more than 500,000 USD or iii) more 
than 100 employees (also the qualification for a large enterprise).385 Companies that are 
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traded on the Cambodia Stock Exchange are required to publish their independently 
audited financial statements on the CSX website.386 There are only five companies listed 
on the exchange at the time of writing. Considering that SMEs make up the majority 
of Cambodian businesses and that most SMEs are unregistered with the MoC or GDT, 
Cambodia’s accounting and auditing regulatory framework does not apply to many 
Cambodian businesses. Further, despite the efforts by the GDT, there is not an effective 
mechanism to deal with the large informal sector of the economy under the current 
auditing and accounting regulatory framework.
1.6.2 Enforcement of accounting and auditing standards
Is the adherence of the country’s accounting and auditing regulatory 
framework enforced in practice?
The primary enforcement agency for accounting and auditing laws and regulations 
is the General Department of Tax (“GDT”).387 The 2017 Law on Financial Management 
has restructured the tax regime and created new business categories for reporting and 
taxation: small, medium and large taxpayers. Small taxpayers, starting at 62,500 USD in 
revenues per annum, are required to follow simplified accounting standards and submit 
a monthly tax return in one single form.388 The next category of medium taxpayers 
(175,0000 - 500,000 USD revenue per annum) are required to follow the international 
accounting standards of Cambodia and submit their tax returns to the GDT on an annual 
basis389. Medium taxpayers now have the same tax liabilities as legal entities; therefore, it 
is to their benefit to register as a legal entity with the Ministry of Commerce (“MoC”) and 
the GDT.390 Large taxpayers, who earn more than 500,000 USD per annum, are required 
to follow the same reporting standards as medium taxpayers.391 The biggest shift since 
2016 is for SMEs or small taxpayers. Prior to the 2016 amendments, small tax payers 
were required to file an estimated annual income, which was impossible for the GDT to 
audit.392 The estimated taxpayer category reinforced poor accounting and record keeping 
standards and under reporting of income among SMEs, which is why the current transition 
to simplified accounting standards is causing confusion. Since 2015, the GDT has been 
very active in both enforcement of reported taxpayer irregularities and providing training 
to SMEs to build their capacity to implement the accounting standards under their new 
taxpayer status.393 
The main challenge for enforcement of auditing and accounting standards is getting 
businesses to register with the MoC and GDT. A large proportion of the over 500,000 
businesses in the Cambodian economy are micro-businesses and SMEs, only 7.8% of 
businesses are registered.394 An example of how the GDT meeting this challenge and 
enforcing reporting standards is by ensuring that registered enterprises use suppliers 
and service providers who are also registered with the tax authority.395 The GDT can 
ensure reporting down the supply chain by disallowing any tax deduction from the 
supplier or service provider that are not registered with the GDT and tax compliant. 
A senior accountant confirmed that their firm changed the travel agency they used in 
order to ensure that the services provided were tax deductible.396 As discussed above, 
the GDT is incentivising its officers to enforce the laws by providing 30% bonuses for 
giving penalties, even though about 50% of those penalties fail on appeal in independent 
arbitration.397  
The reason behind the increased activity of the GDT is that Cambodia has been reclassified 
by the World Bank Group (“WBG”) as a Lower-Middle Income economy from a Iower 
Income economy.398  The WBG classification depends on Gross National Income (“GNI”). 
Cambodia’s GNI for 2015 was 1,070 USD, just slightly above the threshold of 1,025 USD 
for Lower Income economies.399 A reclassification will lead to a scale-back of foreign aid 
and preferential trade access400  thereby requiring the country to expand its tax base 
to increase tax revenue. In the opinion of a senior accountant working in Cambodia the 
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GDT is going about expanding the tax base in an effective manner, by targeting larger 
enterprises in construction, hospitality, manufacturing and car dealerships and then 
using their investment in the economy to promote compliance.401 Alternatively, business 
associations reported an inconsistent application of the new tax requirements resulting 
in an uneven playing field.402 
Effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for 
failure to keep or for omissions and falsification of books, records and accounts for the 
purpose of concealing corruption are available in both the Law on Corporate Accounts403 
and the Law on Accounting and Auditing404 and the Criminal Code405  but the application 
of sanctions is almost exclusively through the GDT enforcing the new amendments to 
the Tax Law.406  It should also be noted that enforcement of auditing and accounting 
standards without due process is also allegedly being used to target civil society and 
independent press organisations that are seen as critical of the Government.407 For 
example, the Cambodia Daily publisher was quoted that “[t]his is clearly a tax bill that 
is not meant to be paid but whose purpose is to close down the Cambodia Daily” with 
regards to the closure of the Cambodia Daily in September 2017.408 
1.6.3 Professional service providers
Are the country’s professional service providers required to comply with 
internationally recognised standards?
Professional auditors and accountants are formally licensed under the Kampuchea 
Institute Certified Public Accountants and Auditors (“KICPAA”) under the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and regulated by the National Accounting Council (“NAC”) as of 
2016.409 Both the KICPAA and the NAC are mandated to implement Cambodian IFRS 
standards.410 A senior international accountant working in Cambodia also confirmed 
that Cambodian trained accountants and auditors are technically proficient and it is 
quite common for domestically trained accountants to undertake the qualification for 
accountants in the UK (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants).411 Accountants 
and auditors in Cambodia enjoy a high degree of independence from the government 
both in practice and in law. The original Law on Corporate Accounts and the new 2016 
Law on Accounting and Auditing include articles enshrining the independence of the 
accounting and auditing profession.412 The KICPAA and the NAC are the professional 
bodies that govern auditors and accountants in Cambodian and apply sanctions 
for unethical behaviour.413 In practice, the GDT is providing most of the training on 
accounting practices to local Cambodian businesses in its efforts to increase tax 
compliance. The accounting professionals interviewed in writing this report did not 
report any interaction with the NAC.  
1.6.4 Beneficial ownership
Do the country’s laws require public information on beneficial ownership 
for companies, trusts and other legal structures?
The understanding of and value placed on collecting beneficial ownership information for 
companies registered in Cambodia and in the wider ASEAN trade area is relatively low. 
Even the definition of a beneficial owner is often unclear and inconsistent. For example, 
in the bilateral double tax agreement signed between Cambodia and Singapore in 2016, 
the definition of a beneficial owner is: “a trustee liable to tax in a Contracting State in 
respect of dividends, interest or royalties shall be deemed to be the beneficial owner of 
that interest or those dividends or royalties”.414 This definition contradicts the definition 
of an “ultimate beneficial owner” from the 2007 Law on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating Financing of Terrorism (“LAMCFT”): “a person who ultimately owns or 
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controls a customer on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted, including those 
persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.”415 
No information on the ownership structure of a business is required when registering 
a new business with the MoC.416 Businesses in Cambodia must be registered with the 
MoC at least 15 days prior to the commencement of business activities. To register a 
business in Cambodia, one needs a valid identification and visa, or a national ID Card, 
a work permit and 1,000 USD in a Cambodian bank account.417 Businesses in Cambodia 
can be 100% foreign-owned, and it is only recently that a domestic bank account is 
required to register a business. Theoretically, the information on businesses registered 
in Cambodia should be available with the Ministry of Commerce, but this information 
has not been listed publicly on their website since 2015.418 Registry of a business with 
the MoC includes the full name, birth date, nationality, address of the registered office 
and the principle place of business. A description of business operations is required but 
a description of how the ownership or control is exercised is not.419  
Registered businesses represent a small fraction of the total businesses operating in 
Cambodia. Most large Cambodian businesses, such as the major banks, airlines and public 
service providers, may have their audited financial statements on their websites but not 
information on ownership of the controlling interests in the respective companies. For 
the five businesses listed on the Cambodian Stock Exchange, ownership information, 
including major shareholders, is publicly available on the website in both English and 
Khmer.420 The CSX ownership information, listing substantial shareholders, does not 
account for trusts, Special Purpose Vehicles or LLCs whose sole purpose is to invest on 
behalf of anonymous parties, therefore the beneficial ownership information, even on 
the Cambodian Stock Exchange, is relatively limited. Furthermore, beneficial ownership 
information is often misreported, an example being the construction industry.421 A 
Special Purpose Vehicle will obtain a license for construction, which can qualify for tax 
incentives, but a significant portion of the budget will go to an anonymous individual or 
company.422   
LAMCFT includes measures under customer due diligence for reporting entities that 
requires companies to look behind the information that is reported to their service 
providers or suppliers.423 This Law designates the MoC as the “competent supervisory 
authority” who is legislated to ensure “that the management and shareholders of 
reporting entities are fit and proper so as to prevent criminals or their associates 
from holding, or being the beneficial owners of, a significant or controlling interest 
or management function in such entities”.424 Whether these provisions in LAMCFT 
have been applied is unknown and highly unlikely given the low level of registration of 
businesses in Cambodia.
Under LAMCTF, customer due diligence should consist of 1) identifying the customer 
and verifying their identity using reliable independent source documents or data; 
2) determine if the customer conducting business is acting on behalf of himself or 
a beneficial owner; 3) understand the beneficial ownership and control structure; 4) 
obtain information on the purpose and the nature of the business relationship; and 5) 
conduct ongoing due diligence and scrutiny to ensure the information is updated and 
relevant.425 However, the National Strategies on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering 
Funding Terrorism identified gaps in the regulatory framework of LAMCTF, including a 
lack of standard reporting formats for banks and other reporting entities, enhancing 
measures for high risk customers and transactions and developing a clear process for 
identifying beneficial owners.426
Reporting entities, including trusts, are required by law to “take customer due diligence 
measures, including the identification of their customers and the verification of their 
customers’ identity”.427 The LAMCFT offers the most comprehensive regulation on 
trusts under the jurisdiction of the Financial Intelligence Unit (“CAFIU”)428 but this 
does not include information on beneficiaries and the enforcement of these reporting 
laws is weak. Disclosure of nominees fronting directors or shareholders are not 
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required on record including the name of the beneficial owners behind the nominee. 
The only requirement under Law is to report suspicious transactions to the CAFIU.429 
Wilful misrepresentation of beneficial ownership information does not directly provide 
grounds for criminal and civil penalties, nor the possibility of imprisonment. Failure to 
disclose nominees fronting directors or shareholders are also not grounds for criminal 
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Undue influence on the public sector, through unregulated political contributions from 
the private sector, lobbying, and a lack of disclosure of conflicts of interest, occurs when 
there is a weak regulatory framework or a lack of enforcement mechanisms. Cambodian 
law has minimal regulations prohibiting undue political influence from the private 
sector. Monitoring of the mechanisms of undue influence also remain weak and thus 
enforcement is sporadic and does not often result in sanctions. 
The newly amended (2017) Law on Political Parties (“LPP”) details financial reporting 
requirements for registered political parties and places restrictions on the sources of 
funding received by political parties. The Law lacks specificity on reporting of political 
contributions from the private sector and fails to place any limit on their amount. 
Sanctions can be applied immediately under the Law by the Ministry of the Interior 
(“MoI”) or the Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”) for parties found in violation, 
including the immediate suspension of all party activities. The recent Law on Election 
of Members of the National Assembly (“LEMNA”) adds additional financial reporting 
requirements for election campaigns, both for political parties and individual candidates, 
but this information is not publicly reported. 
The concept of political lobbying in Cambodia remains undeveloped. This is not surprising 
given that Cambodia is transitioning from a low-income economy relying on the guidance 
of international organisations to a lower-middle income economy seeking to attract 
foreign investors. As such, professional associations, trade associations and civil society 
organisations do work to influence government decisions but they are not registered 
as political lobbyists and there is no formal regulation on these interactions. Similarly, 
the legal framework regulating conflicts of interest for public sector officials is not well 
developed. Disclosing ties to the private sector is not mentioned in either the Law on 
Political Parties nor LEMNA. The only mentions of conflicts of interest under Cambodian 
law are in the Law on Public Procurement, precluding bidders from participating in the 
bidding process who have a conflict, and in the draft law on competition, which has yet 
to become law. 
1.7.1 Laws on political contributions
Is undue influence in the form of political contributions from the 
private sector to political parties and/or individual candidates prohibited 
by law?
There are limited mechanisms in place under Cambodian law to determine direct 
public and private funding for electoral campaigns. Under the 2013 Law on Election 
of Members of the National Assembly (“LEMNA”), the monitoring and facilitation of 
electoral campaigns is under the purview of the National Election Committee (“NEC”).430 
Political parties campaigning for an electoral cycle must register with the NEC between 
70 and 90 days prior to polling and provide an approved bank statement by the National 
Bank of Cambodia (“NBC”) that includes contributions from “whatever sources, has been 
deposited by the political party in any bank in the Kingdom of Cambodia”.431  LEMNA 
also details that all political contributions shall be deposited in a party bank account 
and all electoral campaign spending shall be debited from the same bank account.432 
Furthermore, each registered party must keep an account book to record the source 
of income and the expenses for the electoral campaign, which the NEC has the right to 
inspect at any time.433  
The information gathered by the NEC on the campaign finances of the political parties 
registered in an electoral cycle is not made public, making it difficult for election 
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monitoring organisations to identify and investigate irregularities. In the last National 
Assembly election in 2013, a civil society organisation estimated that campaign 
spending by the incumbent party (15,000,000 USD)434 was five times more than the 
highest contesting party (3,500,000 USD) and thirty times more than the next highest 
party (500,000 USD).435 The use of state resources in favour or against a political party 
or individual candidate is not strictly prohibited under the Law.
Under the LPP, registered political parties must send an annual report of activities and a 
financial report to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
under the Law.436 The financial report includes a bank statement, statement of income 
and expenses and a statement of assets and liabilities.437 These reports are not made 
public but are available by Law to relevant competent institutions, including the judiciary.
New amendments passed by the Senate in February 2017 to the Law on Political Parties 
have increased state regulations on the funding options of all political parties. The Law 
on Political Parties (1997) mandated that “the State could allocate the national budget 
of equal amounts to all political parties, for a purpose of using only in the campaign 
for election of Representatives of the people”438 but civil society organisations report 
unequal electoral spending in the latest National Assembly elections in 2013.439 The 
new amendments to the Law on Political Parties ban political parties from receiving 
contributions from “state institutions, non-governmental organisations, associations, 
public enterprises, public foundations, public institutes” with the exception under Article 
28.440 The new amendments also prohibit a political party from receiving contributions 
from foreign institutions, companies or organisations which have funding from foreign 
sources.441 The UNHCHR commented that restrictions on campaign funding are necessary 
and common in most democracies, but too much regulation places an undue burden on 
non-ruling political parties.442  
The current legal framework sets no limits on the total amount of funds parties can 
raise for campaign financing, or otherwise. The restrictions on political party funding 
under the new amendments on the Law on Political Parties are worrying because the 
Ministry of Interior is authorised to suspend activities of a political party when it finds 
that a party has “acted in contradiction to the Constitution, Law on Political Parties and 
other laws currently in force”.443 This includes the new restrictions on political parties 
receiving contributions from organisations with foreign funding sources. This framework 
gives the ruling party a distinct advantage over other opposition parties, particularly 
with the 2017 amendments to the Law on Political Parties limiting foreign funding, such 
as contributions from the large Cambodian diaspora. Under the new amendments, the 
Ministry of Interior may impose a fine of just over 5,000 USD or suspend political activities 
for parties in violation of receiving contributions from sources listed under Article 29 
new.444 This Amendment has the potential to unduly restrict citizen engagement in the 
political process, particularly given the remitting of monies from abroad and a high level 
of integration of foreign aid in Cambodia’s civic environment.445 
There are no regulations governing the amount of loans available to political parties 
and individual candidates, other than the reporting requirements to the NEC of a bank 
statement during an electoral campaign, or the annual report to the MEF and MoI as 
detailed above. There are also no limits on corporate donations to political parties and 
individual political candidates. Anonymous contributions to political parties or individual 
candidates are not out-rightly banned under the Law, save reporting to the NEC during 
the election cycle and to the MoI and MEF annually.446  
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1.7.2 Enforcement and public disclosure on political 
contributions
Is the prohibiting of undue influence in the form of political contributions 
from the private sector to political parties and/or individual candidates 
monitored in practice?
The NEC is the main oversight body for elections in Cambodia at the provincial and 
national levels. It is an independent agency that is mandated to neutrally implement 
its jurisdiction to ensure a free, fair, and just election in accordance with the principles 
of a multiparty, liberal democracy, as guaranteed under the Constitution.447 Under 
LEMNA political parties or individual candidates must include a bank statement in their 
registration to the NEC but there is no detail of whether it must be itemised, only that 
it must include “contributions from whatever sources”.448 The NEC has the authority 
under its mandate to review the financial records of political parties.449 A civil society 
organisation reported that as of 2013 the NEC has not examined campaign expenditure 
of any political party including the last National Assembly election.450 Furthermore, 
neither the MEF nor MoI, the annual reporting institutions for registered political 
parties, have publicly reported irregularities in political party accounts at the time of 
writing. The annual reports from registered political parties must include “a balance 
sheet stating of incomes and expenses for the year by category”.451 These reports are 
not made public but are kept for seven years and are available for control/inspection 
with the decision of the courts or a competent institution.452  
1.7.3 Laws on lobbying
Is undue influence of lobbying by the private sector prohibited by law?
There are no lobbying restrictions or laws that exist in Cambodia for lobbying by the 
private sector including by corporate lobbyists, professional associations, trade unions, 
law firms, or civil society organisations. As such no public registry of lobbying exists 
nor does a global registry of targets by international trade organisations to which 
Cambodia is a member. A “legislative footprint” procedure is not required for key pieces 
of legislation nor is there a “cooling-off” period for public officials to work in the private 
sector as unofficial “lobbyists”. Personal and political connections are highly important 
for conducting business in Cambodia and this includes connections to public officials. 
1.7.4 Enforcement and public disclosure on lobbying
Is the prohibition of undue influence in the form of lobbying by the private 
sector monitored in practice?
 As there are no lobbying regulations or restrictions, there is equally no independent, 
mandated and well-resourced oversight body that manages registration of lobbyists, 
offers guidance to individuals and organisations, and investigates apparent breaches or 
anomalies. Nor is information, registration or data on lobbyists available online. 
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1.7.5 Laws on other conflicts of interest
Is undue influence in the form of other conflicts of interest between the 
private sector and public sector prohibited by law?
There is limited regulation preventing undue influence in the form of conflicts of interest 
between the private sector and public sector. The Law on Public Procurement and the 
draft law on competition both address conflicts of interest between the private and public 
sector in their respective areas. The new draft law on competition offers an operative 
definition of conflict of interest in most areas of interaction between the public and 
private sector. It will also mandate a commission to address conflicts of interest in most 
areas of trade when promulgated. The Manual on Public Procurement (Vol. 1) includes a 
section defining conflicts of interest in the procurement process and mandates that any 
bidder or staff disclose potential areas of conflict and precludes them from the bidding 
process.453 There is no mention of a cooling-off period in either legislation. 
1.7.6 Enforcement and public disclosure of other conflicts 
of interest
Is the prohibition of undue influence in the form of other conflict of 
interest between the private and the public sector monitored in practice?
As detailed more fully in Section 2.8 on public procurement, monitoring disclosures of 
conflicts of interest during the public procurement process is not common in practice, 
although mandatory under the Manual on Public Procurement (Vol. 1).454 Public officials 
and senior civil servants do not commonly declare their business interests or relationship 
with the private sector nor are bidding documents typically available to the public. 
The Procurement Committee and ultimately the MEF are responsible for monitoring 
conflicts of interest, but in practice, no instances of declared conflicts of interest have 
been publicly reported. Since the passing of the 2012 Law on Public Procurement, there 
are several reports in English newspapers of irregularities in the procurement process 
with some Ministries and national bodies.455 One instance of procurement malpractice 
involving the Ministry of Health was investigated by the ACU, but the outcome of the 
investigation remains unclear.456  Procurement irregularities reported in the Cambodian 
media point to the existence of undisclosed conflicts of interest.457 Therefore, despite 
the strength of public procurement legislation and regulations in Cambodia interactions 
between the public and private sectors regarding conflicts of interest remains opaque. 
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1.8 Public Procurement
Regulation of public procurement has been legislated in some form in Cambodia since 
1995,458 following the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (“UNTAC”) 
handover of the governance of the Cambodian state in 1993. Cambodia first regulated 
its public procurement process with technical support from the Asian Development 
Bank (“ADB”) in order to make public spending more transparent and effective and 
in line with the international standards. At first only the loans and aid received from 
ADB were monitored. This legal framework was progressively expanded upon until the 
Royal Government of Cambodia (“RGC”) decided to use the regulations as the guiding 
principles to create a public procurement system for all public institutions.459  
In 2004, the World Bank and ADB published an assessment report on public procurement 
in Cambodia analysing the strength and weakness in implementing existing procurement 
regulations and meeting international standards.460 Based on these findings, the Prime 
Minister placed renewed emphasis on effective and transparent public procurement. 
This led to the creation of a draft law in 2010 which was completed and subsequently 
approved in 2012.461 The 2012 Law on Public Procurement are publicly available online in 
both English and Khmer. The law includes administrative safeguards designed to avoid 
intentional or inadvertent influence during the bidding, contracting and implementing 
processes. It also serves to limit the opportunity for decision makers to use their 
discretion during the process. 
In 1995, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”), the 
RGC piloted a programme on decentralising management authority to five provinces. 
The programme transferred the role of management and organisation of provincial 
matters to the provincial authorities. This programme expanded to the rest of the 
country by 2002 and included provincial management of the Commune/Sangkat 
Council elections. To date, there have been elections for three mandates under this 
system. The decentralisation of the state budget to the District level, including district 
procurement, was implemented in 2013.462 Public procurement at Commune/Sangkat 
and District level is managed and carried out by specialised departments that include 
the Commune Council.463  
With the decentralisation of the state budget, public procurement at the national 
level operates fairly independently from the District and Commune/Sangkat level. 
The implementation of the Law on Public Procurement differs substantially between 
Ministries providing services at a national level and public works projects administered 
at a local level. Public procurement is estimated to consume 40% of public expenditures 
as of 2012,464 therefore continued implementation of the comprehensive set of Laws 
is essential to increase transparency across Cambodia. There has been great success 
with a civil society project that began in 2013 that empowered local stakeholders to 
monitor Commune/Sangkat public procurement.465 Monitoring and reporting at the 
national level will increase the incentives of Ministers to implement public procurement 
processes, as mandated under the Law.
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1.8.1 Operating environment
To what extent do the country’s public procurement processes ensure 
that contracts are awarded in a fair and impartial manner?
The passing of the Law on Public Procurement466 in 2012 and two Manuals on Public 
Procurement (for externally-financed projects)467 established a robust legal framework 
to ensure that Cambodia’s procurement processes are awarded in a fair and impartial 
manner. These Laws and Sub-decrees are published and easily available on the website of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance in Khmer and English (though the English translation 
remains unofficial). The Laws detail each stage of the procurement process including 
the notification and bidding stages, awarding the contract, oversight of implementation, 
and complaint mechanisms. In 2013, the management of the state budget for public 
procurement was decentralised to the District level. Public procurement at Commune/
Sangkat and District levels is managed and carried out by specialised municipal 
departments.468 Procurement implementation manuals exist at the Commune/Sangkat 
and District levels to regulate procurement at a community level but are not available 
in English.469 It is not clear whether the Commune/Sangkat procurement manuals are 
consistent, but they are intended to give direction in implementing the 2012 Law on 
Public Procurement.
Information on new bids is often an area where public procurement lacks transparency. 
The 2012 Law provides several articles to assure that the notification of bidding is 
unbiased and openly competitive. Notification of on the pre-qualifications, bidding, 
and other amendments must be posted, under the Law, on the public procurement 
website and the press and the information board of the procurement implementing 
institution.470 With the decentralisation of the municipal budgets, announcements of 
bids under Commune/Sangkat projects can be found at the National Committee for Sub-
National Democratic Development (“NCDD”). All bidding proposals are open publicly 
and immediately after the bid entry deadline.471  
The administration processes set out in the Law and Sub-Decrees limit the discretion 
of both the procurement committee and bidders in the context of international and 
domestic procurement processes. The law further includes administrative safeguards 
designed to avoid intentional or inadvertent influence during the bidding, contracting 
and implementing processes. There is a clear chain of responsibility for reporting and 
monitoring procurement processes under the Law. All public bids are organised by a 
Committee on Public Procurement at each relevant institution,472 who report an annual 
procurement plan to the MEF for approval. Any act of public procurement is subjected 
to audits and inspections by the MEF.473 The Procurement Committee receives reports 
from the Procurement Unit who are responsible for implementing the contracts as set 
out under the Procurement Plan.474 Any alteration to the Procurement Plan provided by 
the relevant institution requires approval by the MEF.475  
The Law also includes safeguards limiting the influence of people in positions making 
decisions on public procurement. For example, Article 9 of the Law stipulates that “[t]
he [procurement] unit shall be led by a chief whose roles and duties do not involve 
with other financial matters at their own institution.  Chief of the procurement unit is 
a secretary of the procurement committee”.476 Additional oversight is provided by the 
development partners in externally financed projects, civil society organisations at the 
Commune/Sangkat level477 and ultimately the Cambodian Courts. 
Procurement regulations and policies in both Manual Sub-decrees (Vol. 1 & 2) require 
that each bid include an anti-corruption policy and mechanisms for safeguarding 
integrity and enforcing accountability.478 All bidders are required to complete the 
Statement on Ethical Conduct and Fraud and Corruption when submitting the bid.479 The 
anti-corruption statement submitted by the company during the bidding process does 
not apply to suppliers or sub-contractors of the company submitting the bid. To fill this 
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gap, the Sub-decrees specify that the Anti-Corruption Law in Cambodia is applicable 
and compliments existing policies of the contracting parties and any companies with 
whom they contract.480 These regulations apply to competitive bidding procurement 
processes. Non-bidding processes listed under Article 13 of the Law are not mentioned in 
the regulations. Integrity Pacts are not part of the procurement practices in Cambodian 
legislation or regulations at the time of writing. 
To make public procurement more transparent, there are specific standards in the Laws 
regulating when public bids must be subject to international bidding and to what degree 
notifications must be publicised. Tenders for work above 1 million USD are subject to 
international competitive bidding; the same applies for contracts of 300,000 USD or 
more for goods.481 Similar monetary thresholds, outlined in the Manuals on Procurement, 
trigger different bidding processes such as national competitive bidding, shopping, petty 
cash and direct contracting. Requirements for the breadth of bidding notifications are 
associated with each bidding process. For example, international competitive bids must 
be published in a minimum of one English and one Khmer newspaper, while nationally 
competitive bids need only be published in Khmer newspapers.482 At a more local level, 
shopping of goods and services need only be published in a provincially circulated 
newspaper.483  
An area of concern in the Law worth mentioning, although it does not seem to be 
used excessively in practice, is the availability of alternative non-competitive bidding 
processes under Article 13. This article allows for non-competitive bidding processes 
to be used as an alternative to competitive bidding with the pre-authorisation of the 
MEF. The use of direct contracting in case of an emergency under the Article is not 
sufficiently detailed to prevent abuse. The only limitation is the approval of the MEF 
and what constitutes an emergency is not defined under the Law. The Anti-Corruption 
Law and regulations on conflict of interest, which are applicable to all procurement 
scenarios, mitigate some of the risk of an alternative bidding process. 
1.8.2 Integrity of contracting authorities
To what extent do the country’s contracting authorities and their 
employees adhere to internationally recognized standards of integrity 
and ethical behaviour?
The Law on Public Procurement in 2012 mandates that contracting authorities and their 
employees have a strict anti-corruption policy as part of their code of conduct, both 
under the Law on Public Procurement and the Anti-Corruption Law.484 Although the Law 
is robust, the capacity of key actors within Ministries responsible for public procurement 
contracts must be improved to implement and enforce the procedural framework laid 
out under the Law. At the national level additional training, oversight and enforcement 
are needed to meet the international standards of integrity and ethical behaviour set out 
in the Law. There is no mandate for continued training of public procurement officials in 
the Law but the Manuals are intended for use as a training tool.485 At the time of writing, 
there is no information on training regarding public procurement processes through the 
MEF or ACU on their websites or in a public forum. No representative of the MEF or ACU 
was available to give further details. 
At the Commune/Sangkat level, a civil society partner (SILAKA) has successfully 
implemented a project to organise and train community monitoring committees486 to 
address problems with Commune/Sangkat and District level procurement in two provinces 
(Kampong Thom and Kandal Province).487 The community monitoring committees have 
increased transparency and competence in the procurement processes among local 
communities, who have in turn reported irregularities to provincial authorities.488 Beyond 
these two provinces, proper procurement procedures are not consistently implemented 
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and contracting through preferential networks remains a challenge to procurement 
processes at the municipal level. 
The MEF functions as the ultimate control authority for public procurement at 
the national level. The Inspectorate General is responsible for conducting internal 
audit on public procurement projects and making a report to the Minister.489 
The Law mandates “that internal auditors must maintain their 
professional independence by closely adhering to the audit standards”.490 
External audits are conducted by the National Audit Authority (“NAA”), an independent 
authority from the Ministry subject to the audit.491  External audits are ultimately 
reported to the National Assembly.492 The regularity or necessity of either internal and 
external audits is not specified under the Law nor are they available to the public on the 
MEF website. 
Transparency regarding procurement documents, such as procurement plans from 
procurement implementing institutions, audit reports from the Ministries or National 
Assembly or financial statements of contracting parties is an issue. A procurement 
implementing institution is required to submit an annual procurement plan to the MEF 
for review and endorsement every year at minimum493 but there is no indication of 
whether the report must be independently audited. Public procurement contracts can 
be subject to audit and inspection by the MEF and relevant competent institutions 
but this is at the discretion of the institution and not publicly available.494 Financial 
asset reports for senior managers of contracting authorities are not available to the 
public. Although, bidders must submit audited or certified financial statements to the 
procurement committee, but these documents remain private. 
Anonymous reporting or whistleblowing protections are paramount to discover 
potential irregularities during the procurement process because audit reports of 
procurement projects or financial statements of contracting authorities are confidential. 
Whistleblowing protections are provided under the Manual on Procurement in both 
the sections on the Complaint Handling Mechanism and the section referring to the 
Anti-Corruption Law. The Law shields the identity of a person reporting a complaint or 
corruption.495 The Manual references that the ACU must keep “confidential the identity 
of persons who report corruption and take necessary measures to provide security to 
corruption whistleblowers”.496 As further outlined in Section 2.5, there is currently no 
general law protecting whistleblowers in Cambodia from sanction, threat, or prosecution 
other than what is listed in the Procurement Manual and Anti-corruption Law. 
Dissuasive, proportionate sanctions are in place under the Law for contracting authorities 
and employees upon a determination of corruption, including both monetary penalties, 
blacklisting from future tenders and imprisonment of 1-3 years. Public civil servants at 
all levels who have violated the provisions of the Law or have committed irregularities, 
are subject to both administrative and criminal sanctions.497 Bidders, contractors, or 
suppliers found to be involved in corruption in the public procurement process, or 
to have given false or incorrect evidence while filing a complaint in the procurement 
process, are stopped from the ongoing public procurement and the present contract is 
immediately terminated and recorded in the blacklist.498 For example, when the Office 
of the Investigator General was investigating misuse of funds by the Ministry of Health 
it threatened to withhold 100 million USD in grant money unless information requested 
for the investigation was produced.499 At the Commune/Sangkat level, a company was 
blacklisted when collusion between bidders was discovered, and this sanction was seen 
as common and appropriate.500 The challenge for community members who monitor the 
companies who bid at the Commune/Sangkat level is investigating whether blacklisted 
companies have changed their names and placed bids in the future.501  
The offences listed under the Law on Procurement are under the jurisdiction of the 
ACU.502
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1.8.3 External safeguards
To what extent do the country’s public procurement processes include 
external safeguards for detecting and reporting violations?
The Law on Public Procurement guarantees that external control and auditing bodies 
function independently but their reports are not made available for review.503 The 
process for both internal and external audits is laid out in Manual on Procurement 
Vol. 1 and guarantees the professional independence of auditors for both internal and 
external audits as described above.504 Under the rules on audits discussed in indicators 
2.7 and 3.2, auditors function independently in their professional capacity as per the 
Law on Auditing and Accounting.505 There is no voluntary disclosure programme that 
enables companies to report on corruption in return for the mitigation of sanctions. 
There is institutional discretion within procurement implementing institutions and the 
ACU regarding incentives for companies to report corruption but there is not a formal 
tip-line or similar program.
Robust, independent appeals processes are in place under the Law and in the 
Manuals on Public Procurement for aggrieved bidders.506 The first forum to resolve 
a complaint is through the procurement implementing institution, who is responsible 
under the Law for examining and resolving complaints made by bidders at each stage 
of the procurement process.507 A complainant who disagrees with the decision of the 
concerned procurement implementing institution can file a suit with the MEF to review 
and address the case508 and with the ACU if the complainant is claiming retaliation.509 
A complainant who disagrees with the decision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
can file a suit with the competent court of the Kingdom of Cambodia.510 The Complaint 
Handling Mechanism (“CHM”) is further outlined in the Manual on Public Procurement.511 
An important factor in the effectiveness of the CHM are the time frames for responses 
from the institutions listed above. A formal mechanism to satisfactorily respond to bid 
complaints is in place, which typically allows 10 working days for the project manager 
to review the complaint and render a written decision. The complainant has the right 
to lodge a written appeal of that decision with the MEF within ten working days.512 The 
frequency of use of the CHM is not known as all bids are evaluated behind closed doors 
by the Procurement Committee513 and often bidders are not notified of whether they 
were successful or not in the bidding process. 
There are no independent complaints mechanisms, apart from 
the one listed above, for reporting allegations of corruption. All 
staff involved in the procurement process have a duty to report to the procurement 
review committee, or any other agency that they feel appropriate including the ACU, 
all suspected instances of fraud, corruption and collusive or coercive practices when 
identified.514 The ACU is the institution that generally receives reports or allegations of 
corruption. Under the Manual on Procurement, “any procurement official who receives, 
or learns of, a communication alleging that a person or persons attempted to commit 
or committed any act defined in the articles related to public procurement” must report 
this to the ACU in writing and fully cooperate with any investigation.515 In the past three 
years, the ACU has been much more active in investigating allegations of corruption 
regarding public spending. For example, in 2015 an English newspaper reported that 
the ACU investigated reports alleging irregularities in procurement procedures in three 
state-run bodies.516 The outcomes of these investigations are unknown.
The importance of including civil society organisations in monitoring public procurement 
is recognised in the Manual on Procurement in two different areas, following complaints 
and grievances and increasing a sense of civic duty in monitoring procurement processes. 
On a national scale, no specific programs are in place for civil society organisations to act 
as independent monitors at any stage of the procurement process.521 Both civil society 
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and business associations are interested in improving the transparency of procurement 
processes in Cambodia. For business associations, the focus is on improving record 
keeping and accounting standards. Civil society organisations and national media 
representatives can monitor reports by the ACU regarding public spending, to follow-up 
on the outcomes of allegations when they are available. 
The value of participation of civil society organisations as independent monitors at all 
stages of the procurement process is demonstrated at the Commune/Sangkat level 
through a project run by SILAKA.522 SILAKA is working directly with communities in 
Kampong Thom and Kandal provinces to increase the level of awareness and competency 
among key stakeholders to understand and monitor public procurement. The Joint 
Procurement Monitoring Committee at the Sub-National Level (JPMC) is a local citizen-
based advisory group that was recognised by the Kampong Thom provincial authority 
in June 2013.523  The JPMC enables discussion and consultation from citizens and the 
private sector to monitor procurement at the Commune/Sangkat and district level.524 
They have reported irregularities in the procurement process to the district authorities, 
which then reported the challenges to the NDCC at the provincial level.   The concerns 
raised by the JPMC resulted in a change to the local procurement regulations, requiring 
bidders to place a 2% deposit when placing their bids to prevent collusion amongst 
bidders who withdraw before the end of the bidding process.525 
1.8.4 Regulations for the private sector
To what extent do the country’s public procurement processes require 
integrity measures in the bidding entities?
Each bidding entity must abide by a strict anti-corruption policy, and each company must 
include an anti-corruption clause in all bids. The Law on Public Procurement stipulates 
that, “[i]n the process of public procurement, head, deputy head and members of the 
procurement committee, procurement officers, bidders, and other relevant officers and 
personnel shall respect and follow the procurement code of conducts”.526 On a national 
level, companies are permitted to tender only if they have implemented a code of conduct 
under which the company and its employees commit to a strict anti-corruption policy and 
certify that they have not engaged in illegal conduct as part of their bid. Bidders must 
sign and submit The Bidders/Consultants Declaration on Ethical Conduct and Fraud and 
Corruption, with every bid. The declaration includes a clause that reads: “That neither 
we nor any of our employees, associates, agents, shareholders, partners consultants or 
their relatives or associates have entered into corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive 
practices in respect of our bid or proposal”.527 The Manual on Procurement includes 
examples of unethical conduct for clarity, such as, “[i]gnoring illegal or unethical 
activity by bidders or prospective bidders, suppliers, contractors, service providers or 
consultants, including any offer of personal inducements or rewards or otherwise.”528 
Companies bidding on works contracts must file an audited financial statement, including 
any lines of credit, with their bid.529 They are permitted to tender without disclosing 
their ownership structure or disclosure of their beneficial ownership information as well 
as the ultimate beneficiary of associated parent companies. 
Sanctions available against companies and their representatives are deemed effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive if applied. They include monetary and non-monetary 
penalties for violating the Laws on Public Procurement such as fines, publication of 
misdeeds and exclusion from any future projects. Under the jurisdiction of the ACU, 
allegations of corruption, collusion and coercion can be investigated and brought 
before the Cambodian Courts for criminal charges, such as the crime of Infringement 
on Freedom of Bidding.530 The allowable monetary sanctions under the Law on Public 
Procurement are comparable to those under the Criminal Code. There are no known 
examples at the time of writing of criminal sanctions being applied for misfeasance during 
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the procurement process. Blacklisting of bidders who were found guilty of collusion was 
reported at the Commune/Sangkat level.531 As explained above, settlement mechanisms 
and procedures are detailed and publicly available in the Law on Public Procurement and 
Manuals on Procurement. There are no genuine incentives for companies with effective 
anti-corruption programmes in place under the Law, nor is there much discretion under 
the bid evaluation guidelines to include an anti-corruption programme amongst the 
factors when evaluating a bid.532
TI and CWEA signed MoU 
on 20 November to engage 
on improving business 
integrity and building its 
member’s capacity.
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Since the ratification of the WTO agreement in 2004, the RGC has significantly improved 
the operational efficiency of Taxes and Customs. The General Department of Taxation 
(“GDT”) and the General Department of Customs and Excise (“GDCE”) are within the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (“MEF”). In the last decade, considerable progress has 
been made in tax collection.  Since 2009, the average annual increase of tax collection 
is 19%. This increase could be explained by the introduction of many online services, 
casting the tax net wider to petty taxpayers, simplified accounting, the improved 
capacity of GDT to carry out duties and increase of training for tax audit officers. 
Since 2014 the average growth of exports and imports is 12.3%.533 The GDCE became 
the 155th member of WCO (“World Customs Organization”) in June 2011. It has 
implemented several projects which contributed to trade facilitation and reduction 
of bureaucracy. Cambodia has implemented in many customs offices and branches 
the most recent version of The Automated System for Customs Data (“ASYCUDA”). 
ASYCUDA is a computerised system designed by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) to administer a country’s customs. The system 
allows companies to increase their efficiency by processing the documents of their 
shipments online. Moreover, the National Single Window (“NSW”) was launched in 2015, 
which allows companies to use one entry point to fulfil all import, export, and transit-
related regulatory requirements. In 2016, the MoC also introduced online registration 
for companies. 
Despite the increase of government revenues and the implementation of important 
reforms, representatives from the private sector reported that there still exists a high 
level of bureaucracy and often, customs officers request informal payments.534 In 
addition, some non-transparent tariffs are still applied, which are a major concern for 
international companies because they must be accounted for in their records. The World 
Bank Enterprise survey shows that for most companies a major obstacle in Cambodia is 
the informal sector and informal payments for issuing licenses and permits535. 
While the RGC is rapidly reforming the policies, regulations, and practices of GDT and 
GDCE, there is a need for transparency regarding tax agreements with international 
companies. Increased sanctions and remuneration of tax and customs employees’ 
mechanisms would serve to improve overall business integrity.
1.9.1 Operating Environment
Are the country’s tax and customs administrations utilising processes in 
accordance with international recognised standards?
Cambodia has a developing tax and customs legal framework, which is in accordance 
with international standards, however, some key commercial laws remain missing.536 In 
the last few years, the collection of taxes by the GDT has increased. The GDT has made 
substantial efforts to enforce the existing laws by conducting more rigorous audits and 
penalising noncompliant companies. Along with this increase in tax collection, the GDT 
has improved its customer service and helped to provide guidelines to taxpayers to 
encourage legal compliance. 
More progress is needed to facilitate trade and improve the transparency of tariffs under 
the GDCE. The country manager of a leading international shipping company reported 
that in some cases, tariffs for some services requested by customs (administration fees, 
facilitation fees and other charges) are not announced. In these cases, a local company 
is hired to transport the shipment and to pay the informal payments. The local company 
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subsequently provides a proper receipt to the international company, thus circumventing 
the issues of accounting for informal payments in their records.537 The World Bank’s 2016 
survey reveals that on average senior management of large companies spend 17% of 
their time dealing with requirements imposed by the Government.  On the other hand, 
the senior management of small and medium companies spend considerably more time, 
54% and 48% respectively.538 These figures suggest a high level of red tape. It should 
also be highlighted that the GDCE has implemented The Automated customs processing 
system called Automated System on Customs Data (“ASYCUDA”). ASYCUDA WORLD 
system was established at 54 major customs branches and offices, which covers almost 
99% of Single Administrative Declaration (“SAD”) and approximately 87% of trade 
volume.539 ASYCUDA WORLD is a major step towards the reduction of bureaucracy.  
The World Bank Enterprise Survey shows that for 36.5% of all companies, tax 
administration is not an obstacle, while 17.7% and 40.2% perceive it to be a moderate 
and minor obstacle, respectively. In January 2016, the Ministry of Commerce launched 
an online service for the registration of companies, which considerably reduced the time 
for establishing and registering a business. 
The Council for the Development of Cambodia (“CDC”) provides investment incentives 
(i.e. Profit tax exemption (Selective): A tax holiday period is composed of a “Trigger 
period” + 3 years + Priority Period (Maximum total 9 years).540 There are also tax 
incentives for companies listed on the CSX. However, a register of multinational 
companies and their tax agreements with the government is not available. It has also 
been reported that in order for a given project to become a QIP, informal payments are 
often required.541 
1.9.2 Integrity of tax administration authorities
Are the country’s tax and customs administrations and its employees 
committed to internationally recognised standards of integrity and ethical 
behaviour?
Among the values that the GDCE maintains, the values of transparency, integrity and 
discipline are required to curb and protect custom’s wrongdoing. The GDT’s missions 
and values include the enhancement of the capacity of tax officers through “modern 
and highly responsible policies”.542 However, it seems that anti-corruption measures are 
not sufficiently present in the strategy of either department.  It has been reported that 
there is some training on codes of conduct and anti-corruption measures; however, the 
exact number of such training courses is unknown.
Under the Criminal Code, the sanctions for tax and custom administration employees, as 
well as private sector staff, for a bribery conviction seem to be dissuasive. An employee 
soliciting or accepting any gifts and informal payments could be sentenced to jail for a 
period of between 6 months and 2 years, and to pay a fine of up to 1,000 USD. The same 
sanctions are applied to persons offering gifts and informal payments. The sanctions are 
more severe for a “Governor or another Person” who provide illegal assistance, they can 
be “punished to imprisonment of between 5 to 10 years”. In cases of negligent violation 
of the Law on Taxation, the sanctions vary between 10% and 40% of the unpaid taxes.543 
According to the Law on Customs, administrative fines for any wrongdoing are between 
250 USD and 1,250 USD and imprisonment up to 1 year. In cases of export or import of 
prohibited goods, the sanction is up to three times the value of the goods and maximum 
imprisonment of 5 years. On the websites of the GDCE and the GDT online links to the 
ACU or other authorities to report cases of wrongdoing or corruption do not exist. 
In order to improve dialogue with the private sector, the Customs-Private Sector 
Partnership Mechanism (“CPPM”) was launched.  Among the results of this mechanism 
is the establishment of a Public Relations Unit to receive requests or complaints from 
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the private sector and to provide information to the public about the evolution of the 
GDCE. The GDT also maintains the Department of Tax Payer Services and Tax Arrears 
where taxpayers can raise their issues. Even though there is not a specific entity in 
charge of public relations, the GDT actively cooperates with stakeholders. For example, 
in the 2017 EUROCHAM White Book, the GDT and the MEF responded to all 11 issues 
related to the taxes and resolved 3 of them. Regarding the issues related to transport, 
customs and logistics, none of them has been resolved, 5 had a response and for 2 
issues, there was no feedback from the GDCE or other relevant authorities. 
There are not any publicly available sources of information about the exact amount of 
remunerations, nor a mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of staff performance of 
tax and customs officers. 
1.9.3 External safeguards
Are the country’s tax and revenue collection processes integrating 
safeguards for detecting and reporting violations?
Despite the progress in the tax collection, many businesses remain unregistered with the 
MoC or any relevant Ministry.544 Among the respondents of the World Bank Enterprise 
survey, only 69.5% of firms were formally registered when they started operations in the 
country. The survey also indicates that 77% of the companies compete against informal 
businesses and 32% have major problems with identifying practices of competitors in 
the informal sector. Consistent registration and tax collection requirements should be 
further applied and enforced.
Many respondents were expected to give informal payments and gifts to public 
authorities for issuing operating licenses (50.3%), import licenses (63.4%) and 
construction permits (86.8%).545 It is necessary to establish an external safeguard 
mechanism to limit these informal payments to the relevant authorities. Regarding 
custom licenses, a representative of a major logistics’ association reported that for 
every border checkpoint where products are imported and exported, a different custom 
license is needed.546  
Both the GDCE and the GDT maintain specific departments in charge of internal auditing. 
They have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. However, their reports or the 
results of their audits are not publicly disclosed.  Moreover, every Qualified Investment 
Project (QIP) must submit annual audited financial statements by independent auditors. 
According to the Law on Taxation, the GDT has the authority to carry out audits of 
taxpayer activities and to reassess tax liabilities.547 An independent audit is conducted 
on all issuers trading on the CSX. GDT officials also receive payment incentives if they 
do identify and report errors in tax declarations or filings.548 
In January 2010, the Customs-Private Sector Partnership Mechanism (“CPPM”) was 
launched. The CPPM aims to encourage private sector participation in promoting 
compliance with law and regulations as well as the effectiveness of trade facilitation in 
Cambodia. The CPPM is composed of members from the GDCE and representatives from 
the private sector. Through this mechanism, companies are able to report corruption 
allegations.
Some voluntary disclosure programs exist that allow companies to report on corruption 
in return for mitigating sanctions. It has been reported that a letter to the court could be 
issued by the ACU, stating that the person voluntarily disclosed a valuable information 
for the investigation. According to an ACU source, the court often takes into account 
such letters and mitigates the penalty of the offender.549
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While the Cambodian Constitution calls for an independent judiciary, many investors 
and companies are reluctant to use the courts because they are perceived as 
unreliable and susceptible to political influence or bribery.550 Local and foreign 
companies alike report problems with inconsistent rulings, corruption, and difficulties 
in enforcing decisions.551 One Director of  a business association mentioned that he 
was not interested in using the court system, because there was only one court who 
heard all the cases, criminal or civil and the court was too slow.552 
For these reasons, companies have frequently turned to alternative dispute 
resolutions to solve disputes. Negotiations are often facilitated through institutions 
such as the Ministry of Commerce, the Council for the Development of Cambodia, 
and the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce.553 In 2006, the National Commercial 
Arbitration Center (“NCAC”) was established and officially launched in 2013, in order 
to arbitrate commercial disputes for domestic and foreign companies.554 In August 
2017, it was announced that the NCAC had settled its first two cases - one involving a 
construction contract between a Cambodian company and a foreign entity, and the 
other a supplier contract between a private company and a Government agency.555 
To date, details of the settlement or the dispute have not been publicly disclosed.  In 
addition to the NCAC, the Arbitration Council was established in May 2003 to review 
and settle collective labour disputes. The Arbitration Council has heard hundreds 
of cases since its inception in 2003 and publishes each decision online in order 
to share the legal reasoning of the Council.556 Because very little jurisprudence is 
available from the Court, this information is extremely helpful to companies seeking 
to understand the relevant interpretation of the law. 
Individual departments are also starting to develop dispute mechanisms. For example, 
in 2016 the General Department of Taxation (“GDT”) introduced the Committee 
for Tax Arbitration to handle customs, excise, and tax disputes arising from final 
decisions or rulings from the General Department of Customs and Excise or the 
General Department of Taxation. The Committee is comprised of the Minister of 
Economy and Finance, the Secretary of Economy and Finance, a representative from 
the National Accounting Council, the General Director for the General Department 
of Policy for Economy and Public Finance, and the General Director from the General 
Department of Internal Auditors.557 Since previously the decision made in all disputes 
related to taxation were solved by the GDT, an independent Arbitration Committee 
to help resolve tax disputes was welcomed by the private sector.558 
In 2014, the Law on Organization of the Courts was promulgated, which created 
a specific Court of First Instance for commercial cases, which could help increase 
the court’s efficiency and reduce trial times, while helping judges to develop more 
specialised skills for handling commercial cases.559 
Dispute resolution is an important component of business integrity since the private 
sector must be able to resolve disputes without turning to corruption. The recent 
developments in alternative dispute resolution seem to be a promising signal that 
the private sector can seek resolutions with integrity.
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Summary of Business Sector Indicators 
Business Sector Overview
Cambodian businesses largely have not adopted international corporate integrity 
standards. This is particularly true for domestic SMEs and family enterprises. Generally, 
these companies lack a corporate culture and do not see the benefits of adopting codes 
of conduct, internal and external whistleblowing channels for cases of corruption and 
public disclosure of corporate information. Moreover, companies are not legally required 
to adopt many of these practices. Only listed public and private enterprises on the CSX 
have such obligations. The MEF and its two key departments, the GDT and GDCE, have 
made substantial efforts to encourage company compliance and to increase public 
revenues. However, a large part of the Cambodian economy remains informal.560 There 
is a significant need for additional law enforcement compliance initiatives and trainings 
on relevant laws and regulations.
Business Sector Assessment
2.1 Integrity Management
2.1.1  Provision of policies
2.1.2 Implementation of practices
2.1.3 Whistleblowing 
2.2 Auditing and Assurance
2.2.1 Internal control and monitoring structures 
2.2.2 External audit
2.2.3 Independent assurance
2.3 Transparency and Disclosure
2.3.1  Disclosure of anti-corruption programs
2.3.2 Disclosure of organisational structures 
2.3.3 Disclosure of country-by-country operations
2.4 Stakeholder Engagement
2.4.1 Stakeholder relations 
2.4.2 Business-driven anti-corruption onitiatives 
2.4.3 Collaboration 
2.5 Board of Directors
2.5.1  Oversight 
2.5.2 Executive remuneration 
2.1.4 Business partner management
2.3.4 Additional disclosures 
2.5.3 Conflicts of interest 
0 - Not at all            25 - To a Limited Extent            50 -  To Some Extent            75 - Largely           100 - Fully
0 25 50 75 100
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Summary of Indicators
The business sector is evaluated based on the following thematic areas: integrity 
management, auditing and assurance, transparency and disclosure, stakeholder 
engagement, and the role of the Board of Directors. 
Due to ongoing globalisation and integration of Cambodia in the ASEAN Economic 
Community, many Cambodian companies have publicly or internally implemented a 
set of good practices, which have improved their integrity management. More than 
80 companies have engaged publicly to cooperate with ACU. In 2015, ACU published a 
manual on the implementation of business integrity practices. However, the outcomes 
and benefits in engaging with the ACU for individual companies, especially SMEs are 
not clear. Mainly foreign and joint-venture enterprises have business integrity programs 
because they have to be accountable to stakeholders and directors abroad. Most domestic 
companies do not have any anti-corruption policies, codes of conduct or whistleblowing 
mechanisms, however, the Law on Commercial Enterprises does not legally require such 
programs. Domestic companies that adopt business integrity policies are mainly in the 
financial and insurance sectors. The Law related to Listed Public and Private Enterprises 
Listed on CSX impose legal obligation to be more accountable and transparent. There 
are substantial efforts from the Securities Exchange Commission of Cambodia (“SECC”) 
to increase the number of companies listed on CSX, which could increase transparency 
in those companies.
Cambodia’s legislation on auditing is compliant with international standards (“IFRS”).561 
Only big companies which have a turnover of more than 750,000 USD, 500,000 USD 
assets and 100 employees must submit annual financial statements to an independent 
auditor certified by KICPAA. In recent years, GDT has considerably improved the tax 
collection by maintaining a good dialogue with stakeholders, conducting audits of 
companies’ financial statements and providing online services and training. 
Companies largely are not transparent about disclosing information about their ant-
corruption programme or their corporate information on their websites. For this 
report, 47 domestic and foreign companies were anonymously evaluated based on the 
amount of information publicly accessible on their websites. Overall, there was a clear 
disconnect between the information that was available on a foreign company’s website 
and a domestic company’s websites. Domestic companies tend not to disclose any anti-
corruption policies and corporate information due to the lack of legal obligations and 
low corporate governance culture.
 
Overall, Cambodian chambers of commerce and business associations maintain a good 
dialogue with public institutions and provide many services such as legal support, tax 
information and networking to their members. Private companies experience some 
difficulty in collaborating with governmental institutions. It has been reported that 
private companies are missing effective channels of communications with key ministries. 
Even though there are many outcomes related to the investigations undertaken by ACU, 
it should be highlighted that in many cases the actions of the ACU are informal but have 
a substantial dissuasive effect. 
There is a need for more legislative initiatives regarding the promotion of corporate 
governance and adoption of anti-corruption policies. In practice, the Board of Directors 
is not typically independent from company management. Cambodian legislation and 
particularly the Law on Commercial Enterprises does not specify in detail the duties and 
responsibilities of the Board’s members. 
Overall, many companies indicate a willingness to adopt anti-corruption programs and 
become legally compliant with current legislation. More cooperation with stakeholders 
and training is  necessary to further develop corporate governance especially within 
domestic companies. 
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Recently many Cambodian companies have publicly or internally implemented a set 
of practices, which have improved their integrity management. More than 80 foreign 
and Cambodian enterprises have signed MoUs with the ACU. Most of the business 
associations and chambers of commerce encourage their members to collaborate 
more with the ACU.562 Despite the lack of evidence of outcomes of such collaboration, 
the fact that a given enterprise has a public engagement with ACU seems to have 
a dissuasive effect. In many cases, the ACU intervenes without privately taking any 
legal action. Currently, the Law on Commercial Enterprises does not require medium 
and large companies to establish a code of conduct. The ACU published a “Guidebook 
on Anti-Corruption Program for Business in Cambodia” that is a useful tool for the 
business to implement their anti-corruption practices. The Guide shows a number 
of case studies on good business practices undertaken by big and medium size 
companies. In addition, it offers clear guidelines on how to implement anti-corruption 
policies and specific internal rules and regulations, such as codes of conduct and 
codes of ethics and their disclosure.  
Integrity is among the core values of many companies, but this is not necessarily 
translated into concrete anti-corruption policies. Whistleblowing mechanisms are not 
explicit in all companies with integrity programs, for example, handling information on 
illicit practices and protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. ACLEDA Bank Plc. and 
Amret have established code of conducts and reporting channels, which could make 
them positive benchmarks for other local companies.  Not surprisingly, multinationals 
and joint ventures businesses are more likely to implement their programs in their 
subsidiaries, since they associate corruption with a higher cost. According to the trends, 
ongoing globalisation and ASEAN integration will improve transparency in Cambodian 
companies. As domestic companies interact more frequently with foreign companies 
that maintain established business integrity practices, domestic companies will either 
be required to improve their programs or more actively to choose to do so in order 
to build partnerships and investment opportunities.  Another positive trend is the 
active support of the ACU to business and public institutions to implement good anti-
corruption practices. Finally, companies listed on CSX have a legal obligation to be more 
accountable and transparent. The Security and Exchange Commission of Cambodia 
(“SECC”) supports SMEs in capacity building to be able to be listed on the CSX. 
2.1.1. Provision of policies
To what extent do companies establish formal policies to counter 
corruption?
Companies establishing clear, visible anti-corruption policies are mainly large 
multinationals and joint ventures. These enterprises have real incentives to maintain 
anti-corruption policies because they increase trust among their shareholders. 
However, it should be highlighted that 97.6% of all established companies have up to 10 
employees.563 For these establishments, implementing formal anti-corruption policies 
would be costly.  In addition, laws in Cambodia do not legally require companies to adopt 
a code of conduct or publicly disclose information on their anti-corruption policies, 
therefore many local enterprises do not disclose such information on their websites. 
A representative from a major accounting firm stated that most companies do not 
have written anti-bribery policies or tools to monitor corruption, however they do have 
informal, oral systems.564 
Foreign companies maintain public policies of integrity management because, for them, 
corruption is associated with higher cost. Foreign companies must be fully accountable 
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to their shareholders and directors abroad. The growing number of signed MoUs 
between the ACU and foreign and domestic companies confirms the unwillingness of 
many companies to engage in corrupt practices. However, the benefits and the risks of 
this cooperation are not clear enough. 
Many Cambodian companies do also express a stance against corruption, according to 
their websites or other public statements. Among domestic companies, ACLEDA Bank Plc. 
and Amret Microfinance Institution have established some business integrity measures 
(code of conduct, anti-corruption program, corporate policies, public statements, etc.). 
Additionally, the RGC is undertaking considerable efforts to support private companies 
to implement anti-corruption policies. In 2015, the ACU published the “Guidebook on 
Anti-Corruption Program for Business in Cambodia” which aims to make the business 
environment more conducive to resilience and sustainable growth.565 The Guide has a 
clear set of recommendations and actions to be implemented with specific case studies. 
Inputs for the guide were provided by 27 private companies and business associations. 
2.1.2 Implementation of practices
To what extent do companies have anti-corruption programmes in place?
Few local companies maintain specific policies , like ACLEDA Bank Plc., such as a conflict 
of interest policy that is mandatory for all staff members. The company has stated a 
“zero tolerance” towards corruption, both internally and externally, and transgressions 
are dealt with summarily. ACLEDA Bank Plc. is one of the few domestic institutions with 
an established code of conduct which “sets ethical standards for all staff members”566. 
The Microfinance Institution, Amret, maintains a Risk Oversight Committee, which 
assesses all internal and external risks and ensures that the company is fully compliant 
with applicable laws and regulations. The company also has an Audit Committee 
chaired by an independent non-executive board member. The Audit Committee’s tasks 
include: overseeing the integrity of financial statements, accounting and financial 
reporting processes of the audited financial statements.567 Representatives from 
business associations reported that local SMEs have an established culture of favouring 
their relatives and friends, thus it is necessary to raise their awareness regarding the 
implementation of anti-corruption programs. 
International companies such as H&M have a clear Code of Ethics.568 In addition, H&M 
publicly discloses the grades of their suppliers.569 Coca Cola Beverage company also 
has a code of conduct,570 but it does not disclose any specific recommendations or 
business risks in Cambodia. AEON Specialized Bank (Cambodia) Plc. conducts monthly 
regional risk management meeting to monitor credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and 
operational risk and also to advise each other.571 In addition, all companies listed on the 
CSX have the legal obligation to establish a code of conduct. 
Most of the companies in Cambodia do not disclose publicly any human resource 
practices, training for managers and employees, internal communication, feedback 
mechanisms and other internal processes related to their anti-corruption programmes. 
However, these programmes do exist, for instance, a representative of a leading shipping 
company stated that there is an active collaboration with stakeholders in providing 
training and giving recommendations on how to deal with some specific issues, such 
as hacking emails and bribery.572 Representatives from the business community stated 
that cooperation with ACU has been useful and helps to improve business integrity in 
Cambodia.573  
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2.1.3 Whistleblowing
To what extent do companies provide secure and accessible channels to 
raise concerns and report violations in confidence and without risk of 
reprisal?
To what extent do companies provide secure and accessible channels to raise concerns 
and report violations in confidence and without risk of reprisal?
Accessible channels to report information about actual, suspected or perceived 
corruption in the company are practices implemented mainly by large multinational 
companies. Not surprisingly, most of the local enterprises do not disclose such channels. 
A representative of a major business association reported that most of the companies 
in Cambodia prefer to deal with such issues internally.574 
Representatives of domestic and foreign companies stated that they provide secure 
and accessible channels to report information about actual, suspected or perceived 
corruption in their enterprises. But often, such channels are not disclosed on their 
websites.575 Very few local enterprises have channels that enable employees and 
others to raise concerns or report violations of suspected breaches of their anti-
corruption policies. An exception is the ACLEDA Bank code of conduct which states 
that, “management will establish a hotline or other avenues to allow staff members, 
suppliers, third party service providers and customers to report questionable activity or 
instances where this Policy is not being followed, and to have their concerns addressed 
in a confidential manner.” Amret also provides a whistleblower report form in Khmer and 
English, which could also be confidential.576 These practices should be adopted by other 
domestic companies, as the existence of reporting channels does have a substantial 
dissuasive effect on corruption. 
Many of the foreign companies in Cambodia have established reporting channels. 
Chevron577, DHL578 and Manulife579 are good examples to follow. These companies have 
social or corporate responsibility reports and inform their customers and employees 
about possible scams and how to report any irregularities. However, we do not have 
any clear evidence whether the Cambodian branches of these companies provide any 
corruption reporting channels. 
2.1.4 Business partner management
To what extent do companies apply their anti-corruption programme to 
relevant business partner?
Mainly multinational companies implement their anti-corruption programs in all 
business entities over which they have effective control, which serves to build a sense of 
trust and stability in their shareholders. These practices are rarely fully implemented in 
Cambodia due to the lack of legal obligations and local business culture. Many Cambodian 
enterprises do not publicly share their anti-corruption programmes. A representative of 
a major business association stated that such integrity programs are mostly applied in 
Phnom Penh, as implementing them in the provinces is challenging due to some “cultural 
factors.”580 This could be partially explained by the fact that the headquarters of most 
big foreign and domestic companies are situated in Phnom Penh. The employees in the 
capital have access to more seminars and training related to corporate governance. In 
addition, in some provinces, traditional Khmer values, such as a strong family identity, 
non-confrontation in disagreements, tolerance for ambiguity, and willingness to accept 
the status quo581 might be an obstacle to implementing business integrity practices. 
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A representative of a major joint venture company stated that due diligence plans are 
applied when they undertake major investments, mergers and acquisitions. A Japanese 
investor stated that, “mergers and acquisitions are not so popular in Cambodia yet, 
but they are becoming a good and fast way for foreigners to get into business here.”582 
This statement was confirmed by Mr. John McGinley, from Mekong Strategic Partners, 
who stated that mainly companies in the financial sector are performing merges 
and acquisitions because most of these companies “have already embedded strong 
corporate governance and strong management systems, making them easy to look 
at as potential assets.”583 Private equity is a new practice in Cambodia which should 
be further promoted by including an exit option on the CSX. The Law on Commercial 
Enterprises provides a good framework for any significant investment, merges or 
acquisitions. However, the amount of some major acquisitions, such as the acquisition 
of the country’s fourth-largest operator Beeline by Metfone, are undisclosed.584 
Cambodian companies listed on the CSX should adopt codes of conduct, adequate 
financial reports and accounting principles. In August 2017, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Cambodia (“SECC”) launched its “Excellence Program” to support SMEs 
to list on the Cambodian stock exchange’s Growth Board. More than 70 SMEs have 
joined this new initiative offered by the market regulator.585  
The BIP team was trained 
on “ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery 
Management System 
(ABMS)” by Anti-Bribery 
Management expert, Dr 
KM Loi. Several companies 
have expressed interest in 
ISO 37001. 
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Cambodia’s legislation on auditing and assurance is compliant with international 
standards (“IFRS”), therefore the country has a sound legal framework for external and 
internal controls of companies. Assurance is not well represented in domestic law nor is 
it overly emphasised in international accounting standards. Auditing and assurance of 
company records are unevenly applied depending on whether the enterprise or not-for-
profit falls under the Prakas requiring an independently audited financial statement. The 
Prakas, set by the MEF, require all enterprises which meet the following criteria to submit 
their annual financial statements to an independent auditor certified by the Kampuchea 
Institute Certified Public Accountants and Auditors (“KICPAA”). The criteria are: i) an 
annual turnover of 750,000 USD ii) Assets totalling more than 500,000 USD or iii) more 
than 100 employees (also the qualification for a large enterprise).586 The majority of 
domestic Cambodian businesses are not compliant, either because they do not believe 
they qualify because of poor record keeping or because they are trying to minimise 
their tax liability by underreporting assets or revenues.587 The General Tax Department 
(“GDT”), in its efforts to increase tax compliance among Cambodian businesses, is 
increasingly conducting audits of companies’ financial statements submitted with their 
annual tax return.588 Tax officers receive a 30% bonus of the penalty if they find an 
irregularity during their initial audit. This thematic area looks at audit and assurance 
practices, and how they affect internal and external control and monitoring mechanisms 
that seek to detect and prevent corruption.
2.2.1 Internal control and monitoring structures
To what extent do companies establish internal control and monitoring 
structures that seek to detect and prevent corruption?
Internationally affiliated companies establish and maintain an effective system of 
internal controls over corruption, comprising financial and organisational checks and 
balances over accounting and record-keeping practices and other business processes. 
A senior accountant with an international firm in Cambodia confirmed that large 
companies operating internationally generally have anti-corruption policies in place 
through either legal requirements in their jurisdictions of incorporation or through 
public commitments to meeting international standards.589 All enterprises are required 
to keep accurate accounts and have them audited in accordance with the terms provided 
for under the Law on Corporate Accounts, but many businesses are not compliant.590 
For large companies, typically with international franchising or affiliations, internal 
audits are usually ongoing, or at a minimum conducted annually by an independent or 
external reviewer.591 This often takes the form of auditing financial statements that many 
registered companies must prepare and present to their shareholders at the end of each 
fiscal year.592 For example, ACLEDA Bank Plc., one of Cambodia’s predominant banks, 
has its 2017 first and second quarter Audited Interim Consolidated Financial Statements 
on their website, audited by PWC Cambodia.593 For large and medium size companies the 
CEO and/or Head of Finance must certify in writing to the Board of Directors that the 
financial statement accurately portray the affairs of the company.594 
SMEs and family businesses, who comprise most of the businesses in the Cambodian 
economy, have not conventionally kept accurate records of transactions or separated 
their business assets from personal assets. Part of the challenge in complying with the 
new provisions requiring an independent audit of financial statements is that SMEs do 
not have independent and sufficiently resources internal audit structures in place. Most 
SME business owners lack awareness of the benefit of using a domestic accounting 
firm or believe that employing accounting services would be too costly. A survey of 
FASMEC member recorded that over 75% of respondents thought their businesses 
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maintained accurate records to some extent and 26.5% of respondents replied that they 
thought companies were fully compliant.595 Recent changes in the laws on accounting 
and auditing require more SMEs to comply with new accounting standards, but there 
remains much confusion on what steps SMEs need to take in order to be compliant.596 
Most SMEs have informal or verbal checks and balances, including anti-bribery and anti-
corruption policies, but not written codes.597 In survey conducted among members of a 
business association representing SMEs (FASMEC) 38% of respondents stated that they 
have some system of internal controls to detect and prevent corruption.598  
2.2.2 External audit
What extent do companies subject their financial reporting to external 
audits?
All auditors in Cambodia are licensed by the Kampuchea Institute Certified Public 
Accountants and Auditors (“KICPAA”), under the MEF and regulated by the National 
Accounting Council (“NAC”) as of 2016.  Therefore, enterprises whose accounts must 
be audited annually, as set out in the Prakas, and which are compliant with the Law on 
Corporate Accounts, utilise external auditing services.600 The Prakas, set by the MEF, 
require all enterprises which meet the following criteria to submit their annual financial 
statements to an independent auditor certified by KICPAA. The criteria are i) an annual 
turnover of 750,000 USD ii) Assets totalling more than 500,000 USD or iii) more 
than 100 employees (also the qualification for a large enterprise).601 Annual audits are 
conducted by an independent, competent and qualified auditor certified by the KICPAA 
and objective assurance is provided to shareholders when required. 
For companies whose financial statements must be externally audited, audit services 
are compliant with IFRS standards (implemented in 2009) and therefore auditors 
are rotated frequently.602 Under the 2016 Law on Accounting and Auditing, auditors 
are prohibited from conducting their services for an enterprise for more than five 
consecutive years and have a mandated three year cooling-off period.603 Auditors must 
be independent “up to a 3rd level benign” from not have any conflicting interests or 
management rights in the enterprises.604 Enterprises and not-for profit organisations 
are not required to publish their external audits but many do, such as the some banks 
in Cambodia, companies listed on the Cambodian Stock Exchange605 and larger NGOs. 
An observation throughout the research is that a large majority of enterprises and not-
for-profit organisations that post their audited financial statements publicly have their 
audits done by internationally affiliated firms (PWC, KPMG, E&Y, Deloitte) operating in 
Cambodia.
There are few incentives for SMEs in Cambodia to conduct internal or external audits 
other than what is required for tax compliance. Most SMEs are struggling to meet the 
record keeping and accounting requirements and therefore do not yet see the benefit 
of hiring auditing and accounting services. There are a growing number of new tax 
consulting firms who are now assisting SMEs in becoming tax compliant following 
the CIFRS standards for SMEs.606 Small businesses who do work with small domestic 
accounting and auditing firms report high levels of competence generally but the quality 
of service varies.607 
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2.2.3 Independent assurance
To what extent do companies undergo voluntary independent assurance 
on the design, implementation and/or effectiveness of the anti-
corruption programme?
There is very little information on whether companies undergo a voluntary independent 
assurance on the design and implementation of their anti-corruption programme. As 
most businesses in Cambodia (SMEs) do not have such a programme, or only have 
informal internal controls, such assurance is unlikely. Most internationally affiliated 
firms comply with their parent company’s obligations which would include an anti-
corruption programme or policy and independent assurance.608 They may also have 
internal processes that provide assurance to the directors of the parent companies that 
their subsidiaries are following the anti-corruption programmes.609 Assurance opinions 
for such firms are generally not disclosed publicly, an example of non-disclosure being 
the companies listed on the Cambodian Stock Exchange nor major financial institutions 
in Cambodia.  SMEs do not undergo any form of assurance.
25
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In order to gather information on the transparency and disclosure practices of 
companies operating in Cambodia, 16 foreign and 31 domestic companies were 
surveyed to gather information about their reporting practices. The companies were 
selected based on market size to cover a broad spectrum of Cambodian industries. 
Each company’s website was consulted and scored based on a total of 26 questions 
analysing their transparency and disclosure. Companies could receive a score of 1 or 0.5 
for each question based on the information readily available on their website. Annual, 
financial, and sustainability reports were examined if available on a company’s website. 
(See TRAC Methodology (Annex I) for more information). Since companies were not 
directly contacted, the companies remain anonymous in order to give a broad overview 
of reporting practices. The companies surveyed included domestic and foreign-owned 
companies, including multinational corporations. The companies varied across sectors, 
including telecommunication, finance, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals. The survey 
examined three areas of reporting: 1) the companies anti-corruption programme; 2) 
organisational transparency; and 3) country by country reporting.
Overall, there was a clear disconnect between the information that was available on 
a foreign company’s website and a domestic company’s website. By and large, foreign 
companies had well developed websites that contained information regarding their anti-
corruption policies. Domestic companies frequently had underdeveloped websites, with 
very little information available at all, and very rarely contained links to their Annual 
Reports. Since this was the case in many of the domestic companies surveyed, it is 
clear that domestic organisations are not in the habit of using websites as a mechanism 
for sharing information to consumers, investors, or the public. This may change as 
companies register with the Cambodian Stock Exchange and the Cambodian economy 
continues to grow and develop. However, it should be cautioned that the lack of 
transparency on company websites may not reflect whether the company is willing to 
share information about their organisation or sales revenue to the public, or that they 
do not have an anti-corruption programme in place. Legally, Cambodian companies are 
not required to publicly report this information, therefore most companies simply do 
not. Finally, while foreign companies were clear about their anti-corruption programmes 
and organisational transparency, often they did not explain well their revenue or taxes 
in all of the countries in which they operate, rather choosing to share this information 
on a regional basis rather than by country. Overall, the trend indicated that foreign 
companies reported their anti-corruption programmes and organisational structure, 
but were limited in their country by country reporting. While domestic companies, 
frequently did not build websites that were very informational. 
2.3.1 Disclosure of anti-corruption programmes
To what extent do companies report publicly on their anti-corruption 
programmes?
In examining a company’s anti-corruption commitment, 13 questions  examined 
whether company websites included Code of Conducts or Ethics for their employees and 
directors, policies on facilitation payments, channels for whistleblowing, and policies for 
political contributions. 
In a survey of 47 of the largest companies operating in Cambodia, with 31 domestic 
companies surveyed, only four domestic companies stated any commitment to anti-
corruption on their websites, two of which were finance institutions.  Two companies 
mentioned a commitment to integrity but did not define what that commitment entailed. 
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In addition to the two domestic companies who stated a commitment to anti-corruption, 
four additional domestic companies stated a commitment to all applicable laws, although 
only one company mentioned anti-corruption laws as well.  Three domestic companies 
shared information about channels to report wrongdoings, which indicates that there 
may be internal anti-corruption policies.
12 out of the 16 foreign companies surveyed did include an anti-corruption statement 
on their websites. However, the policies were included on their home or headquarter 
websites rather than their Cambodian webpages. Although one company did have the 
Code of Conduct translated into Khmer, the policy could be found on their headquarter 
page, rather than the local site. In 11 out of 16 foreign companies, the policy either 
explicitly applied to both staff or directors or did not specify. Five out of 16 companies 
have a policy that barred facilitation payments and 10 out of 16 companies had a gift and 
hospitality policy and some channels to report wrongdoing.  Overall, only six companies 
scored a 65% in reporting on their anti-corruption programme, with only two companies 
scoring an 80%.
In the survey, it was clear that domestic companies largely do not share much 
information on their websites about their company, which leaves consumers, investors, 
and the public without information about the company. The relatively small number 
of domestic companies who have chosen to build websites with significant content is 
surprising given that 48% of Cambodians use a smartphone, with 37% of Cambodians 
having used the internet at least one time.610 
2.3.2 Disclosure of organisational structures
To what extent do companies report publicly on their organisational 
structure?
The survey of 47 of the largest companies operating in Cambodia also evaluated the 
company’s transparency regarding its organisational structures. For the purpose of 
this study, the research utilised 8 questions regarding a company’s fully consolidated 
holdings, percentage owned, and the company’s non-consolidated holdings.  More 
than half (9 out of 16) of foreign companies disclosed some information about their 
subsidiaries, including the percentage of shares owned. However, only two  companies 
adequately provided all information about their subsidiaries as required by the survey 
(receiving a score of 8). 3 companies received scores between 5.5 and 7.5, and 12 
companies received a 5 and below. 
There was a clear lack of transparency in organisational reporting  for domestic 
companies. However, many of the largest companies operating in Cambodia, do not 
have subsidiaries to report. Of the 31 companies surveyed, only 10 had subsidiaries, 
of this figure, one company received a score of 8. As Cambodian companies grow, 
properly reporting information about their subsidiaries is recommended, particularly 
as companies build more informative websites. Based on the survey,  both foreign and 
domestic companies could improve in terms of their reporting on their holdings and 
financial flows.
2.3.3 Disclosure of country-by-country operations
Do companies report publicly on their countries of operation?
The survey of 47 of the largest companies operating in Cambodia, also evaluated the 
company’s transparency regarding its country by country operations. This final section 
included four questions on revenue and profits, pre-income and income taxes, and 
capital expenditure. For these questions, the analysis was slightly adapted to examine 
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only whether companies shared this information about their operations in Cambodia, 
rather than in multiple countries.
Foreign companies had little available information about country by country operations, 
rather focusing on overall revenue and taxes, or sometimes reporting on regional 
revenue and tax information. Of the 16 foreign companies included in the survey, only 
two received a score of 4, adequately answering all questions. 9 companies did not have 
any available information. 
In domestic companies, information about a company’s revenue/sales and pre-income 
and income taxes was also largely not readily available. Only five companies out of 31 
received a score of 2 or higher in this section, with only two companies receiving a 
score of 4. Despite the large push from the General Department of Taxation for smaller 
companies to register their businesses and become tax compliant, large domestic 
companies are often also withholding this information and choosing not to reveal their 
revenue or income tax paid in Cambodia. However, legally domestic companies are not 
required to report this information publicly. 
The lack of information from foreign companies is equally troubling because in many 
cases it is impossible to tell how much they are profiting from their business operations, 
and how much tax they are required to pay in Cambodia.  
2.3.4 Additional disclosures
To what extent do companies publish information on charitable 
contributions, sponsorships and lobbying activities both domestically 
and internationally (for example corporate reporting or corporate social 
responsibility reports)?
To what extent do companies publish information on charitable contributions, 
sponsorships and lobbying activities both domestically and internationally (for example 
corporate reporting or corporate social responsibility reports)?
The last survey question evaluated the company’s disclosures on their charitable 
contributions and corporate social responsibility (“CSR”). In total, 18 out of 47 
companies disclosed information about their corporate social responsibility program. 
Of those 18 companies, only 3 foreign companies disclosed financial amounts tied to 
their community contributions. Companies did not disclose their lobbying activities 
in Cambodia; however, Cambodian companies are under no legal obligation to report 
lobbying activities since there are no regulations on lobbying. 
Additionally, throughout the survey process, it was clear that domestic companies do 
not typically have advanced websites for disclosing information about their company, 
including their CSR programs. Overall, while quite a few companies were willing to 
showcase their CSR activities on their websites, very few were willing to tie a financial 
figure to those activities.  
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A corporate stakeholder is a member of a group without whose support the organisation 
would cease to exist.611 A stakeholder can affect or be affected by the overall business 
environment. A stakeholder could be an employee, consumer, corporate partner, or non-
governmental organisation. Corporate shareholders are also considered stakeholders. 
Cambodian business associations and chambers of commerce provide many services, 
such as legal support, tax information and networking to their members. The International 
Chamber of Commerce, EUROCHAM, CAMFEBA and CAMFFA actively collaborate with 
public institutions. However, there is only limited evidence of joint-efforts against 
corruption, i.e. the MoU between EUROCHAM and ACU. 
Private companies encounter some difficulties collaborating with governmental 
institutions. Representatives of major local and foreign companies reported that 
many ministries do not have a clear vision and it takes time to obtain or request any 
information. Key ministries such as the MoC, Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and 
Fisheries (“MAFF”), Ministry of Industry and Handcraft (“MIH”) should improve their 
communication strategy and engage in a closer dialogue with the private sector. A 
positive sign of increasing efforts of the private sector to implement anti-corruption 
measures is the increasing number of MoUs between private companies and the ACU. 
However, the benefits of signing a MoU with the ACU are not clear. Even though there 
is a lack of any concrete joint-efforts and outcomes between the private sector and 
the ACU (beyond administrative dimension, signing MoU), representatives of major 
business associations reported that business integrity does improve when companies 
publicly show their engagement. 
Foreign companies are more transparent than domestic ones. They better communicate 
their anti-corruption efforts and organisational structure. Additionally, the securities 
regulatory framework in Cambodia is effective, requiring the few listed enterprises to 
establish a set of good corporate practices. All issuers are obligated to disclose financial 
and other important information to their shareholders. 
2.4.1. Stakeholder relations 
To what extent do businesses engage their own stakeholders (including 
shareholders) in ensuring sound corporate governance?
Chambers of commerce and business associations in Cambodia actively support and 
work with their members in training and implementation of good practices related 
to sustainability of financially sound enterprises. Members of different business 
associations and chamber of commerce have access to market insights and legal and 
financial data. The European Chamber of Commerce has a Tax Committee, which is a 
platform that seeks to provide up-to date information to its members and to work with 
Cambodian authorities on tax related issues.612 The Garment Manufacturers Association 
in Cambodia (“GMAC”) provides free of charge legal pointers and trainings related to 
taxes and auditing. CAMFFA also encourages cooperation and engagement in multi-
stakeholder initiatives to promote good management and financial practices. The 
Government-Private Sector Forum (“GPSF”) is another initiative between the Prime 
Minister and his Cabinet and the business community. The International Chamber 
of commerce is actively involved in the Working Group on Law, Tax and Governance. 
Better Factories Cambodia (“BFC”) is an established partnership between civil society 
and the private sector. BFC discloses factory compliance on key legal requirements and 
information related to strikes and garment worker human rights. 
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Only companies listed on the CSX have the legal obligation to provide shareholders 
with the right to participate in and to be sufficiently informed on decisions concerning 
fundamental corporate changes. The Law on the Issuance and Trading of Non-
Governmental Securities and its Sub-decrees legally require all issuers on the Cambodian 
Securities Exchange to comply with a set of corporate requirements such as maintaining 
corporate records, including shareholders’ agreement and shareholders resolutions. 
Moreover, issuers must set up a management monitoring system to facilitate disclosure 
and transparency. 
2.4.2. Business-driven anti-corruption initiatives
To what extent do companies engage in multi-stakeholder initiatives 
aimed at reducing corruption? 
According to a representative of a large domestic agricultural company, there is a need 
for effective channels to work with the Government to quickly process decisions and 
feedback related to payments, issuing certificates, permissions, etc. This is particularly 
true for the MIH.613 An individual affiliated with a major business association stated that 
the communication with the MIH is not efficient.  On the other hand, all interviewed 
experts stated that ministries have significantly improved recently, especially the 
MoC, MEF and MPWT. An example of partnership between private and public sector 
is the Customs-Private Sector Partnership Mechanism. The GDCE works closely with 
representatives of the private sector to “draft regulations and to reduce/eliminate other 
illegal unofficial fees”.614  
Engagement with the ACU is necessary to prevent corruption in Cambodia. Companies 
who engage with the ACU are expected not to engage in corrupt acts and to report 
any solicitation of corruption to the ACU for investigation.615 In general, SMEs do not 
have significant public engagement with the ACU, potentially because they are afraid 
of possible repercussions. It should be highlighted that even though not much evidence 
is available regarding productive collaboration between businesses and the ACU, good 
practices have been reported. In many cases, the ACU solved the incident without 
any legal actions and many of its activities have a dissuasive purpose. For instance, 
in a case with one private company, the public administration was slow in processing 
administrative documents. Following a submitted complaint from the company to the 
ACU, the staff of the ACU solved the problem by communicating with the administrative 
staff and their supervisors, without taking any formal legal action. Overall, signing an 
MoU with the ACU seems to have some secondary effects which are important and can 
save companies a lot of time and money.
2.4.3 Business associations: collaboration
To what extent do business associations support companies in fighting 
corruption?
Business associations and chambers of commerce play a key role in the implementation 
of good practices and corporate policies against corruption. For example, among the core 
values of the Cambodian Rice Federation is integrity. In 2015, EUROCHAM signed a MoU 
with the ACU. It was the first business association in the Kingdom to do so. In addition, 
EUROCHAM aims to have the reputation of being the “Chamber of compliant companies”. 
Every membership request is carefully examined and only fully compliant companies 
are accepted to become members.  It was reported that the ACU is ready to conduct 
training on anti-corruption and implementation of codes of conduct with every business 
association.
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In an interview, a representative of CAMFFA stated that the association is against 
corruption and its members do not want to engage in corruption. The Association actively 
encourages their members to directly engage with the ACU. CAMFEBA implements 
projects such as “Strengthening the Business Associations”616 with private stakeholders 
in order to create an enabling environment for policies,  relationships  and  behaviours 
that  foster economic growth and allow enterprises to thrive. 
Business associations provide many trainings to their members. However, very few are 
focused on anti-corruption topics. The Federation of Association of Small and Medium 
Enterprises (“FASMEC”) signed an MoU with Transparency International Cambodia in 
2016 for a three-year partnership aimed at promoting business integrity. FASMEC works 
with TI Cambodia to train their members on issues such as taxation, procurement, and 
important  export procedures with a focus on business integrity.  A representative of a 
major business association reported that the GDCE, GDT and CamControl,617 Cambodian 
Ports and the Police provide some materials related to corruption, but it is not enough.618 
Business associations should establish good relations with governmental institutions 
and request supporting materials. EUROCHAM, CANCHAM, the American Chamber of 
Commerce, CAMFFA and CAMFEBA and others are important platform for enterprises to 
voice their concerns and receive legal advice. 
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2.5. Board of Directors 
Cambodian legislation and particularly the Law on Commercial Enterprises does 
not specify in detail the duties and responsibilities of a Board of Directors. Prakas 
on Corporate Governance for Listed Public Enterprises require more transparency 
regarding conflict of interest of public enterprises. More legislative initiatives regarding 
the promotion of corporate governance are necessary. In practice, the Board of Directors 
is not typically independent from the companies’ management. Based on the research, 
there were no legislative requirements or practices related to anti-corruption policies 
and training. However, all experts with whom Transparency International Cambodia 
conducted interviews stated that due to globalisation and ASEAN integration, Cambodian 
companies have significantly improved the integrity of their management structures.619 
It is expected that corporate governance structures will continue to improve as will the 
growing discipline of the Government to enforce laws on taxes and customs. There is a 
need for closer collaboration with the ACU, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, as well as with other stakeholders to build the capacity of 
Cambodian companies to implement corporate governance practices, which will bring 
confidence to shareholders and ensure the boards’ accountability.
 
2.5.1. Oversight
To what extent is the Board of Directors responsible for the oversight of 
their company’s anti-corruption program?
Responsibilities of Board of Directors are defined in several laws and provisions. 
According to Article 4 of the Kram on the General Statutes of Public Enterprises, 
the highest governing body of public companies is “The Council of Administration”. 
It determines the objectives and controls of the management of the enterprise, and 
ensures the rationality and effectiveness of the organisation. President, General Director, 
or member of the Council of Administration’s function is incompatible with the function 
of members of the National Assembly.   One of the seats is occupied by a representative 
of the employees of the public enterprise who is selected from and by the employees.621 
Every public enterprise must send to the responsible ministry minutes of meetings, the 
budget, report on activities (balance, management account) and report on the audit of 
various activities.622 There is a state controller attached to each public enterprise. They 
are selected based on “their personal merits and experience”.623 The Law of the General 
Statute of Public Enterprises does not have provisions related to anti-corruption and 
integrity programs. 
According to the Law on Commercial Enterprises, private enterprises are governed by 
a Board of Directors headed by a chairman.624 If necessary, the Board of Directors can 
establish different committees and delegate them a set of rights and responsibilities.625 
These committees function similarly to the Board. All directors and officers have the 
following duties: “act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the 
company and exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person 
would exercise in comparable circumstance”.626 However, the Law does not give any 
obligation to implement any anti-corruption practices or to establish a corporate code 
of conduct. 
Article 3 of the Prakas on the corporate governance for listed companies, requires 
all enterprises listed on the CSX to “assure good corporate governance through the 
establishment of mechanisms to protect shareholders’ rights, arrange the governance 
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and management structure of the company, define the authority and obligations of 
the board of directors, set up an effective system of controls and protect stakeholders’ 
rights.” Every company must establish an Audit Committee attached to the Board of 
Directors, which is responsible to the board for review and oversight of the company’s 
financial reporting and report on the company’s risk and risk management.627 Moreover, 
listed companies also have a Nomination Committee for the Board which reviews and 
evaluates the qualifications of candidates for the position of directors and for senior 
officers who have been approved by the Board.628 At least 20% of the members of 
the board must be independent directors (not previously directly engaged with the 
company). “The board shall act honestly, in good faith and in the best interest of the 
company and the shareholders”.629 Directors of each listed company are responsible for 
monitoring and implementing policies, to ensure compliance with the law, to appoint the 
CEO, to ensure the financial solvency of the company, proper financial management and 
control  and protection of shareholders assets. The law also states that Directors shall 
not take improper advantage of their position, shall not  misuse information acquired as 
a Director,  shall not accept personal benefit from third parties, and shall make conflict 
of interest declarations.630 
The Board of Directors of publicly listed companies on the CSX shall approve a Code of 
Conduct for directors and senior officers.631 These codes of conduct should be publicly 
disclosed. Moreover, information regarding conflicts of interest should be also made 
available to the public. 
2.5.2 Executive remuneration
To what extent are the Board member and senior executive remuneration 
of companies determined according to good corporate governance 
standards?
The To what extent are the Board member and senior executive remuneration of 
companies determined according to good corporate governance standards?
The Law on Commercial Enterprises states that the Directors of the company have the 
power to “set the salaries and other compensation of such officers”.632 According to 
the Kram on the General Statute of Public Enterprises, the Council of Administration 
“determine[s] the organisational structure of the enterprise, the statute of the personnel 
and the salary system”.633 
None of the existing laws in Cambodia require a special committee to handle the 
remuneration policy and employment contracts for Board members. Companies listed 
on CSX may establish such committees, but it is not compulsory.634 The salaries of the 
Board members must be approved by the shareholders of the company. Prakas on the 
corporate governance for listed companies and public enterprises stipulate that “the 
Company shall establish a formal and transparent policy for fixing the compensation 
and remuneration of individual and senior officers”.635 
The disclosure of executive and benefits packages depends on the type of the company. 
Article 134 of the Law on Commercial Enterprises stipulates that directors or officers 
have to disclose the nature and extent of their interest if: “(a) is a party to a contract or 
proposed contract with the company, or (b) has a material interest in any person who is 
a party to a contract or proposed contract with the company.” Article 17 of the Prakas 
on the Corporate Governance for listed companies stipulates that “the Company’s 
report shall separately disclose the aggregate, direct or indirect compensation and 
remuneration of the Board and Senior Officers including the CEO.”636 The same article 
also defines the parameters of executive remuneration and compensation: “the Board 
is responsible for ensuring that levels of compensation or remuneration are appropriate 
to attract and retain the executive directors and senior officers needed to run the 
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company successfully. A proportion of fixed and variable incentives may be structured 
for executive directors and senior officers in order to link their rewards to individual, 
team and sustainable company performance for shareholders”.637  
All representatives of private companies with whom BICA researchers interviewed 
stated that the performance of senior management is tightly linked to their salaries. 
It was also reported that in some cases, a bonus package is distributed to employees 
based on their performance. 
2.5.3 Conflicts of interest
To what extent are safeguards in place to govern Board of Directors 
conflicts of interest?
The duties and responsibilities of the Board of Directors are defined in the respective 
laws and regulations. Even though the Law on Commercial Enterprises does not clearly 
state the responsibilities of the Board of Directors, it states that all management 
activities are conducted by directors and managers. The Law says that, “if all directors 
vote to approve a matter, it is deemed approved by the board”.638 The Board of Directors 
has the power to propose a merger and to adopt a resolution approving a merger.639 The 
resolution must be approved by a majority of a quorum of the Directors. Representatives 
from large companies in the shipping and agricultural sectors stated that the members 
of the Board of Directors are directly involved in the management of the company. 
Cambodian law lacks provisions related to safeguards for the Board of Directors against 
insider trading.
Regarding the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest to the Board of Directors and 
the company, the Law on Commercial Enterprise clearly states that “a director or officer 
of a company shall disclose the nature and extent of his interest in writing to the company 
or request to have a statement entered in the minutes of meetings of directors”.640 
Generally, regulations on Listed Companies (public and private) on the CSX have 
multiple disclosure requirements related to conflict of interest. The Prakas on Corporate 
Management for Listed Public Enterprises states that “Directors shall be independent in 
judgment and action, and take all reasonable steps to ensure the soundness of board of 
directors’ decisions.”641 They also have to make public announcements on their conflicts 
of interest.642 The Board also must ensure that the appointed independent directors 
are free of any material relationship with the listed public enterprise’s senior officers 
or other employees.643 Independent directors could be dismissed if they do not disclose 
information related to conflict of interest. The Law also requires that incentive policies, 
codes of conducts and policies on conflict of interest must be publicly disclosed.644 
Contrary to publicly listed enterprises, commercially listed enterprises have fewer 
requirements related to the disclosure of conflict of interest of their Boards of Directors. 
For instance, in Article 7 of the Prakas on the Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, 
the obligation of directors to resolve conflict of interest does not exist.645 Article 20 
of the same provision does not stipulate that the directors have to publicly disclose 
announcements on their conflicts of interest related to the enterprise. Members of the 
Board of Directors of a commercial enterprise listed on the CSX cannot be disqualified 
due to a conflict of interest. The other texts related to conflict of interest are similar to 
those written in the Prakas on Corporate Governance for Listed Public Enterprise. 
Due to ASEAN integration, Cambodian businesses, especially those relying on networks 
of family members, relatives and friends, face significant challenges. These companies 
should adopt appropriate corporate governance structures in order to build up the 
confidence of shareholders. Regarding the overall transparency and the board of 
directors “there is quite a control gap in Cambodian companies”.646 
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Summary of Civil Society Indicators
Civil Society Overview 
The purpose of the civil society analysis is to examine the ways in which Cambodian civil 
society serves as a valuable check on the public and private sectors. This section examines 
through a narrow lens the role of media and civil society organisations to interact and 
monitor the private sector with a focus on business integrity. The three indicators in this 
section analyse: i) to what extent Cambodia’s media is fair and independent; ii) whether 
civil society engages with the private sector to promote accountability, transparency, 
and integrity in business practices; and iii) to what extent civil society is active and 
engaged in monitoring private sector corruption. 
Summary of the Indicators
The independent media indicator assesses whether media in Cambodia is free and 
independent, as well as the media’s capacity to monitor business integrity. Cambodia’s 
media is generally not classified as being free and independent.647 Many of the media 
outlets maintain close ties to the RGC.648 While there are journalists committed to 
unbiased and independent news coverage, many journalists lack training and independent 
resources to adequately cover anti-corruption and business integrity issues, thereby 
serving as a necessary check on the public and private sectors.649  
The first indicator related specifically to civil society examines the extent to which 
civil society organisations engage with the private sector to promote transparency, 
accountability, and integrity in business practices. Several recent initiatives build 
partnership between civil society and the private sector in order to improve issues 
through multi-stakeholder engagement.
The final civil society indicator looks at the extent to which civil society monitors the 
private sector and whether actors are using transparency, accountability, and integrity in 
their business practices. Cambodia has an extensive network of civil society organisations. 
While many civil society organisations are experienced in working with human rights 
issues related to land, very few civil society organisations have historically focused on 
business integrity or on responsible business conduct. The situation also appears to be 
evolving, however, as more NGOs focus on responsible business conduct and coordinate 
relevant initiatives amongst each other. The tools and expertise previously used by NGOs 
to advocate for communities affected by the land sector can be applied to similar areas 
of private sector engagement. Therefore, while civil society is well primed and able to 
monitor the private sector on certain issues, there has not been a consistent approach by 
civil society to monitor specifically business integrity in the private sector.
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3.1 Broader Checks and Balances
Since the early 1990s Cambodia has experienced a large and often robust civil society 
presence, additionally the presence of media outlets has also increased since that time. 
However, business integrity has been highlighted or explored rather infrequently by 
both the media and civil society groups. For the media, reporting on business integrity 
issues or implicating the private sector in corruption can carry great risk, as many media 
outlets rely on the private sector for financing through advertising sales.650 Additionally, 
many media outlets lack the investigative training to explore potential cases of private 
sector corruption. For civil society, the focus has largely been on the linkages between 
business and human rights, rather than on advocating for increased business integrity. 
Despite this, civil society groups are well placed and well trained to promote advocacy 
efforts and serve as private sector watchdogs, in order to promote and increase business 
integrity. In recent years, civil society organisations have identified responsible business 
conduct and business integrity as objectives that civil society could help private sector 
partners to achieve, therefore collaboration between civil society and the private sector 
on these efforts does seem to be increasing to some extent. Additionally, many multi-
stakeholder initiatives have been developed that seek to engage the private and public 
sectors and promote responsible business conduct.
3.1.1 Independent media 
To what extent is the country’s media perceived as being free and 
independent?
Cambodian press is largely considered not free, with Reporters Without Borders ranking 
Cambodia 132 out of 180 countries in 2017.651 This ranking dropped four points from 128 in 
2016, due to threats against media outlets in 2016.652 The TV sector is the most popular 
but highly concentrated with four media companies, controlling 78% of viewership.653 7 
out of 10 TV channels are owned by individuals associated with the ruling party. These 
individuals are either paid by the Government or are advisors to the Government.654 
Meanwhile, the print sector is also highly concentrated with the top 4 outlets reaching 
59% of the available audience.655 The top 4 media corporations and owners reach in total 
83.4% of the audience across all media sectors, which leaves these four companies to 
have considerable influence over public opinion.656 In addition to the close ties between 
the largest media organisations and the ruling parties, journalists are often subject 
to threats and violence that seem aimed at chilling independent investigative media 
reports.657 One of the most difficult subjects for journalist to report on is corruption.658 
There are several media organisations and outlets seeking to provide independent, 
fair and accurate news to the Cambodian public. The Cambodian Club of Journalists 
articulates a Code of Conduct that requires journalists to collect information based 
on, “honesty, dignity and justice,” and to refuse to write or publish false texts that are 
beneficial to a business or individual or group.659 For many media outlets, fairness and 
accuracy is very important to their journalistic integrity despite the pressures of being 
the first to break the story. In political stories, media outlets try to get both sides in 
order to avoid being called pro or anti-government.660  
In March 2017, the Cambodian Center for Independent Media (“CCIM”) with the support 
of TI Cambodia re-launched a weekly radio programme that offers listeners who 
experience corruption opportunities to join in discussions related to corruption and 
address their potential consequences.661 In August 2017, CCIM radio broadcasts were 
shut down.662 Some media outlets are less inclined or are unable to cover corruption 
issues because they are supported by advertisements from private companies.663 
Additionally, many journalists do not have the capacity to conduct investigations into 
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corruption, because they lack the skills, the resources, or the time to carry out the type 
of investigative journalism corruption stories require.664 In 2017, all radio stations that 
broadcast Radio Free Asia and Voice of America into the provinces were closed by the 
Ministry of Information, 19 radio stations in total.665 The closure of the radio stations 
coincided with one of the leading independent, English-language, newspaper sources, 
the Cambodia Daily, receiving a 6,300,000 USD tax bill from the General Department 
of Taxation for unpaid back taxes, and ultimately closing due to its inability to pay.666 
Based on these recent events, the space for independent media appears to be shrinking 
in Cambodia. 
3.1.2 Civil society engagement in business integrity
To what extent are civil society organisations engaged with companies in 
order to strengthen their commitment towards integrity, accountability 
and transparency?
To what extent are civil society organisations engaged with companies in order to 
strengthen their commitment towards integrity, accountability and transparency?
Cambodia has a strong and active civil society presence, with many organisations 
operating despite political pressures on human and civil rights. While civil society 
organisations (“CSOs”) have been active in Cambodia since the late 1990’s focusing on 
a variety of initiatives, CSOs have focused on largely on business and human rights, with 
very few initiatives targeting business integrity issues directly. In 2008, 40 domestic 
and foreign companies, supported PACT’s Clean Business Initiative, which called for 
companies to commit to avoiding bribery, or selling fake and unsafe products, to operate 
with fairness and integrity and to promote reforms to the business environment.667 The 
initiative closed in 2010.668  In 2012, Transparency International Cambodia launched 
their three-year strategic plan, which included a focus on private sector anti-corruption 
measures. The Business Integrity Programme was officially established in 2014 and began 
offering compliance and business integrity training, as well as one on one consultative 
services to companies interested in establishing Corporate Integrity Systems, to better 
equip their staff with policies and procedures to ward off corruption. However, prior to 
the establishment of the Business Integrity Programme, most anti-corruption efforts in 
Cambodia were focused on improving anti-corruption in the public sector, such as the 
passage of the Anti-Corruption Law and the establishment of the ACU. 
Historically, CSOs in Cambodia have focused on advocacy efforts surrounding business 
and human rights issues as part of their engagement with the private sector, particularly 
in issues related to land rights and the rights of factory and agricultural workers. 
Therefore, a large proportion of CSOs have experience in working on and serving as 
watchdogs on business and human rights initiatives, such as Equitable Cambodia, 
Inclusive Development International, the Cambodian Center for Human Rights and 
UNOHCHR.669 Often in these initiatives, however, there is more emphasis on the human 
rights issue or abuse, than the potentially related business integrity issue.  
Recently CSO’s have sought to promote responsible business conduct and corporate 
social responsibility in the private sector through coordinated efforts with the private 
sector. In 2017, the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia launched its “Responsible 
Business Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy 2016-2012,” which 
seeks to prepare CSO’s for increasing engagement with the private sector in order to 
enable sustainable inclusive development and to strengthen CCC and its CSO members’ 
capacity to engage with the private sector and understand and promote responsible 
business conduct.670 Also in 2017, the Extractive Industries Governance  Forum (“EIGF”) 
was launched, which builds critical partnerships through multi-stakeholder engagement 
for key players involved in the extractive industries including industry, government, 
community and civil society and seeks to promote greater transparency and 
50
BICA Assessment 2017
120
accountability in the extractive industry.671 Additionally, in 2015 the Cambodian Corporate 
Social Responsibility (“CSR”) Platform, with support from Oxfam, was established to 
encourage companies to promote, implement and understand CSR policies and to support 
advocacy efforts to encourage the RGC to adopt CSR framework for companies operating 
in Cambodia. Through these initiatives, the TI Cambodia’s Business Integrity Programme 
has sought to promote business integrity as part of a larger effort to improve responsible 
business conduct and promote corporate social responsibility. 
3.1.3  Civil Society monitoring of  business integrity
To what extent does the country have an active and engaged civil society 
monitoring private sector corruption?
As already mentioned, CSO engagement with the private sector is relatively recent in 
terms of anti-corruption efforts and in monitoring business integrity. The 2008 PACT 
Cambodia Clean Business Project, was supported by several major Cambodian banks 
and sought to support the private sector by enabling businesses to work in a fair 
environment and to promote clean business practices within company operations.672 
Overall, 40 local and foreign businesses endorsed the PACT Cambodia Clean Business 
Project including an initiative to create a certification for Cambodian businesses that 
adheres to international best business practices.673 However, the project finished in 
2010, along with efforts to make a lasting certification for companies. The Oxfam led 
CSR platform is also supported by the business community, with over 20 domestic 
businesses joining the platform. Based on the examples of PACT Cambodia’s Initiative 
and the CSR Platform, the private sector has proven its willingness to engage with civil 
society initiatives to promote business integrity.
In another initiative, SILAKA Cambodia has established a project to monitor corruption in 
public procurement at the sub-national level in Kandal and Kampong Thom provinces. The 
public campaign is intended to promote awareness of public procurement and to engage 
local citizens to join and monitor bidding meetings, as part of SILAKA’s “Strengthening 
Procurement System at Sub-National Level (SPSL)”.674 Finally, TI Cambodia’s Business 
Integrity Programme (“BIP”), monitors the private sector’s commitment to business 
integrity. The (“BIP”) offers training on a variety of issues relevant to business and 
to business integrity, including taxation, procurement, and public service fees. The 
BIP works with companies to implement Corporate Integrity Systems, which provide 
companies with strong policies and procedures to avoid corruption and operate a 
cleaner business. 
As mentioned, Cambodia has a vibrant civil society community, however many CSOs 
have focused on business and human rights issues, including supporting communities 
impacted by business and generating advocacy campaigns on human rights violations 
committed by companies. CSOs such the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (“CCHR”), 
the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (“LICADHO”), 
and Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (“ADHOC”) may be able 
to hold private companies accountable for business integrity. They have had practice 
taking companies to task for human rights violations, specifically concerning land and 
labour rights.  Often the corruption issues are behind or secondary to the human rights 
abuses. For example, Inclusive Development International, Equitable Cambodia, and the 
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights have all assisted 
in filing international complaints against businesses who allegedly committed human 
rights abuses. In this regard, CSOs have developed their watchdog role is well developed, 
though still lacking in terms of business integrity specifically. 
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SILAKA Public Procurement Project
One project has made significant progress in increasing local capacity and 
transparency in public procurement at the Commune/Sangkat level. The Participatory 
Public Procurement Watch Program, run by NGO partner SILAKA and funded by the 
Centre for International Private Enterprise (“CIPE”), established a community based 
monitoring committee that observes and monitors the notification and bidding 
processes at the sub-national level. This project is significant on two levels, it first 
increases community participation in the bidding process at the Commune/Sangkat 
level and secondly elevates the capacity of procurement officials at the commune 
and district level to follow the procedures laid out in the 2012 Law on Public 
Procurement  and the Commune/Sangkat Project675 Implementation Manual.676  
SILAKA piloted the Joint Procurement Monitoring Committee at the Sub-National 
Level (“JPMC”) in Kampong Thom in 2013 and Kandal provinces in 2015. The JPMC 
performs two main functions: i) it facilitates the dissemination of information on the 
provincial budget and notifications of new procurement projects for local enterprises 
and ii) it monitors, documents, reports and consults with local officials on abuses or 
irregularities in the procurement process with the Commune/Sangkat Procurement 
Committee.677 The JPMC is a voluntary group comprised of representatives of local 
authorities, private enterprises as well as civil society members. The group enables the 
discussion and consultation with citizens and the private sector to monitor Commune/
Sangkat and District procurement (from bidding announcement to biding opening).678 
They are watchdogs and information providers on the proper procurement process, 
supporting good governance within local communities.  Since its initial pilot in 2013 
the programme resulted in the reporting of several irregularities to the Provincial 
Planning and Investment Division (“PID”).679 The JPMCs are intended to function 
independently with limited support from SILAKA in future.
SILAKA facilitated 18 outreach meetings in Kampong Thom province, providing training 
on basic concepts of good governance, social accountability and civil engagement in 
the procurement process at the Commune /Sangkat level.680 The outcome of these 
meetings and the JPMC’s continued engagement is a better awareness by citizen’s 
that procurement projects are funded by and belong to them through taxation and 
paid public services. Attendees reported a greater understanding that they have the 
right, and it is to their advantage, to report irregularities in procurement at the local 
level. The success of this programme hinges on awareness of proper procurement 
procedure by the JPMC and adequate reporting mechanisms. In Kampong Thom, 
JPMC members successfully monitor communal boards for new notices of bidding 
and follow the processes and outcomes bidding in their communities.681 The outcome 
has been an increase in bidding announcements posted to communal boards at the 
commune and district levels.682 The main challenge is that bidding meetings are held 
in the district hall, not the commune office, making it difficult for citizens to attend.683  
Another significant achievement of this project is the reporting of commune level 
challenges and best practices to the provincial and national authorities.684 The 
meeting minutes from the JPMC of Kampong Thom were incorporated into the PID’s 
annual workshop with the NCDD (National Committee for Sub-National Democratic 
Development) in 2014 and 2015. The NCDD is an inter-ministerial mechanism for 
promoting democratic development in Cambodia and implementing the administrative 
laws on the management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts, Khans 
(Organic Law) and Commune/Sangkats.685 PIDs from different provinces meet 
annually with the NCDD to discuss best practices and recommendations for changing 
laws governing the administration of the provinces. This resulted in several changes 
to improve how the procurement process is implemented.686 
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The JPMC has observed 9 bidding processes in the two provinces where the project 
is active. As a result of monitoring the bids, the JPMC was able to suggest changes 
to the Commune/Sangkat Procurement Implementation Manual in Kampong Thom 
through the PID and NCDD (as mentioned above).687 The JPMC noticed that bidders 
would place a bid and then withdraw the bid before the closure of the bidding 
process, or register multiple bids under different names, thereby influencing 
bidding prices. The Commune/Sangkat addressed this behaviour by requiring a 
2% deposit for all bids, to prevent collusion amongst bidders.688 Furthermore, the 
timeframe for bidding on most projects was changed to earlier in the year (from 
April/May to February/March) to avoid project implementation during the rainy 
season, beginning in June, which caused delays and additional costs.689   
Moving forward the JPMCs are working towards registration with the Ministry 
of Interior as a civil society organisation, which would enable them to fundraise 
independently and work towards operational independence from SILAKA. 
Furthermore, SILAKA690 intends to expand the scope of the project by creating 
community monitoring associations at the district level.691 This project is particularly 
effective because it is implemented at the commune level where communities 
are most impacted by procurement projects. Local leaders are being trained in 
civic engagement and bidding procedures and are effectively implementing this 
training, resulting in improvements.692 In comparison, bidding processes at the 
national level are not yet open to civil society monitoring, or participation and 
bidding notifications are often not well publicised.693 This grassroots strategy to 
educate and raise awareness is rare in the technical arena of public procurement, 
but the effects of this programme have been transformative. The aspiration is that 
the programme will grow to create sufficient awareness to affect change at the 
Ministerial level for national procurement projects, thereby increasing transparency 
and accountability from the ground up.
How bout this: Meeting 
with the JPMC in Kampong 
Thom province as part of 
the Participatory Public 
Procurement Watch 
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Recommendations
Recommendations for the Public Sector:
Short-Term Recommendations:
• Increase online and one-window public services to reduce bureaucratic burdens and
costs associated with doing business in Cambodia, particularly for SMEs, and 
coordination, responsiveness and accountability from relevant Ministries.
• Make business registration with the MoC and GDT publicly available, including access
to information on beneficial ownership.
• Expedite the promulgation of key pieces of legislation to increase transparency and
accountability such as the draft law on competition; the draft law on the protection of 
reporting persons; the draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses 
and provide operational benchmarks for both public and private sectors that are in 
line with international standards. 
• Engage with business associations and civil society to draft laws regulating
e-commerce, consumer protection and commercial contracts as well as laws on 
environmental impacts assessments and building codes.
• The Cambodian Stock Exchange should provide training and encourage companies,
particularly SME’s, in corporate governance systems and business integrity. 
• Strengthen monitoring and oversight of national and sub-national public procurement
to assure public notification of contracts and transparency in the outcomes of 
awarding contracts on national level bids.
• Disclose all Qualified Investment Projects (QIPs) publicly and provide a list of
beneficiaries and aggregated data regarding tax incentives and other benefits under 
the QIP program.
• Disclose all official tariffs levied by the GDCE, the GDT, and other officials publicly,
and sanction any officers who request informal tariff payments. Disallow changes to 
tariff schemes without timely notification to the public.
• Introduce mechanisms to submit complaints directly to the GDT and GDCE and provide
a mechanism for anonymous reporting by companies of any issues or wrongdoing 
involving customs and tax officers.
• Consistently and transparently enforce new amendments to the Cambodian tax
code, under the 2017 Financial Management Law, across sectors to avoid creating a 
non-competitive business environment. Provide more training, incentives and support 
for businesses to become tax compliant.
• Increase the consistency of enforcement of the GDT of penalties provided under the
Tax Code and ensure due process and appeal mechanisms for each application of a 
penalty by the GDT.
• Clearly define Micro, Small and Medium businesses according to the number of
employees and revenues across relevant Ministries in order to have clearer 
expectations for compliance with taxation and business registration requirements. 
• Increase  the independence of the NCAC and the ACU by amending the legislation
regarding the appointment of NCAC members and the ACU leadership as clearly 
stated in the TI-NISA Cambodia report. 
• Continue to create an environment of integrity within the ACU and a better relationship
between the ACU and the public by i) providing an anonymous mechanism for 
complaints against ACU investigators (i.e. through the online complaint mechanism 
administered by the Ministry of Civil Service) ii) making public the general process by 
which ACU investigations result in charges of corruption iii) providing mechanisms of 
due process and appeal for public allegations of corruption.
• Publish the terms and conditions of the MoUs that the ACU has signed with Cambodian
and international companies and other ministries.
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• Strengthen the effectiveness of CAFIU in investigating and sanctioning instances of
suspected money-laundering and in coordinating and consistently reviewing financial 
institutions.
Long-Term Recommendations:
• Improve transparency from the MEF and National Assembly regarding the annual
budget and fiscal deficit by the public and timely release of an annual independent 
audit of the national budget by the national audit authority.
• Increase the independent functioning of the ACU and the Office of the Inspector
General from the Executive and Government Ministries.
• The GDT should include more positive reinforcement for tax compliant companies,
particularly SMEs, while continuing to work with the business associations and 
organise workshops and training on business registration and on tax compliance.
• The MoJ and RGC should amend legislation in order to require Judges at all levels of
court to publish their decisions and reasoning and ensure that standards are 
established for open court proceedings.
• Publish and implement a clear and transparent mechanism for the recruitment and
appointment of judicial officials and judges, including clear and well-publicised 
recruitment and appointment criteria.
• Innovate and implement a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating staff performance
at GDT and GDCE for consistency and transparency in order improve good and fair 
working practices of taxes and customs’ officers.
• Strengthen anti-corruption legislation within the Law on Taxation and the Law on
Customs and link the Anti-Corruption Law with tax and customs regulations through 
a sub-decree.
• Create an online legal database of all laws in Cambodia, with translation of all new
laws into English, in order to increase awareness of the legal framework in Cambodia 
and the ability of civil society organisations to monitor legal developments and their 
implementation.
• The RGC should update existing laws that are outdated, or run counter to anti
corruption objectives in consultation with the private sector and civil society (Anti-
Corruption Law, Law on Commercial Rules and Commercial Register, Investment Law, 
Law on Corporate Enterprises, Law on Customs, Law on Taxation).
• The RGC should amend the Law on Commercial Enterprises to include legal obligations
for companies to establish a code of conduct and anonymous whistleblowing channels. 
Recommendations for the Business Sector:
Short-Term Recommendations:
• The chambers of commerce and business associations should disclose information
about the benefits of engaging closely with the ACU to their members, particularly, 
the importance of protection for potential whistleblowers who report to the ACU. 
• Business associations and chambers of commerce should continue to organise
training  in business integrity and corporate practices (i.e. codes of conduct, codes of 
ethics, anti-corruption reporting channels, anti-corruption policies), including working 
closely with the ACU to establish and train in best practices.
• Business associations should identify benchmarks for business integrity in each
industry and acknowledge and reward companies who achieve them.
• Domestic and international companies should establish anonymous, and protected
lines for whistleblowing to encourage employees at all levels to report cases of 
corruption or other wrongdoing. 
• Companies should ensure compliance by registering with the MoC and the GDT.
Business associations should encourage the process and assist whenever possible. 
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• Domestic companies, particularly SME’s, should increase business integrity by
adopting internal policies and procedures, including codes of conduct, whistleblowing 
channels and other anti-corruption measures.
• Companies who are required to conduct annual independent audits should
conduct audits and publicly release their audited annual reports.
• Companies should disclose anti-corruption policies and activities in their annual
reports and on their websites.
Long-term Recommendations:
• Business associations should encourage companies to understand the value of
clean accounting practices and the value added by professional accounting services.
• Companies should require anti-corruption due diligence of their partners and
suppliers and create a database of clean companies. 
• Private companies should offer more channels to report cases of corruption.
Reporting exclusively to ACU is insufficient.
• Chambers of commerce should promote and advise ministries on drafting and
promulgating relevant legislation, including the draft law on the protection of 
reporting persons, the draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses 
and the draft law on competition and update existing laws which are outdated or run 
counter to anti-corruption objectives. This should be in consultation with the private 
sector and civil society.
• Business associations should promote a dialogue on challenges incurred in doing
business in Cambodia to remove the shame associated with reporting and talking 
about problems in doing business.
Recommendations for Civil Society
Short-Term Recommendations:
• Civil society organisations should engage with independent media outlets to
provide training in investigating and documenting private sector corruption and 
business integrity issues.
• Civil society organisation should continue to work closely with the private sector
on initiatives that promote business integrity.
• Civil society should acknowledge and reward businesses who actively promote
anti-corruption and business integrity.
• Civil society organisations should actively monitor and report on the private sector
with an eye towards anti-corruption and business integrity.
Long-Term Recommendations:
• Civil society and the private sector should coordinate to promote initiatives that
increase business integrity, including legislation and policy changes that increase 
integrity, transparency and accountability.
• Civil society should consult and engage the private sector and public sector on the
passage of key pieces of legislation to increase transparency and accountability, such 
as the draft law on competition; the draft law on the protection of reporting persons 
and the draft law on the protection of experts, victims and witnesses. 
• The media should continue to identify independent sources of income for their
outlets, in order to maintain and promote independence.
• The media should increase investigation and reporting on business integrity.
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Score each question between 0-1 pts, ½ points are possible
I. Reporting on anti-corruption programs (ACP)
1. Does the company have a publicly stated commitment to anti-corruption?
Score____
2. Does the company publicly commit to be in compliance with all relevant laws, 
including anti-corruption laws?
Score_____
3. Does the company leadership (senior member of management or board) 
demonstrate support for anti-corruption?
Score_____
4. Does the company’s code of conduct/anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to all 
employee’s and directors?
Score_____
5. Does the company’s anti-corruption policy explicitly apply to persons who are not 
employees but are authorized to act on behalf of the company or represent it (for 
example: agents, advisors, representatives or intermediaries)?
Score_____
6. Does the company’s anti-corruption program apply to con-controlled persons 
or entities that provide goods or services under contract (for example: contractors, 
subcontractors, suppliers)?
Score_____
7. Does the company have in place an anti-corruption training program for its 
employees and directors?
Score_____
8. Does the company have a policy on gifts, hospitality and expenses?
Score_____
9. Is there a policy that explicitly prohibits facilitation payments?
Score_____
10. Does the program enable employees and others to raise concerns and report 
violations (of the program) without risk of reprisal?
Score_____
Annex I: 
TRAC Research Questionnaire
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11. Does the company provide a channel through which employees can report 
suspected breaches of anti-corruption policies and does the channel allow for 
confidential and/or anonymous reporting (whistle-blowing)?
Score_____
12. Does the company carry out regular monitoring of its anti-corruption program 
to review the programmer’s suitability, adequacy and effectiveness and implement 
improvements as appropriate?
Score_____
13. Does the company have a policy on political contributions but either prohibits such 
contributions or if it does not, requires such contributions to be publicly disclosed?
Score_____
II. Organisational Transparency
1. Does the company disclose all of its fully consolidated subsidiaries?
Score_____
2. Does the company disclose percentages owned in each of its fully consolidated 
subsidiaries?
Score_____
3. Does the company disclose countries of incorporation for each of its fully 
consolidated subsidiaries?
Score_____
4. Does the company disclose countries of operations for each of its fully 
consolidated subsidiaries?
Score_______
5. Does the company disclose all of its non-fully consolidated holdings?
Score_____
6. Does the company disclose percentages owned in each of its non-fully 
consolidated holdings?
Score_____
7. Does the company disclose countries of incorporation for each of its non-fully 
consolidated holdings?
Score_____
8. Does the company disclose countries of operations for each of its non-fully 
consolidated holdings?
Score_____
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III. Country-by-Country Reporting
1. Does the company disclose its revenues/sales in country X?
Score_____
2. Does the company disclose its capital expenditure in country X?
Score_____
3. Does the company disclose its pre-tax income in country X?
Score_____
4. Does the company disclose its income tax in country X?
Score_____
 5.   Does the company disclose its community contribution in country x?
 Score______
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